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COURT
OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL

HOLLI TELE"ORD
Plaintiff /Appellant

vs .

Defendants/ Respondents

Honor

1 .,
· • Oneida County
Stephan S . Dunn, '
r_-

J

ge

Attorney for Appellant
H

,

Attorney for Respondent
HO" L

•P

IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO

VOLUME II
HOLLI TELFORD

Plaintiff/Appellant
vs.
SANDRA COPELAND; ADMITRA MILLS; JEANETTE HAR.MON; CODY KELLY; PAUL
KELLEY JR; THE ESTATE OF PAUL KELLEY SR; SMITH COUNTY TRUSTEE; TAX
ASSESSOR GARY BARBER; SMITH COUNTY; ARTIE ROSS; ATTORNEY TAB BEALL;
LAW OFFICE OF PURDUE, BRANDON, FIELDER, COLLINS & MOTT; LISA NEILSON
AND DOES 1 - 10

Defendants/Respondents.

Appealed.from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District,
of the State ofIdaho, in and for Oneida County
Honorable Stephen S. Dunn, District Judge

Oneida County Case CV-2011-66
Holli Telford (Pro Se)
10621 South Old Hwy. 191
Malad, ID 83252

Attorney for Appellant
Stephen L. Adams
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP
P.O. Box 7426
Boise, ID 83707-7426

Attorney for Respondent
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ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
WAIVER OF CLERK'S RECORD FEE

05/03/2012

473

III

ORDER VACATING HEARING

08/24/2011

261

II

PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO THE
DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS TO
DISMISS SUPPORTED BY: (1) THE
AFFIDAVIT OF HOLLI TELFORD,
(2) THE AFFIDAVIT OF L.A. GREER,
(3) THE AFFIDAVIT OF ELHAM
NEILSEN, (4) THE AFFIDAVIT OF KIM
VOGT, (5) THE AFFIDAVIT OF
S. DURFEE, (6) VERIFIED RESPONSE
TO COURT ORDER DATED AUGUST
18, 2011 CROSS MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

09/01/2011

264

II

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
DISMISS, MOTION TO QUASH AND
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

08/18/2011

153

I

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
DISMISS, MOTION TO QUASH AND
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

08/18/2011

162

I

REQUEST FOR CLERK'S ENTRY OF
DEFAULT AND DEFAULT
JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO IDAHO
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
RULE 55 (a) AND (b)(l)-ADMITRA
MILLS

06/27/2011

43

I

REQUEST FOR CLERK'S ENTRY OF
DEFAULT AND DEFAULT
JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO IDAHO

ALPHABETICAL INDEX - 8
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RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
RULE 55 (a) AND (b)(l)-ARTIE
ROSS

06/27/2011

111

I

REQUEST FOR CLERK'S ENTRY OF
DEFAULT AND DEFAULT
JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO IDAHO
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
RULE 55 (a) AND (b)(l) CODY
KELLY

06/27/2011

74

I

REQUEST FOR CLERK'S ENTRY OF
DEFAULT AND DEFAULT
JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO IDAHO
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
RULE 55 (a) AND (b)(l)-PAUL
KELLEY JR.

06/27/2011

63

I

REQUEST FOR CLERK'S ENTRY OF
DEFAULT AND DEFAULT
JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO IDAHO
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
RULE 55 (a) AND (b)(l)-SANDRA
COPELAND

06/27/2011

52

I

REQUEST FOR CLERK'S ENTRY OF
DEFAULT AND DEFAULT
JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO IDAHO
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
RULE 55 (a) AND (b)(l)-SMITH
COUNTY TRUSTEE

06/27/2011

96

I

REQUEST FOR CLERK'S ENTRY OF
DEFAULT AND DEFAULT
JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO IDAHO
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
RULE 55 (a) AND (b)(l)-THE ESTATE
OF PAUL KELLEY SR.

06/27/2011

85

I

ALPHABETICAL INDEX - 9
Oneida County Case CV-2011-66
Supreme Court #39878-2012

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION AND REQUEST
FOR 54(b) CERTIFICATE, FILED
OCTOBER 18, 2011

11114/2011

359

II

VERIFIED COMPLAINT

06/06/2011

22

I

VERIFIED PLAINTIFF'S REPLY RESPONSE
TO THE DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION
TO PLAINTIFF'S I.R.C.P. RULE
l l(a)(2)(B) MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF THE COURT'S
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ENTERED IN
FAVOR OF GARY BARBER, TAB
BEALL, LAW OFFICES OF PURDUE,
BRANDON, FELDER, COLLINS &
MOTT, A_ND SMITH COUNTY
11/21/2011

392

III

VERIFIED RESPONSES TO COURT ORDER
DATED AUGUST 18, 2011 AND
OPPOSING COUNSEL'S OBJECTION
TO CONTIN1JANCE OF THIS CASE
FILED ON AUGUST 16, 2011

192

II
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HOLLI TELFORD
AKA HOLLI LUNDAHL
10621 S. Old Hwy 191
Malad, Idaho 83252

I

.

__ Q.~~~_J''f.
Lfi-31P' ·.,.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DLSTBl.CT~ ..:.;~~-~~-~FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF ONEIDA

HOLLI TELFORD
Case No. CV 2011 -- 00066
Plaintiff

vs.
SANDRA COPELAND, et al.

VERIFIED
RESPONSES TO COURT ORDER DATED
AUGUST 18, 2011 AND OPPOSING
COUNSEL'S OBJECTION TO CONTINUANCE
OF THIS CASE FILED ON AUGUST 16, 2011
A VERIFICATION IS ATTACHED TO THIS
RESPONSE TO CONVERT THIS RESPONSE
INTO A SWORN STATEMENT

Defendants

COMES NOW Plaintiff Holli Lundahl to Respond to the Defendant's Objection
to Plaintiffs Motion To Continue the instant proceedings as ordered by this Court on August
18,2011.

I.

UNCONTROVERTED FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

On August 9, 2011,

'
1
l

3 ~ J~l

the Sheriff of Oneida County, Idaho and 5 deputy

officers conducted an illegal search and seizure of plaintiffs abode under a "general search
warrant" proscribed under the Fourth Amendment.

See Voss v. Bergsgaard, 774 F.2d 402,

404 (10th Cir. 1985) (The particularity requirement under the Fourth Amendment ensures
that the search is confined in scope to particularly described evidence relating to a specific
crime set forth in the warrant and for which there is probable cause.).

'These requirements

prevent "general, exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings." Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564, 91 S. Ct. 2022 (1971).

See also USA v.

Albert Foster Jr., 100 F.3d 846 (1 Qth Cir. 1996) (It is beyond dispute, that the officers in this
case viewed the warrant issued by the state judge as a general warrant and executed the

0

~

h~

warrant in accord with those views.

Because the officers here flagrantly disregarded the

terms of the warrant in seizing property "in general",
undermined

and

"the particularity requirement was

[the otherwise] valid warrant was transformed into a "general warrant"

proscribed by the Fourth Amendment and thereby required suppression of all evidence
seized under that warrant" citing

Medlin II, 842 F.2d at 1199 (10th Cir. 1989). The evil that

this circuit addressed in Medlin II was the use of an otherwise valid warrant to conduct a
general search. With this particular evil in mind, the court held that blanket suppression

was mandated when a warrant was executed to perform in reality a general
search of the target's property.

Our Supreme Court has observed: "It is familiar

history that indiscriminate searches and seizures conducted under the authority of 'general
warrants' were the immed- iate evils that motivated the framing and adoption of the Fourth
Amendment." Payton v. New York, 445 US 573, 583 (1980). This Amendment exists in
recognition of "[t]he tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain
conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions,"

Marron v. United

States, 275 U.S. 196 (1927). The particularity requirement guarantees "[a]s to what is to
be taken,

nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant." Id.

Stanford v. State of Texas, 379 US 476 (1965) ("The
in a warrant

indiscriminate sweep of language

is constitutionally intolerable.") A warrant that includes the dangerous

phrase, "any and all data, including but not limited to" a list of items, turns a computer
or other search warrant into an unconstitutional "general warrant."

United States v. Fleet

Management Ltd., 521 F. Supp. 2d 436, 443-44 (E.D. Pa. 2007); see also Otero, 563 F.3d at
1132 (warrant authorizing seizure of "any and all information and/or data"
particularity requirement.).

fails

the

United States v. Hunter, 13 F. Supp. 2d 574, 584 (D. Vt. 1998)

(concluding that warrant to seize "[a)ll computers" was not sufficiently particular where
description "did not indicate the specific crimes for which the equipment was sought, nor were
the searching instructions embedded into the probable cause affidavit incorporated by
reference into the warrant.")
2.

After plaintiff identified the facial defects in the general search warrant

subsequent to the officers reading the whole of the warrant to plaintiff while standing on the
outside of the locked screen storm door to plaintiff's home, and accordingly denying entry into
her home based on those defects which effected the validity of the warrant,

the officers

kicked in plaintiffs screen storm door and forciably entered plaintiff's home.
3.

The officers handcuffed plaintiff to a chair in plaintiff's home office while the

officers executed a general search of plaintiffs and other third persons properties,

home,

outbuildings, barn and vehicles ; searches that were unattended by any resident member
because plaintiff had been handcuffed to a chair and barracaded into a corner of her home
office during the search.

The officers broke or cut off

locks to cabinet doors, security

drawers and to outbuildings in order to seize items securely locked in these structures and for
which officers were given no consent either by plaintiff or other third persons to search and
seize these items which were locked away from plain view.

See 'People v. Gonzalez, 51

Cal.3d 1179, 1260, 800 P.2d 1159, 1206, 275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 776 (1990), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 835, 112 S. Ct. 117, 116 L Ed. 20 85 (1991)

(" Without clear consent, the government

does not have the right to 'fish' through private and privileged files to investigate possible
crimes".).
4.

Part of the items also seized were all of plaintiffs case files including

mailed pleadings and responsive pleadings;
proving plaintiffs cases at jury trial;
self authenticated evidence;

electronic data from non-party witnesses constituting

electronically recorded phone messages from opposing parties

establishing contact with the jurisdiction;
work product,
strategies, etc.

original evidentiary documents in support of

witness communications,

electronic and documentary data memorializing
investigatory matters for the cases and litigation

The entirety of the files pertaining to this case were seized by the sheriff's

office; thereby raising serious questions as to whether opposing counsel was involved with
the illegal seizure of plaintiffs protected and privileged materials in order to obstruct
prosecution of the within case.
5.

Plaintiff complained about and vocally objected to the illegal searches and

seizures of hers and other third person's properties to which
attorney.

plaintiff held

powers of

Plaintiff also demanded an electronic copy of all files on hers and others

computers so that plaintiff would not be prejudiced by the seizure of these items and be forced
to default on her pending civil and criminal traffic cases.
Westheimer Road,

See In re Search of 5444

2006 WL 1881370, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Jul. 6, 2006) (the Government is

required to provide the

property owner with an electronic copy of seized computer files;

If the Government fails to do so then the defendant has an obligation to file a demand for
return of the property because the Government's actions will be deemed unreasonable). See
Ramsden v. United States, 2 F.3d 322, 325 (9th Cir. 1993) (seized property will be returned if
the government's continued possession is unreasonable.).
6.

Because plaintiff complained about these unlawful takings of her properties

and the properties of third persons to which plaintiff held lawful possession,

plaintiff was

arrested for obstructing a police officer in the performance of his search duties and
incarcerated in Bannock county jail.
7.

When Holli returned to her home three days later after being released on

OR, her home and outbuildings were left unsecured and it appeared that in addition to the
items seized under the general search warrant, the property had been stripped of removable
non -- fixed items.
took place,

Whether all items were taken by the sheriffs office or a subsequent theft

is anybody's guess.

The point is,

the sheriff had no lawful right to search

plaintiffs premises, much less arrest plaintiff for objecting to the illegal taking of hers and
others properties lawfully in plaintiffs possession ; so if a theft took place afterwards, it was
a predicament caused by the Sheriffs illegal actions at the outset.
8.

Plaintiff immediately filed a handwritten motion to continue the within case.

Plaintiff was unable to secure a sworn affidavit in support of the motion (an issue raised in
opposing counsel's paragraph 2 of his Objection to plaintiffs motion for continuance),
because the sheriffs office seized all of plaintiffs identification cards, bank cards and credit
cards at the time of the search, and plaintiff needed an identification card for presentation to a
notary to obtain a sworn affidavit.

The only notary that could have executed a sworn

statement for plaintiff based on that notary's personal knowledge of the identify of plaintiff,
was this court's clerk Dianne Skidmore.
declaration for plaintiff,

When Ms. Skidmore was approached to notarize a

Ms. Skidmore informed plaintiff that she was instructed by

an

unidentified authority after the search, not to execute anymore notaries for plaintiff. Plaintiff
was thus forced to obtain new identification in order to execute a sworn notary before a
person

having
9.

no familiarity with
On August 13, 2011,

plaintiff.
plaintiff returned to her property with a borrowed

desktop computer which she hooked up to her internet cable.

When Holli attempted to use

the internet, .she received security warnings from various browsers. See exhibit "1" attached
for computer messages admitting that Holli's internet access had been blocked.
these warnings,

In spite of

Holli proceeded with accessing the internet and a virus was immediately

sent to the attached computer causing this borrowed computer to crash. Holli has since
been using wifi connections .at McDonalds to access the internet
10.

In paragraph 1 of page 2 of opposing counsel's Objection To Continuance,

counsel cites the wrong rule which authorized

opposing counsel's

motions to dismiss.

Because plaintiffs copies of opposing counsel's motions to dismiss were seized during the

illegal search,

plaintiff obtained additional copies from the court's file to confirm that the

whole of all declarations and the memorandum filed by opposing counsel assert authority to
dismiss plaintiff's complaint under l.R.C.P. Rule 12, not rule 56.

Plaintiff therefore contends

that rule 7 (b)(3) (B) or (E) controls the time limitations for rule 12(b) motions to dismiss. Rule
7(b)(3). Time limits for filing and serving motions, affidavits and briefs, provides in part:
(B) When a motion is supported by affidavit(s), the affidavit(s) shall be served
with the motion, and any opposing affidavit(s) shall be filed with the court and
served so that it is received by the parties no later than seven (7) days before
the hearing.
(E) Any brief submitted in support of a motion shall be filed with the court and
served so that it is received by the parties at least fourteen (14) days prior to the
hearing. Any responsive brief shall be filed with the court and served so that it
is received by the parties at least seven (7) days prior to the hearing. Any reply
brief shall be filed with the court, and served so that it is received by
the parties, at least two (2) days prior to the hearing.
Opposing Counsel asserts that because his motions to dismiss are subject to being
converted to summary judgment motions given he filed affidavits with his motions to reach
Rule 12(b)(6) matters in plaintiffs complaint on their merits, that this procedural manuever
changed the timeline in which plaintiff was to respond to the defendant's motions or be
deemed defaulted.

Plaintiff disagrees.

Rule 7 refers to the filing of affidavits in support of

motions and requires that responsive briefs and opposing affidavits be filed 7 days before the
scheduled hearing date.

Plaintiff contends Rule 7 controlled the time limitations for filing

responsive breifs, not rule 56.
In researching case law to interpret this issue, the only case plaintiff could find
was In the adoption of John Doe v. Idaho Dept. of Health And Welfare, Docket no. 37936
(Idaho Supreme Court, 2011 ).

The Idaho Supreme Court found that the Department had

filed a motion to dismiss under l.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) along with an affidavit by its attorney stating
that the Department would not consent to the Does adopting A.H.

Does filed a timely

opposition . The hearing was held 14 days later, and the magistrate court indicated that it
was treating the motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment under LR.C.P.
because it was considering the Department's affidavit.

56(c)

The Civil Rules provide that if matters

outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, a motion under l.R.C.P.
12(b)(6) shall be treated as one for summary judgment. l.R.C.P. 12(b). Glaze v. Deffenbaugh,
144 ldaho 829, 831, 172 P.3d 1104, 1106 (2007). Because the district court considered the

Department's affidavit in its decision, the Court properly treated the matter as an order
granting summary judgment. Here, the Supreme Court affirmed that it was within the courts
discretion to consider or exclude affidavits, and that if the affdavits were considered, then
the judgment would be converted to a Rule 56 judgment.

In the case at bar, opposing

counsel is purporting to revoke the court's discretionary powers to consider or exclude the
affdavits;

a necessary predicate to converting the proceeding into a summary judgment

proceeding. Therefore, Rule 7 controls the time limitations on these proceedings.
This conclusion would be supported by the Idaho Supreme Court's ruling in
Parkside Schools v. Bronco Elite Arts,

177 P.3d 390 (Idaho Supreme Ct. 2008) .

Here

Parkside filed a motion to dismiss without prejudice under Rule 41 (a)(1) which provides for
filing a "Notice of Dismissal", not a motion.

The Court found that l.R.C.P. 7(b)(3) controls

the procedure to be employed with the filing of "any motion", excepting motions for summary
judgment and given the district court ignored the provisions under rule 7(b)(3), the high court
overturned the dismissal corder and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Given the foregoing, Plaintiffs responses for the August 19, 2011 hearing were
not due until August 11, 2011,

not August 5, 2011 as alleged by opposing counsel.

Nevertheless this issue is moot because counsel amended the hearing date to August 26,
2011.
Following the foregoing rules, plaintiff's response brief and remainder opposing
affidavits would not have been due until

August 19, 2011 - under the 7 day rule - for a

hearing scheduled for August 26, 2011.
Nevertheless,

plaintiff does not have access to a paid law library like counsel

does. Moreover, the only public law library in the state is located in Boise Idaho, more than 7
hours drive from plaintiff's house located in a rural community on the east side of Idaho.
Consequently plaintiff's resources are limited to what plaintiff can locate online and it takes
considerably more time to locate those resources online, if any can be found.

At the time

the Oneida County Sheriff's office illegally searched and seized plaintiff's abode and
properties in a seeming attempt to obstruct plaintiff's access to the courts by stealing plaintiff's
case files, among other illegal actions, plaintiff had invested more than two weeks of online
research in an opposing brief for this case. In fact, at the time the sheriffs came knocking on
plaintiff's door, plaintiffs was in the process of editing her response brief for this case and had
intended on filing the response brief by the end of the day on August 9, 2011.

When the

officers made clear their intent to seize all of plaintiff's case files and computers etc., plaintiff

pleaded with the officers to tender her an electronic copy of all files on her computer so that
plaintiff could complete her response brief in this and other cases plaintiff is presently
litigating.

The officers refused and hauled plaintiff off to jail for obstructing an officer in the

performance of a search and seizure duty. The officers then seized everything from plaintiff's
location by breaching the security devices plaintiff had in place.
According to the foregoing, plaintiff's responsive documentation would not
have been subject to be stricken because it was untimely at any time before the seizure of
plaintiff's documentation on August 9, 2011.
11.

Because no legal reason existed for the seizure of plaintiffs privileged

materials as it applied to this proceeding, it would be very interesting indeed if the defendants
reply papers seek any collateral advantage from the illegal search and seizure of plaintiff's
properties on August 9, 2011.
12.
continuance,

In paragraph 2 of opposing Counsel's objection to the Plaintiff's motion for

counsel complaints that Plaintiff has not provided sworn statements regarding

the events which resulted in plaintiffs motion for continuance.

Plaintiff has now obtained

new identification and is able acquire a notary to take plaintiffs oath regarding this matter and
said notary's jurat is affixed to the verification summing up this response which is attested as
true and correct under penalty of perjury.
13.

On August 13, 2011, plaintiff filed a motion to disqualify Magistrate Evans

from sitting on the Obstruction of Jutice prosecution re the illegal search and seizure
performed on plaintiff's property commencing August 9, 2011.

On August 18, 2011, the trial

court administrator disqualified Magistrate Evans and assigned Magistrate Laggis to plaintiff's
criminal case. See exhibit "2" attached for reassignment order.
14.

On August 22, 2011, plaintiff herein filed an ex parte mandamus petition in

the criminal case, petitioning in part for the immediate return of all properties illegally seized
from plaintiff's residence from August 9, 2011 through August 12, 2011. That Mandamus
petition is attached hereto as exhibit "3".

Plaintiff has placed her mandamus petition before

the assigned court on an emergency and expedited basis.

As soon as Magistrate Laggis

grants the petition, plaintiff will have access to her illegally seized properties taken in this
case ... assuming the bailees prefer to avoid a criminal contempt charge.
Laggis denies plaintiff's mandamus petition,

If Magistrate

then the denial order is a final order subject to

immediate appeal before the Idaho Supreme Court; an election that plaintiff will exercise. As
soon as plaintiff obtains custody of her stolen documentary and electronic files,

plaintiff will

be able to prosecute this case in spite of the pending obstruction case given plaintiff has also
sought a protective order against further search and seizures. The defendants should not be
permitted to take advantage of the illegal search and seizure given it is reasonably suspicious
that these defendants may have colluded with the Sheriff's office and sitting prosecutor to
steal

plaintiffs records regarding this

case for the purpose of obstructing same.

If any prejudice exists in this case, it exists to plaintiff, not any defendant.

15.

For example, as averred in her filed affidavit in Opposition to the Defendant's Motion To
Dismiss,

Holli attested that she had borrowed funds to expedite the purchase of the

properties at issue in this case.

Holli obtained a letter of credit from her bank confirning

Holli's loan credits to be applied towards the sales transactions at issue. That letter of credit
is found at exhibit "2" attached to Holli's affidavit. Exhibit "4" attached to Holli's affidavit is the
electronic confirmation by the lawfirm of Linebarger, Goggan, Blair and Sampson LLP ( the
lawfirm admittedly constructing the deed to be transferred to plaintiff upon signature by Lois
Mosley) verifying that Charlene Fugler from their law office will be emailing plaintiff a copy of
another demand document on plaintiffs letter of credit and then will mail the original of this
demand document to plaintiff for personal presentation to plaintiffs bank.

This lawfirm has

already taken one draw on plaintiff's letter of credit for payment of the home which picture is
attached as exhibit "8" to Holli's affidavit.

This home has been permanently affixed to the

property. Attached to this response as exhibit "4" is yet another original copy of a letter from
plaintiffs bank verifying that $4,214.77 was credited from plaintiffs loan proceeds from
America First Bank and as admitted in the letter of credit, as an initial draw on the entire
transaction, and wire transferred to the Law Offices of

Linebarger, Goggan, Blair and

Sampson LLP in March of 2011. Attached to the letter is the wire transfer transcript identfying
Holli's Idaho address as the applicant for the letter of credit. The Law Offices of Linebarger,
Goggan, Blair and Sampson LLP accepted partial funds for this transaction as Smith County's
contracted agent.

Draws on Letter of Credits permits the applicant to enforce the transaction

subject of the draw. See Synergy Center v. Lone Star Franchising, 63 S.W.3d 561 (Tex.App.Austin, 2001)

(letter of credit is a contract promising payment and can be specifically

enforced or avoided on grounds of breach.) Blickenstaff v. Clegg, Docket n. 29901 (ID, 2004)
(letter of credit is equivalent to a gaurantee of payment.) Loscha Falls LLC v. State, 207 P.3d
963 (Idaho, 2009) (letter of credit was instrument gauranteeing payment of costs).

SRS

Products v. LG Engineering, 994 S.W.2d 380 (Tex.App., 1999) (The beneficiary of the letter
of credit is the seller and the account party is the purchaser. The seller is guaranteed payment

on the transaction through a letter of credit proferred by the pruchaser.). The prejudice exists
to plaintiff because the interest rate for real estate transactions has increased 2% since the
sale was confirmed to plaintiff.

Plaintiff cannot lock the interest rate on her loan until title is

completely conveyed to plaintiff and the property may be used as collateral security for the
letter of credit
In addition, opposing counsel does not deny that plaintiff made significant

16.

improvements to the property after plaintiff was promised and believed she had color of title.
But opposing counsel essentially calls plaintiff a fool for improving property before she had the
deed in hand.

The Idaho Supreme Court in Bach v. Miller, 144 Idaho 142; 158 P.3d 305;

2007 Ida. LEXIS 82 (Idaho 2007) affirmed its ruling in Smith v. Long, 76 Idaho 265, 277, 281
P.2d 483, 491-92 (1955) ,

that occupiers who make improvements to real property in good

faith while believing they had color of title would be entitled to compensation for those
improvements.

Texas law requires a similar result.

The monies expended on those

improvements again came from draws on plaintiffs letter of credit buttressed by the loan in
favor of plaintiff.

Again Plaintiff is prejudiced by ever increasing interest rates because this

matter has not been judicially settled in an expedited manner in plaintiffs favor.
17.

The defendants on the the hand have suffered no prejudice by the within

transaction because they seek to steal plaintiffs properties and have that theft judicially
sanctioned by this court.
18.

With respect to opposing counsel's irregularity claim re plaintiffs statement

that Oneida County Sheriff has the power to shut down plaintiffs internet account, exhibit "1"
attached speaks for itself.

Plaintiff can also email pictures of exhibit "1" which she took

directly from the computer before a virus crashed the borrowed computer. Plaintiff is not a
computer nerd and does not know how officials did what they did,

she only knows it

happened.
19.
internet,

With respect to counsel's assertion that plaintiff can go elsewhere to use the

plaintiff has already admitted that she uses the internet service provided at

McDonalds. Gmail access however has been locked.
20.

As to magistrate Evans being disallowed from sitting on any case naming

plaintiff, that matter is a sealed matter before the judicial misconduct commission.
21.

Furthermore,

opposing counsel complains that they should not have to

expend additional time and resources in this civil case
her criminal case.

becaus~

of plaintiff needing to address

The cases are indeed separate and plaintiff has expeditiously demanded

that her properties relating to this case that were illegally seized on August 9, 2011 be
immediately returned. This requires no additional expenditure from the defendants.
22.

Finally, plaintiff contends that the motions to dismiss submitted by the

defendants may not be ruled on as a matter of law; indeed they are very fact intensive with
respect to the fraud committed by the defendants and introduced into the forum to procure
plaintiff to part with substantial amounts of money based on the defendant's false promises;
actions remedial under Idaho's Consumer Protection act and Idaho's racketeering act.
23.

The defendant's contention that this court should just give this case to the

defendant's because the court has ruled that plaintiff must personally serve the defendants
with the process herein rather than employ the service procedures specifially set forth under
the Idaho Consumer Protection act as it applies to non-resident offenders, lacks merit.

First

the defendants have made a general appearance by pleading that plaintiff cannot state a
cause of action against the defendants on any of her claims as a matter of law.

Given the

defendants have sought affirmative relief from this court by way of asking this court to rule that
plaintiffs claims are frivolous as a matter of law, this court has already acquired personal
jurisdiction over these defendants, and whether service was proper or not, is not a moot
issue as to these defendants.

Moreover as set forth supra, plaintiff did not fail to timely

respond to these defendants motions; plaintiff was clearly obstructed from timely responding.
The only question is, did these defendants have any part in that obstruction?

THIS PART IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Based on the foregoing,

plaintiff requests that this court continue these

proceedings until plaintiff's properties are ordered returned to plaintiff by the newly assigned
magistrate Laggis.

At that time,

plaintiff

will

prepare her response and request oral

argument.

VERIFICATION UNDER OATH
I, Holli Telford, being first duly sworn upon oath, state under penalty of pejury that
each of the foregoing statements of fact and conclusions of law are true and correct, and
that the documents attache.d here~o are true and corrr~ies of the original doc~ments.
~,

Further your afflant saith naught,

'
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

SP.NOY Fl\CER
Nok' 1 °ublic
State 01 Idaho

(

p.,_")

day of August, 2011.

Notary Public

I. J.
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DUSTIN W. SMITH
Oneida County Prosecuting Attorney
30 North 100 West
Malad City, Idaho 83252
Telephone: (208) 766-2201
Facsimile: (208) 766-2202

IN TIIE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF Tiffi
STATE OF IDAHO, IN ANu FOR TIIE COUNTY OF ONEIDA
MAGISTRATE DMSION

******
IN TIIE MATTER OF THE

APPLICATION FOR A
SEARCH W ARRA.~T.

)
)
)
)

CASE NO. - - - - SEARCH WARR~T

).

)

THE STATE OF IDAHO, TO AA1Y SHERIFF, CONSTABLE, MARSHAL OR
POLICEMAN IN THE COUNTY OF ONEIDA, STATE OF IDAHO:
PROOF, by Affidavit having been this day made before me by Sheriff J.P. Semrad of the
Oneida County Sheriff's Department, that there is probable cause to believe that certain property
and/or evidence consisting of information, data, communications, correspondence, electronic
images or data, digital images or data, te:x."t messages, e-mails, electronic or other messages or
communications or information or data, computers, laptop computers, computer hardware,
computer software, computer drives, hard drives, storage devices, disks, CD-ROMS, thumb
drives, jump drives, or similar instruments used or associated with electronic or digital
information or data, routers, modems, and network equipment used to connect computers to the

i('
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internet, items or instrumentalities evidencing v.'ho used, owned, or controlled any of the
aforementioned items together with anything evidencing who created, edited, or deleted such
items such as logs, registry entries, saved usemames and passwords, documents, browsing
history, user profiles, records of use of routers, modems, computers and network equipment used
to

connect to the internet, records or information pertaining to internet protocol addresses,

records of internet activity including firewall logs, caches, browser history and cookies, together
with any similar record or information in whateYer form and by v.ilatever means ~
together with any items, instrumentalities, memory, or drives associated with the same, toget:hcr
with any item, instrumentality, document, writing, drawing, painting, printing, file, or
representation or reproduction thereof, and any mechanism or item used to print or type or create
or alter or be used in conjunction with creating, generating, altering, forging, reproducing,
publishing or conveying any written or electroajc items or instruments, v.hlch may exist in, on,
1--·

upon, or within a residence or home, white siding _and blue roof, and outbuildings, sheds,

garages, and storage areas appurtenant thereto, located at 10621 South Old Highway 191, Malad
City, Oneida County, Idaho, the property of Holli Telford, Holli Lundahl, R.M. Telford, Ruth
Marlene Telford, James Keddington, and/or Marie Marchant, together with any
instrumentalities, and/or any indicia, evidence, item, information, material or instrumentality
which indicates use, possession, ownership, dominion, control, connection with, or distribution
of any of the above mentioned property or items, and the Court having specifically hereby

warrant is easily concealed and/or destroyed in a very short period of time.

YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED, at any time of the day and/or night to make

\

immediate search of the above-described item for the items or evidence descnlied above, and if
you find the same or any part thereof, to bring it forthwith before me at the Oneida County
Courthouse in the City of Malad, Oneida County, Idaho.
RETURN of this Warrant is to be made to the above-entitled Court within ten (10) days
from the date hereof.
GIVEN UNDER.MY HAND and DATED this

2_l!f;, o~, 2011.

~~
Magistrate Division
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Search Warrant for the Vehicle of Ti1nothy McVeigh
The file includes a list of items found in the vehicle

(May 5, 1995)
States District Court
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
!APPLICATION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
In the matter of the search of AUTOMOBILE LOCATED AT 1977 MERCURY I ,
:MARQUIS AUTOMOBILE LOCATED AT 1009 N.W 4TH STREET
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA
I, Henry C Gibbons, being duly sworn depose and say I am a Special Agent.
Federal Bureau oflnvestigation, and have reason to believe that on the premises
known as, AUTOMOBILE: Yellow 1977 Mercury Marquis, currently located at
1009 N W. 4th Street, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, in the Western District of
Oklahoma, there is now contained certain property, namely yellow 1977 Mercury
Marquis, and for which a comprehensive forensic examination of its contents
could reveal items. including but not limited to, hair, fibers, oil, fuel, soil, grass,
chemicals and fingerprints which has been used as the means of committing a
' criminal offense and which is property that constitutes evidence of the
commission of a criminal offense specifically a violation of Title 18, United
States Code, Sectlon 844(£).The facts to support a finding of Probable Cause
areas follows: See attached Affidavit of Special Agent Henry C. Gibbons, Federal
Bureau of Investigation, which is incorporated by reference herein.Continued on
· the attached sheet and made a part hereof
HENRY C. GBBONS
Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation

.Sworn to before me and subscribed in my presence on this 5th day of May, 1995,
Iat Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.
DAVID L. RUSSEL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

AFFIDAVIT
I, HENRY C. GIBBONS, being duly sworn, Hereby state that I am an agent v.rith
the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation, having been so employed for 26 years and as
such am vested with the authority to investigate violations of federal laws,
inciuding Title 18, United States Code, Section 844(£) This affidavit is submitted
in support of a search warrant for a 1977 yellow Mercury Marquis in the
pcssession of the Federal Bureau ofinvestigation(FBI). FUrther, Affiant states:
1 The follomng information was received by the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation
lduring the period Apri' 19, 1995 to May 4, 1995.
!2, On April 19, 1995, a powerful exploslve device detonated in front of the
1
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jAlfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, OY-Jahoma, at
approximately 9:00 a.m. Among the many people killed by the bombing are
employees of the numerous federal agencies which had offices in the building.
3. Investigation by Federal agents at the scene of the explosion has determined
that the explosive was contained in a 1993 Ford truck O\vned by Ryder Rental
Company. a. A partial vehicle identification number (VIN) was found at the scene
of the explosion and determined to be from a part of the truck that contained the
explosive device. 57/5/45 B. The Vin which was completely redonstructed was
traced back to a truck owned by Ryder Rentals of Miami, Florida. c. Ryder
Rentals informed the FBI that the truck was assigned to a rental company known
as Elliot's Body Shop in Junction City Kansas.
4. The rental agent at Elliot's Body Shop in Junction City_was intervied by the
FBI_ on April 19, 1995, and advised that two persons had rented the truck on
April 17, 1995. The individual who signed the rental agreement provided the
following informatlon: a. the person who signed the rental agreement identified
himself as Bob Kling, SSAN 962-42-9694, South Dakota driver's license number
YF942A6, and provided a home address of 428 Maple Drive, Omaha, Nebraska,
telephone 913-238-2425. The person listed the destination as 428 Maple Drive,
Redfield, South Dakota. b. Subsequent investigation conducted by the F3I
determined all that information to be false.
5. An employee of Elliot's Body Shop in Junction City, Kansas, identified
Timothy McVeigh from a photographic array as the person who rented a Ryder
truck on April 17, 1995, and signed the rental agreement.
6. An employee of the Dreamland Motel in Junction City, Kansas, identified
Timothy McVeigh as a guest at the motel from April 14, 1995, through April 18,
1995. This employee, when sho"WD. a photo lineup identified Timothy McVeigh's
picture as the individual who registered at the motel under the name of Tim
McVeigh, listed his automobile as a Mercury bearing an Arizona license plate,
and provided a Michigan address, onNorthVan Dyke in Decker Michigan. 7. On
April 17, 1995, Trmothy James McVeigh was arrested in Noble County,
IOklahoma, on traffic and weapons offenses and was thereafter incarcerated on
Ithose charges in Perry, Oklahoma. McVeigh's arrest occurred approximately
60-70 miles north o Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, approximately 1 hour and 2o
minutes
after the April 19, 1995, explosion that damaged the Alfred P. Murrah
1
!Federal Building. At the time of his arrest, McVeigh was driving a 1977 yellow
Mercury Marquis.
8. On Ap-il 21, 1995, a criminal complaint was filed charging Timothy James
McVeigh with a violation of 18 U.S.C. 844 f) based on his involvement of the
bombing of the Murrah Federal Building. Later that day, McVeigh was taken into
federal custody.
I9. On April 27, 1995, a prelinlinary hearing was held on this charge, evidence
1was presented and the federal magistrate judge found that there was probable
I~ause to believe that an offense had been committed and that McVeigh committed
1

1
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[to believe McVeigh did not act alone in committing this offense: a. The employee
at Elliot's Body Shop in Junction City, Kansas, where the truck subsequently used
as the bomb vehicle was rented, has advised that the vehicle was picked up by
1
two persons; b. Two witnesses at the scene of the Alfred P Murrah building on
April 19, 1955, observed a person believed to be Timothy James McVeigh with
another person departing the area of the Murrah Building shortly before the
bombing. One of these witnesses observed the person they believed to be
Timothy James Mc Veigh leave the area in a yellow or cream-colored Mercury;
11. Supervisory Special Agent(SSA) James T. Thurman, Chief, Explosives Unit
Washngton, D C , Bomb Data Center, FBI Laboratory, advised that: a the bomb
which detonated in front of the Murrah Federal Building on April 13, 19949,
contained a high explosive main charge initiated by as yet unknown methods; b.
an explosive device of the magnitude which exploded in Oklahoma Cily on April
19, 1995, would have been constructed over a period of time utilizing a large
quantlty of both paraphernalia and materials, which may have included, but not
been limited to, the following: fertilizer, fuel oil, chemicals, dynamite, military
explosives, detonators (blasting caps), electrical or non-electrical fusing systems,
· wires, batteries, timing devices, burning type fuse, mixing and other containers. c.
The construction of an explosive device similar to the one believed to have
caused the damage to the Murrah Building would necessarily have involved the
efforts of more than one person. '
12. On. April 21, 1995, United States District Judge David L. Russell authorized
a search warrant for the 1977 Mercury Marquis based upon an application and
affidavit of the United States Among the items located during the course of the
search of the 1977 yellow Mercury Marquis were human hairs of value for
· comparison purposes of more than one person.
13. On May 2, 1995, FBI Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) Richard S. Hahn
advised affiant that during the course of the initial search, a test for latent
. fingerprints utilizing Cyano Acrylate was not conducted. SSA Hahn advised that
the Cyano Acrylate search procedure can produce latent finger prints of value
which other tests cannot produce.
[14. A comprehensive forensic processing and examination of the vehicle and its
contents could reveal hair, fibers, oil, fuel, soil, grass, chemicals and fingerprints
which could be used to identify the presence of other persons present in the
vehicle with Timothy James McVeigh and/or the presence of chemicals which
could be used in the construction of the explosive device, and/or could be used to
place the vehicle at locations where the explosive device may have been
constructed, and/or could provide other evidence of the relationship of the vehicle
and its owner to the explosion in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Moreover, during
the course of this investigation, evidentiary items, including man-made and
natural fibers, hairs, cloth, oil, fuel, other compounds, soil and grass have been
seized from the Dreamland motel room, described paragraph 6 where Mc Veigh
Istayed, and from a location at Geary State Fishing Lake, approximately six miles
Isouth of Junciton City, Kansas, where witnesses described seeing a Ryder truck
parked next to a pickup truck in an unpaved area on April 18, 1995. The pickup
1
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·truck was described as a 1980-1987 Chevrolet or GMC truck, dark blue or brown
in color, Vvith possibly a white camper shell back. Terry Nichols, who has
admitted that he is an associate of Mc Veigh, and who has stated that he loaned his
pickup truck to McVeigh on April 18, 199 5, in Junction City, Kansas, owns a
1984 GMC blue pick-up truck with a white camper top. An additional,
comprehensive processing and examination of the yellow 1977 Mercury Marquis
is needed in order to obtain representative samples and quantities capable of
Ianalysis for purposes of comparison with the items described above.
15. Based upon the aforesaid, your affiant believes that probable cause exists to
believe that the yellow 1977 Mercury Marquis, which is currently in FBI custody,
is property which has been used as a means of committing a violation of Section
I844(f) of Title 18, United States Code. Affiant also believes that probable cause
exists to believe that the yellow 1977 Mercury Marquis currently in FBI custody
consists of and contains items, both visible and latent, which are evidence of a
criminal offense, namely Section 844(f) of Title 18, United States Code, or which
can be compared to items seized and identified which are such evidence.
16. Based on the aforesaid and Rule 41 (b), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
affiant wishes to seize said vehicle as evidence and to examine and process said
vehicle and its contents Affiant believes there is a probable cause for law
enforcement officials.to conduct laboratory examinations on this vehicle and its
contents for trace evidence materials to associate the vehicle with the bombing of
the Alfred P.Murrah Federal Building, the mixing of explosives and to link said
•vehicle to any other coconspirators. Further your a:ffiant sayeth not.
Henry C. GIBBONS
Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation
ITEMS TO BE SEIZED 1977 MERCURY +MARQUIS
1. Explosive materials and residue including but not limited to the following:
Military explosives, C4, ammonium nitrate, dynamite, water gels, emulsions,
detonating cord, explosive boosters, free flowing powders, including but not
limited to black powder, pyrodex and smokeless powder and explosive detonators
including but not limited to electric and non-electric.
2. Fuzing systems including but not limited to clocks, timers, radio transmltters,
servo motors and components, wires, electncal andlor mechanical switches, time
fuse, chemical delays, andlor any other source of power.

1
1

3. Non-explosive construction materials including but not limited to tape, v.riring,
adhesives, fasteners, containers, nails, staples, or any other matenal necessary to
I assemble IED devices.
4. Non-explosive fragmentation material including nails, screws, wire and other
metal fragment which could be used to enhance the damage effect of the

- 21i -

2f)

Warrant for the serach of Timothy McVeigh's 1977 Mercury Marquis

file://IC :/Users/elham/Desk.'1op/m cveighwarranthtml

I l os1on.
.
1exp
5. IED construction tools which would include but are not limited to scewdrivers,
cnrnpers,wire strippers, knives, pliers, hammers, fingernail clippers, files, electnal
tools such as saws, dulls and presses.
6. Documentation which would include but not limited to schematics, bluepnnts,
receipts for purchase of items, uhow to+ magazines, books and pamphlets which
described construction, design and assembly techniques, directions, maps and
blueprints of target sites and potential target sites, communications, memos and
photographs which would include descriptive infonnation such as telephone
numbers, addresses, affiliations and contact points of individuals involved in a
conspiracy to manufacture, transport and/or detonate the explosive device used at
the Alfred P. Mc:rrah building on April 19, 1995.
7. Any assembled explosive and/or detonation device.
8. Photographs, maps, hotel receipts, rental receipts, notes, ledgers, phone
numbers, address books, commerical transportation receipts, and firearms,
ammunition, digital pager(s), cellular phones, chemical formulas, and/or recipes
for explosives. For which items there is probable cause stated in the Affidavit in
support of the Application for the Search of the 1977 Mercury Marquis, and
which items are evidence and instrumentalities of a violation of 18 U.S.C. + 371
and 844(f).

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FEDERAL BUREAU OF
: INVESTIGATION
page 1/1
date April 21, 1995
1977 yellow Mercury Marquis VIN 2260A613847
Description ofltems:
1 black ball cap from front passenger seat
2 one sheet of paper from front passenger seat
3 one enveloped containing contents unopened from front passenger seat
4 one clipboard form front passenger seat
5 one Wrigley gum ·wrapper from between from passenger seat
6 one pair brown gloves from under passenger seat
7 debris from under rear seat(includes .55)
.8 dry swabbing from door handles and steering wheels
9 dry swabbing from drivers side sun visor
10 white rag from trunk
11 carpeting from trunk
112 dry swabbing from trunk (illegible)
1
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AUG-18-2011

l0:12AM

20M36-7012

FROM-Bannock 6th Dist.Cr!

MSO

P.001/002

F-SB7

IN THE DlSTRlCT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTIRC'!'
OF THc STATE OF IDAHO, lN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF ONEIDA
MAGISTRATE DIVISION
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,

vs.

Filed AT f12lJ!i. O'clock--ftM

) Case No. CR-2011-719

HOLLI LUNDAHL,

)

)
)

Defendant.

) ORDER OF ASSIG1'tr:MENT

TIIE Honorable Dave Evans having disqualfied himself;
TT TS HEREBY ORD£RED that rhe above matter be and hereby is assigned to the
Honorable Paul Laggis for all further proceedings.

IT IS SO ORDERED this August l 8, 2011

Suzanne H. Johnson
Trial CounAdministrator
Sixth Judicial District

DALE HATCH, Bannock County Clerk of the Court
BY, Deputy Clerk

AUG-IMVll

l0:12Ah!

20M3HOl2

FROM-Bannock Sth Dist Crt

T-360

P.002/00Z

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

THERE BY CERTJFY that on the August 1&, 2011, I served a true and correct copy of
the foregoi11g document on the following person(s):
Honorable Dave Evans
Oneida County Magistrate Coun
I 0 Court Street
Malad City, Idaho 83252
QU.S. Mail, postage prepaid
0Hand Delivery (Courthouse Mail)

0Hand Delivery (Courthouse Mail)

0U.S.Mail

(glFax

0Fax

Honorable Paul Laggis
Power County Magistrate Court
543 Bannock Avenue
American Falls, Idaho 83211

QU.S. Mail, postage prepaid
0Hand Delivery (Courthouse Mail)

[2JFax

Ou.s. Mail
01-land Delivery (Courthouse Mail)

OFax

Deputy Clerk

-ZI~'

F-687
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Holli Telford Lundahl
10621 S. Old Hwy 191
Malad Idaho 83252
208-4 73-5800

SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO
ONEIDA COUNTY

Case No. CR 2011-719

STATE OF IDAHO

VERIFIED EX PARTE APPLICATION
FOR
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS.
FOR ORDERS:

Plaintiff

RETURNING ILLEGALLY SEIZED PROPERTY
FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
FOR CRIMINAL CONTEMPT
FOR SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE
FOR PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF HOLLI
FOR REMOVAL OF PROSECUTOR DUSTIN
SMITH, AND;
(7) OTHER EQUITABLE RELIEF

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

vs.

Defendant

COMES NOW Holli Telford Lundahl and PETITIONS this Court EX PARTE for a
Writ of Mandamus directing Oneida County Officials to: (1) Immediately return all of the
defendant's and other third person's properties illegally seized on August 9, 2011; (2) For a
protective order against the illegal use of, interference with, or collateral gain by any illegal
actions taken against Holli and other third persons commencing August 9, 2011 and therafter;
(3) For an Order of Criminal Contempt Order and an Order of imprisonment against anyone
who violates the protective order;
Presumption in favor of Holli;

(4)

(5)

For an Order of Spoliation of Evidence and

For an order removing prosecutor Dustin Smith from

participation as counsel in any action concerning Holli; and (6) For any other equitable relief.

UNCONTROVERTED FACTS
1.

On August 9, 2011,

Oneidc:: county Magistrate David Evans, challenged

ii - I/

d

-22.D-

from sitting on any action naming Holli as a party,
prosecutor

Dustin Smith on

issued a search warrant prepared by

subject matter wherein Prosecutor Dustin Smith was

defendant in a civil suit the defendant

a

HOLLI brought against Oneida County Revenue

officials, DOE sheriff officials and Dustin Smith on April 15, 2011 as State of Idaho, Sixth
Judicial District, Oneida County, case no. 2011- 44 .

The "General Search Warrant"

is

attached hereto as exhibit "1".
2.

Prosecutor Dustin Smith had a pecuniary conflict in interest in acting as

counsel or as a prosecutor in any matter concerning the defendant Holli and third parties
Marie Marchant, James Keddington and Ruth Marlene Telford.

In spite of this

knowing

conflict of interest, Prosecutor Dustin Smith corrupted his office by colluding with Sheriff Jeff
Semrad to abuse the criminal process against Holli by creating an illegal "general search
warrant" which purported to authorize a "fishing expedition" of Holli's and other third
person's properties in search of any incriminating evidence that would support an extortive
criminal prosecution against Holli.
3.

The "General Search Warrant" on its face suffers from wholesale defects

under the fourth amendment, to wit (1)

It does not list the person who is reportedly the

target of the search and allegedly engaging in criminal acitivity;

(2) It does list any crime

giving a magistrate criminal jurisdiction to issue any search warrant;

(3)

It does not

incorporate the probable cause affidavit of Sheriff Jeff Semrad within the body of the search
warrant to test issues of probable cause and the veracity and credibility of Jeff Semrad's
attestments;

(4) It does not draw a nexus between any crime and items to be seized; the

latter which are required to be related to the crime alleged in the warrant; (5) It does not list
items to be seized with any level of particularity;

(6) the warrant instructs officers to seize

anything and every at the property that is documentary or electronic in nature without giving a
legal justification for the seizure;

(7) The warrant was obtained by a conflicted prosecutor;

and (8) The warrant was signed by a Magistrate whom was barred from sitting on any case
naming Holli as a party.
4.

On the early morning hours of August 9, 2011, Sheriff Jeff Semrad and

5 Oneida County officers, appeared at the defendant Holli's front door and knocked on the
door.

Holli opened the wooden part of the door but left the screen storm door shut

officers asked Holli to come outside of her home to speak to these officers.

These

Holli said no.

The officers said they were there to serve a search warrant on Holli's house and outbuildings.
Holli instructed the officers to read the search warrant to her from outside the house.

One of

the officers did so. After the officer finished, Holli inquired into who petitioned for the warrant
and who signed the

warrant.

The doe officer announced that prosecutor Dustin Smith

petitioned for the warrant and that Magistrate David Evans signed the warrant. Holli informed
Sheriff Semrad that the warrant was void on several grounds and stated the grounds set forth
in paragraph 3 supra.
valid warrant if he

Holli then instructed Sheriff Semrad to go back to the court and get a
wanted to search Holli's home and furthermore,

to attach Semrad's

probable cause affidavit to the new properly executed search warrant.
5.

Sheriff Semrad kicked in Holli's screen storm door and he and the other 5

officers forcibly entered into Holli's home.

Sheriff Semrad forcifully pushed Holli up against

the wall and then ordered deputy Williams to handcuff Holli to a chair situated in Holli's office
inside the home;

while the other officers commenced going through Holli's entire home,

outbuildings and cars without any member resident to observe their search activities.
6.

Holli observed that the officers were piling banker size boxes of litigation

files on top of the feeder tray to her copy machine knowing that such conduct would break the
machine.

Holli complained several times.

The officers ignored Holli complaints not to

damage her office equipment.
7.

Holli also complained that the officers were seizing documents WITHOUT

HOLLI'S CONSENT that were protected under various work product, privacy, and witness
communication privileges and which were not in any way related to the suit Holli had pending
against Oneida County.

Ignoring Holli,

the officers seized nearly all of the "litigation"

paperwork Holli had in her home, leaving only "a part of the litigation paperwork" involving
Hollis lawsuit against ELI LILLY dating back to 1991.

Holli complained that the officers had

no right to seize Holli's case files with the purpose of obstructing Holli's fair access to the
courts and Holli's right to present best evidence to a jury.

In response the officers told Holli

to shut up or they would take Holli to Jail
8.

Holli held power of attorney for a number of low income taxpayers. Holli

handled the taxpayers claims through payment of refunds or structured tax payments
contracted under settlements agreements with the IRS.
held custody of the taxpayer's
information;

As part of Holli's client's files, Holli

bank accounts, credit information, and social security

records which were required for IRS tax examinations.

Holli handled all

administrative appeals with the IRS on behalf of her client taxpayers for which Holli held
power of attorney.

Sheriff Semrad seized all of Holli's taxpayer files asserting that Holli had

no right to posess these records.

Holli complained that Sheriff Semrad had no authority to

.31

seize her clients files or to interfere with Holli's powers of attorney with her taxpayer clients.
Sheriff Semrad informed Holli that if Holli gave him the taxpayers phone numbers so that
Sheriff Semrad could contact the taxpayers and verify Holli's status as their power of attorney,
Sheriff Semrad would not take Holli's taxpayer client files. This turned out to be a blatent lie.
Holli did give the phone numbers of her taxpayer clients to a female lieutenant and demand
that this lieutenant contact Holli's taxpayer clients in front of Holli to verify Holli's status as their
representative and attorney in fact

Th~

liuetenant did call several clients in front of Holli and

Holli heard the clients refuse to give consent to the officers to seize their files from Holli's
house.

In spite of Holli's demands that these records not be searched or seized, and the

clients demands that the officers were not to search or seize their private files pr records,
Sheriff Semrad illegally ordered that all of these files be searched and seized.
9.

The officers also siezed all of Holli's computers, software programs,

scanners, internet adaptors, computer external hard drive devices, jump drives, computer
telephone recievers, and any other devices that Holli could use to communicate with others.
Holli complained about these seizures because Holli's work product for her past and pending
civil and criminal cases was on these computers and were memorialzed electronically as
opposed to paper records and Holli feared that the officers would corrupt her electronic files
and make them irretrevable.

Holli asked the officers to transfer copies of her electronic

records to a computer jump drive so that Holli could have her records preserved on another
computer in the event the officers destroyed her electronic files after they seized her hardware
storing these records. The officers refused and at that point they arrested Holli for obstructing
the officers performance of their official duties. They transferred Holli to Bannock County jail.
10.
member

The officers remained at Holli's property unattended by any resident

for possible days given Holli was in jail and does not know when the officers

completed their illegal search and seizures.
11.

While Holli remained in jail, individual Taxpayers contacted by the female

lieutenant during the first day of the search, were re-contacted by Sheriff Semrad in a failed
effort to obtain these

taxpaxer's consents to retain these taxpayers private tax files that

Sheriff Semrad had seized on August 9, 2011 without their consent. In response to Semrad's
post seizure contact, at least two taxpayers wrote Semrad expressly denying consent and
demanding Semrad return their private files to Holli. See these two communication attached
as exhibit "4" hereto.
12.

Holli got out of jail on August 12, 2011. Holli and others appeared at Holli's

32...

property which was left unsecured. The property list authored by Oneida County officials was
taped to Holli's door. Holli entered the building with others and surveyed the condition of her
properties.

Her residence was almost entirely cleaned out of all paper files including case

files and client files, and the only remaining office equipment was the broken copy machine,
outdated computer monitors Holli purchased from Oneida County school district, and hollis
netgear router.

Holli locked up the property and went to her friends house in Utah.

13.

The next day Holli reappeared at her property with a desktop computer she

obained from her friend. Holli hooked up the desktop computer and attempted to access her
Holli received a message from her ISP provider indicating that her

internet account.

"navigation had been blocked",

that there was security certificate problems which allowed

interception of any data Holli obtained on her computer, and when Holli went through her
Firefox brouser,

this browser warned Holli that someone was trying to impersonate Holli's

access information to her website.

See exhibit "3" attached hereto for these security

warnings displayed on desktop computer Holli had borrowed.
14.

Holli accessed her internet provider anyway. Suddenly the computer went

in to download mode. The computer downloaded a virus which crashed the computer.

Holli

has now been remanded to her friends house to use her friends other computer equipment
and ISP services.
15.

Because of Holli's incarceration in jail, Holli defaulted in her appearance in

two civil cases.

Holli contacted the sheriffs office and demanded electronic copies of her files

so that Holli could submit belated process in the defaulted proceedings. The sheriffs office
refused to submit Holli electronic copies of her case files kept on Holli's computer.

The

Sheriff also refused to return the illegally seized tax files and in fact threatened the taxpayers
that

he,

Sheriff

Semrad,

intended

on

obstructing

the

taxpayers

claims.

Based on the foregoing, the defendant now seeks relief from the illegal conduct of
Onieda county officials on an expedited, emergency and ex parte basis.

ARGUMENT

I.

l.R.Cr.P. Rule 41 Provides For The Return of Seized Property
If The Property Was Seized In Violation of The Fourth
Amendment Or The Defendant Will Suffer Harm If The
Property Is Not Returned
A defendant may file a demand to return his property if he believes that the
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seizure of his property violated the Fourth Amendment.
violated,

the seized property must be returned.

If the Fourth Amendment was

See In re Grand Jury Investigation

Concerning Solid State Devices, Inc., 130 F.3d 853, 855-56 (9th Cir. 1997).

Also Rule 41

permits owners to move for a return of their property when the seizure was lawful, but
the movant is "aggrieved
property." Id. At 856.

by the government's continued

possession of the seized

Under Idaho Law, the return for seized property is controlled under

l.R.Cr.P Rule 41.1. Reclaiming property:
At any time after the commencement of a criminal action, any interested
party or person may apply to the trial court for an order permitting a
reclamation by such party or person of exhibits offered or admitted in
evidence, documents or property displayed or considered in connection
with the action, or any property in the possession of any department,
agency or official who is holding such property in connection with the
trial of a criminal action.
Also see Rule 41 (e) Return of property under search:
A person aggrieved by a search and seizure may move the district court
for the return of the property on the ground that the person is entitled to
lawful possession of the property and that it was illegally seized. The
motion or application for the return of the property shall be made in a
criminal action if one is pending, but if no action is pending, a civil
proceeding may be filed in the county where the property is seized or
located. The court shall receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary
to the decision on the application. If the motion or application is granted
the property shall be restored and it shall not be admissible in evidence
at any hearing or trial. If a motion or application for return of property is
made or comes on for hearing after a complaint, indictment or information is filed, it shall be treated as a motion to suppress under Rule 12.
Moreover, if the government's possession of seized property is unreasonable, the
government must return the property immediately. See Ramsden v. United States, 2 F.3d
322, 325 (9th Cir. 1993) (seized property will be returned if the government's continued
possession is unreasonable.

This test requires the court to weigh the government's

interest in continued possession of the property with the owner's interest in the property's
return. United States v. Promises Known as 608 Taylor Ave., 584 F.2d 1297, 1304 (3d Cir.
1978).

If the government has a need for the property in an investigation or prosecution, its

retention of the property generally is reasonable.

But, if the government's legitimate

interests (emphasis added) can be satisfied even if the property is returned, continued
retention of the property would be unreasonable.

See also Standard Drywall, Inc. v. United

States, 668 F.2d 156, 157 n2. (2d CiL 1982)("seizure of privileged documents demonstrates
harm as a matter of law in light of statutory protections against disclosure.");

Moreover,

where the government seizes electronic records, the government's failure to provided a copy
of the seized electronic records is deemed unreasonable. See In re Search of

5444

Westheimer Road, 2006 WL 1881370, at *2 (S.D. Tex. JuL 6, 2006) (the Government is
required to provide the property owner with an electronic copy of seized computer files; If
the Government fails to do so then the defendant has an obligation to file a demand for
return of the property because the Government's actions will be deemed unreasonable);
See In re Grand Jury (Impounded), 138 F.3a 978, 982 (3rd Cir. 1998)("Judicial enforcement of
the work product privilege is required to foreclose the government from further use' of the
seized files.") Id At 982.
As stated supra, the defendant was served with a "general search" warrant
(exhibit "1" attached) at her place of abode on August 9, 2011. The search warranted was
constructed and authored by Oneida County Prosecutor Dustin Smith; the latter whom was a
defendant in the civil rights and abuse of process lawsuit plaintiff filed against Oneida county
officials 4 months earlier on April 15, 2011. The search warrant served on the defendant did
not list the premise to be searched on the caption page of the warrant ; did not allege any
I

crimes defendant herein was alleged to have committed; did not draw a nexus with between
any particular items to be seized any "listed" crime;

did not specifically particularize what

documentary or electronic evidence the officers were required to seize to comply with the
terms of the "search warrant";

purported to authorize a wholesale seizure of any and all

documentary and electronic items kept within the 4 corners of defendant's abode, house,
outbuildings, barn and vehicles, and; omitted the probable cause affidavit of Sheriff Jeff
Semrad thus making it possible for Sheriff Semrad to alter his affidavit before defendant has
had an opportunity to assess same for competent probable cause. Attached hereto as exhibit
"2", is the online search warrant issued on a car owned by Timothy McVey respecting the
Oklahoma bombing. As required, this search warrant had all the contents included to make it
a competent search warrant.
Moreover, all of the properties taken by the government officers were subject
to work product priviledges, witness communication privileges, privacy act privileges, and
most Important of all, could not establish any criminal offense against the defendant.
Based on the foregoing,

the defendant is entitled to a mandamus order directing

Oneida County executive officials to immediately return to defendant Holli Lundahl all of her

properties seized on August 9, 2011 and,

to a protective order which provides that if the

defendant or her clients suffer any prejudice or harm from the unlawful seizure of their
properties, Sheriff Semrad, Prosecutor Dustin Smith or anyone acting through or under them,
will be found in criminal contempt and immediately imprisoned in jail for knowingly acting on
the illegally seized evidence without authority at law.

II.

The Government Executed An Illegal Search And Seizure
On Defendant's Properties As Part Of A "Fishing Expedition"
To Search For Any Incriminating Evidence Against The
Defendant And Possibly To Plant Evidence -- All For The Purpose
Of Obstructing The Defendant's Civil Lawsuit Filed Against
Oneida County Officials, Other Pending Lawsuits And To Punish
Defendant For Prosecuting Civil Rights Claims
A.

Blanket Supression Of Evidence Seized During A
Search Is Authorized When The Officers Execute A
General Search Warrant As A Pretext To Conduct
A Hfishing Expedition" Through The Targets
Private Properties

In State of Idaho v. Belden, Case no. 35284 (Idaho.App. 2009) : the Idaho
appellate court held that the burden to prove a search warrant is invalid is upon the defendant.
State v. Kelly, 106 Idaho 268, 275, 678 P.2d 60, 67 (Ct.App.1984).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Article I, Section 17, of the Idaho Constitution is virtually identical to the Fourth Amendment,
except that "oath or affirmation" is termed "affidavit."
A search is executed in "flagrant disregard" of its terms when the officers so
grossly exceed the scope of the warrant during execution that the authorized search appears
to be merely a pretext for a "fishing expedition" through the target's private property. Same in
United States v. Liu, 239 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2000); United States v. Foster, 100 F.3d 846, 851
(10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Young, 877 F.2d 1099, 1105-06 (1st Cir. 1989). See also
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United States v. Khanani, 502 F.3d 1281, 1289 (11th Cir. 2007) (To be entitled to the
extreme remedy of blanket suppression, the defendant must establish that the seizure of
reported materials proves that the agents executed the warrant in "flagrant disregard" of its
terms. With respect to seizing electronic material, the seizure of storage media commingled
with other information not ·subject to the warrant can lead to a blanket seizure of all property. )
Same in United States v. Le, 173 F.3d 1258, 1269 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v. Matias,
836 F.2d 744, 747-48 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing cases).

When applying for a search warrant,

Probable cause to search requires a nexus between criminal activity and the item to be
seized, and a nexus between the item to be seized and the place to be searched. U.S.
CONST. amend. IV; State

v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 686, 85 P.3d 656, 662 (2004). See also

United States v. Spilotro, 800 F.2d 939, 963 (9th Cir. 1986) ("The Fourth Amendment requires
that a warrant particularly describe both the place to be searched and the person or things to
be seized.

If a warrant is not particular, it can be challenged as too broad." );

Voss v.

Bergsgaard, 774 F.2d 402, 404 (10th Cir. 1985) (The particularity requirement ensures that
the search is confined in scope to particularly described evidence relating to a specific crime
set forth in the warrant and for which there is probable cause.); 'These requirements prevent
"general, exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings." Coolidge

v. New Hampshire, 403

U.S. 443, 467, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564, 91 S. Ct. 2022 (1971);
The 1Oth Circuit has decisioned what will be the ultimate outcome when a general
search warrant is conducted on a USA citizen's home or abode, to wit: blanket supression of
all evidence seized and the inability to proceed on criminal charges arriving from the tainted
search. See USA v. Albert Foster Jr., 100 F .3d 846 (1 Oth Cir. 1996). Here, Foster brought a
motion to suppress all property seized during the search, including the items listed in the
warrant. Following a suppression hearing, the

Honorable Frank H. Seay found that the

officers had exhibited flagrant disregard for the terms of the warrant by conducting a
"wholesale seizure of

Foster's

property amounting to

discovery of incriminating evidence."

a

''fishing expedition for

the

Accordingly, pursuant to the 1Qth Circuit's decision

in United States v. Medlin, 842 F.2d 1194 (10th Cir. 1988) ("Medlin II"),

the district court

ordered the blanket suppression of all evidence seized from Foster's residence, including
those items specifically covered by the search warrant.
district court's order of blanket suppression.
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirmed.

Held:

The United States appealed the

The 1Qth Circuit exercised jurisdiction pursuant
We review de novo the ultimate determination of

the reasonableness of a search under the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Callwood, 66
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F.3d 1110, 1112 (10th Cir. 1995).

It was undisputed that items were taken from Foster's

residence which did not fall within the terms of the warrant. The search of Foster's residence
lasted from 3:25 p.m. until approximately 11 :00 p.m.

Although the warrant specifically

identified the items to be seized, four weapons and marijuana, when the DEA agents left the
residence they took thirty-five items "including various firearms, ammunition, videotapes,
marijuana, drug paraphernalia, and other miscellaneous items." Dist. Ct. Order at 4.

There

was a wholesale seizure of Foster's property amounting to a fishing expedition for the
discovery of incriminating evidence of "any crime."

It is beyond dispute, that the officers in

this case both viewed the warrant issued by the state judge as a general warrant and
executed the warrant in accord with those views.
disregarded

Because the officers here flagrantly

the terms of the warrant in seizing property in general,

"the particularity

requirement was undermined and [the otherwise] valid warrant was transformed into a
"general warranf' proscribed by the Fourth Amendment and thereby requiring suppression
of all evidence seized under that warrant."

Medlin II, 842 F.2d at 1199.

The evil that this

circuit addressed in Medlin II was the use of an otherwise valid warrant to conduct a general
search.

With this particular evil in mind,

the court held that blanket suppression was

mandated when a warrant was executed in flagrant disregard for its terms. This Circuit has
spoken to the issue and has determined that blanket suppression is mandated when the
executing officers flagrantly disregard the particular terms of the warrant. We are bound to
apply that rule of law. See In re Smith, 10 F.3d 723, 724 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that threejudge panel cannot disregard or overrule circuit precedent), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 53 (1994).
Young, 877 F.2d at 1105-06 ("the lawful part of the warrant seems to have been a kind of
pretext for the unlawful part of the warrant").
Our Supreme Court has observed: "It is familiar history that indiscriminate
searches and seizures conducted under the authority of 'general warrants' were the immediate evils that motivated the framing and adoption of the Fourth Amendment." Payton v. New
York, 445 US 573, 583 (1980). This Amendment exists in recognition of "[t)he tendency of
those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful
seizures and enforced confessions," Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 196 (1927).

The

particularity requirement guarantees "fa]s to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the
discretion of the officer executing the warrant" Id.
476 (1965) ('The

indiscriminate

sweep of

Stanford v. State of Texas, 379 US

language

intolerable.")
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in a warrant

is constitutionally

A review of the search warrant at exhibit "1" attached, shows nothing "particular"
on the face of the "general warrant".

First, the warrant doesn't describe the property to be

searched in it's caption as does the search warrant issued against Tim McVey's car in exhibit
"2" attached.

Ttle search warrant claims to be supported by the affidavit of Sheriff Jeff

Semrad, but this probable cause affidavit is not incorporated into the search warrant itself so
that the target of the warrant can determine if the warrant was based on false or omitted
information by Sheriff Semrad in his affidavit.

The warrant then commences to set forth

Sheriff Semrad's belief that certain property and evidence exists at the defendant's house.
The properties described.by Sheriff Semrad is a "laundry list of general properties and items"
found in any normal home where a home business is conducted or where the

home is

arranged on a networking basis that allows numerous users to access the internet, computers
and other networking devices designated to that address.

The warrant does identify the

location to be searched in the body of the warrant; but does not identify any crime supporting
probable cause for the search, nor does it draw a nexus between any crime and the "laundry
list" of items to be seized.

In addition, the warrant does not particularize the items to be

seized as instruments or evidence of any alleged crime - but simply directs the officers to take
everything listed in the warrant.

Finally, the warrant was obtained by prosecutor Dustin

Smith in collusion with Jeff Semrad,
-

4 months after the defendant filed suit against

Prosecutor Dustin Smith charging this prosecutor with conspiracy to violate plaintiffs
constitutional rights to equal protection under the revenue codes, fifth amendment takings
and spoliation of evidence schemes.

A considered analysis of the warrant shows that it was

a "general warrant" issued for the sole purpose of conducting a ''fishing expedition" through
the defendant's and other third persons private properties located at the search site in hopes
of discovering incriminating evidence against Holli and witnesses acting in favor of Holli in
pending

civil

litigation.

As set forth supra, the defendant immediately complained about the defects in the
void warrant after the 2;..{ page warrant was read to the defendant from behind the defendant's
closed screen door.

When the defendant denied the officers entry into her home because

the void warrant was executed by a financially conflicted and vindictive prosecutor and bore
facial defects that sounded a death knell to the invalid warrant, Sheriff Semrad broke through
the defendants screen door and directed his 5 attending officers to handcuff the defendant to
a chair while the officers rummaged through the defendants entire house and curtilege
unattended, looking for any incriminating evidence against Holli and witnesses in Holli's civil

//
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litigations (and possibly planting evidence).

The officers would not allow Holli to videotape

their search of her premises thus suggesting the officers had a great deal to hide. When the
sheriff and his deputies began seizing the Holli's client's tax return files, all of the Holli's
pending civil case files,

and Holli's and others computer equipment and electronic data

devices and files - to force Holli and others into default in their pending civil cases, Sheriff
Semrad directed deputy "rusty" to arrest and incarcerate Holli at Bannock County jail for /
obstruction of an officer in the performance of his duty.

Rusty did arrest the defendant Holli

and remove Holli to the Bannock County jail while the remaining 5 sheriff officials continued to
rummage through Holli's and non-target's properties and commit wholesale seizures of
everything in site without another resident member present to visually monitor the officer's
actions. Moreover, the officers purported to tape a property list to plaintiffs front door, but
the property list omits a number of client files, original Documentary records for pending civil
cases, and electronic equipment and sofurvare.
Because the search warrant served upon Holli was a "general search warrant" in
violation of the particularity requirements of the Fourth Amendment and because the warrant
was used to conduct a fishing expedition at Holli's place of abode in hopes of finding
incriminating evidence against Holli and Holli's witnesses, the entire search was tainted and
illegal and mandates: (1) a "blanket supression order" from this court, (2) an order directing
immediate return of all of Hollis and other third persons properties seized from the abode,
and, (3) a protective order directing that no official use, communicate or interfere with any
matter seized during the illegal search - else that official shall be convicted of criminal
contempt and ordered incarcerated.

B.

Sheriff Semrad Deliberately Failed To Incorporate
His Probable Cause Affidavit Into The Search
Warrant Because He Knew It Was Supported By
False Statements And Omissions That Would Have
Defeated Probable Cause

In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), the United States Supreme Court
held that a defendant is entitled to a Franks evidentiary hearing to challenge probable cause
for a search warrant. If the defendant establishes that the search warrant contained material
omissions or misrepresentations,

the criminal natter must be enjoined.

Franks does not

permit a court to "correct" the affidavit after the warrant has issued or been executed.
United States v. Davis, 714 F.2d 896, 900 (9th Cir.1983)).

(See

See United States v. Barton, 995

F.2d 931, 934-36 (9th Cir. 1992). United States v. Stanert, 762 F.2d 775, 785, amended 769
F.2d 1410 (9th Cir.1985) (demonstration that affiant probably knew that

previous arrest

mentioned in affidavit had not resulted in conviction was sufficient showing that probable
cause affidavit was false.).

The Ninth Circuit has held that proven "misstatements or

o_missions of government officials which are incorporated into an affidavit for a search warrant
establish that probable cause was lacking and strip the affiant of immunity in subsequent civil
rights litigation. United States v. Deleon, 979 F.2d 761, 764 (9th Cir. 1992).

United States

v. Condo, 782 F.2d 1502, 1506 (9th Cir.1986) ( ... in determining whether probable cause to
search exists, a court must consider not only false matter in the affidavit but also material
omissions which taint probable cause.).
Here,

Sheriff Semrad withheld his affidavit both from the search warrant itself

and from filing with the magistrate's clerk after the search was executed. It is this defendant's
belief that the affidavit was withheld so that Sheriff Semrad could alter the affidavit to include
"fabricated probable cause allegations" post seizure. Holli specifically appeared before the
court's clerk as soon as she was released from jail on the underlying charge and was told that
Sheriff Semrad had not filed his probable cause affidavit with the Magistrate's clerk as
required under the criminal rules. Therefore,

Holli requests that this court order Sheriff

Semrad to produce a copy of his probable cause affidavit to Holli forthwith so that it may be
impeached and Holli may use the affidavit as a basis to dismissing the underlying criminal
charges.

C.

The .uGeneral Search And Seizure" Was
Executed To Default The Defendant's Appearance
In Pending Civil Litigation By Seizing All Computers,
Data And Work Product Files, Software, Wireless
Adaptors, Phone .Devices, Internet Devices, And
Printing Devices Used To Construct, Communicate
And Deliver Legal Process

In USA v. Carey, 172 F3d 1268 (101h Cir. 1999), the 10th circuit directly addressed
the issue of an illegal search and seizure of a computer. Here, the defendant was charged
with drug crimes. Officers started doing searches on the defendant's computer for key words
for drugs and found none.

Officers then conducted search on Jpeg files and found child

pornography. Following MARRON V. US, 275 US 192 (1946) the 101h circuit held that the
limitations on search warrant were exceeded because warrant limited the search to drug
crimes.

In Bridges, 344 F.3d at 1016 (9 1h Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Kow, 58
F.3d 423, 426 (9th Cir. 1995), the

gih

Circuit reaffirmed that a warrant was unconstitutional

because the wording was unquestionably broad in describing the items the agents could
seize which was almost all of [the suspect's] property, papers and home office equipment."
Id., at 1017. Specifically the "Bridges Warrant" stated that officers were authorized to seize
among other items, "records and documents, or electronically stored information ...
documents, contracts or correspondence ... computer hardware ... computer software ...
all records, documents, and photographs establishing the person ... in control of the
property seized and owning or leasing [the premises to be searched]". The Ninth Circuit
noted, "The list is a comprehensive laundry list of sundry goods and inventory that one'would
readily expect to discover in any small or medium-sized home business in the United States."
In US v. Comprehensive drug testing, 579 F3d 989 (9th Cir. 2009), the 9th circuit
following the 10th circuit in Davis v. Gracey, 111 F.3d 1472, 1478 (10th Cir. 1997) held: the
description of the things to be seized should be limited to the probable cause scope of the
crime alleged in the warrant to

forbid agents

from seizing equipment needed in most

households settings today. The .computer is "evidence" only to the extent that some of the
data it stores is evidence. See United States v. Giberson, 527 F.3d 882, 887 (9th

Cir. 2008)

("Computers, like briefcases and cassette tapes, can be repositories for documents and
records.").

When probable cause to search relates in whole or in part to information stored

on a computer, the warrant should identify that information with particularity, focusing on
the content of the relevant files rather than on the storage devices which may happen to
contain them.

See United States v. Vilar, 2007 WL 1075041, at *36 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2007)

("underlying information must be identified with particularity and its seizure independently
supported by probable cause"); United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 1999)
(stating that a warrant to seize evidence stored on a computer should specify "which
type of files are sought");

In cases where the computer is merely a storage device for

evidence, failure to focus on the relevant files will lead to a Fourth Amendment violation. For
example, in United States v. Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852, 862 (10th Cir. 2005), which involved an
investigation into harassing phone calls, the court held that a warrant authorizing seizure of
all storage media as well as the computer itself and "not limited to particular files"
violated the Fourth Amendment.
A similarly dangerous phrase, "any and all data, including but not limited to"
a list of items,

has been held to turn a computer search warrant into an unconstitutional
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"general warrant."

United States v. Fleet Management Ltd., 521 F. Supp. 2d 436, 443-44

(E.D. Pa. 2007); see also Otero, 563 F.3d at 1132 (warrant authorizing seizure of "any and all
information and/or data" fails the particularity requirement). See, e.g., United States v. Kow,
58 F.3d 423, 427 (9th Cir. 1995) (invalidating warrant for failure to name crime or limit
seizure to computer files sharing nexus with crime.); United States v. Hunter, 13 F. Supp. 2d
574, 584 (D. Vt. 1998) (concluding that warrant to seize "[a]ll computers" was not sufficiently
particular where description "did not indicate the specific crimes for which the equipment was
sought, nor were the supporting affidavits or the limits contained in the searching instructions
incorporated

by reference.")

Accordingly, the majority of courts who have considered the question of seizing
computers have held these types of seizures to be unreasonable, especially when the
government refuses to remediate loss of use of the computer.

See Ramsden v. United

States, 2 F.3d 322, 325 (9th Cir. 1993) (seized property will be returned if the government's
continued possession is unreasonable.

This test

requires the court to

weigh

the

government's interest in continued possession of the property with the owner's interest in
the property's return.). Also see United States v. Promises Known as 608 Taylor Ave., 584
F.2d 1297, 1304 (3d Cir. 1978) (If the government's legitimate interests in seized property
can

be satisfied if the

unreasonable.)

property is returned,

Moreover,

continued retention of the property is

where the government seizes electronic records,

the

government's failure to provide a copy of the seized electronic records is deemed
unreasonable.

See In re Search of 5444 Westheimer Road, 2006 WL 1881370, at *2

(S.D. Tex. Jul. 6, 2006) (the Government is required to provide the property owner with an
electronic copy of seized computer files; If the Government fails to do so then the defendant
has an obligation to file a demand for return of the property because the Government's actions
will be deemed unreasonable).
In the case at bar, the government took all of defendants computers, Data, Work
Product and case files, Software, Wireless Adaptors, Phone Devices,

Internet Devices,

And Working Printing Devices; All Used To Construct, Memorialize, Communicate And
Deliver Legal Process and client files. The Officers also locked up Holli's IP Address and
internet program so that Holli nor any other user at the abode could use the internet, email or
phone systems that required internet access.

See exhibit "3" attached for computer

messages received when a borrowed computer was brought to property and hooked in (after
the search and seizure was executed and Holli was released on OR on the underlying

charges); these messages show a denial of access to emails accounts irrespective of the
browser used.

Holli's email accounts had been locked down by the seizing officers.

Furthermore, Holli's internet service worked for a couple of hours to permit Holli to access
websites albiet not email,

and then a virus was sent through

corrupting that computer from functioning.

the borrowed computer

This defendant does not know much about

computers save they are a great substitute for typewriters and to do "free" research;

so

defendant is unaware of how the sheriff officials corrupted defendant's access to her internet
service or any computer device hooked up to defendant's internet service.

In addition, the

officers did leave behind a copy machine, but during the initial search which Holli witnessed
before she was arrested and taken to bannock county jail, officers stacked heavy banker size
boxes onto the feeder tray of the machine breaking the feeder tray; in spite of Holli's repeated
complaints to the officers not to place boxes on top of the copy machine at all - much less the
feeder tray.

The Officers owe Holli a new copy machine plus several locks which the

officers cut off to Holli's outbuildings in order to search these buildings. In addition, if the
officers dont return all of Holli's equipment in the conditions seized, Holli will be seeking theft
damages against the Sheriff's office.
Finally, Holli repeatedly told the officers that she was editing her memorandum
response "on the Sandra Copeland, et al. case" before the Idaho Sixth Judicial District,
Oneida County and assigned case no. 2011- 66 and that this ''work product" file was only
contained on the laptop computer that had the document up on the computer screen at the
time officers Rusty and Williams seized Holli's computers.

Holli repeatedly begged these

officers to email this extensively researched pleading to Holli's email address so that Holli
could complete the legal document from another offsite computer and thereby not default in
her response in this civil case given the officers announced they were taking all of Holli's
computers and supporting devices. This "pleading draft" represented three weeks of internet
research in order to obtain authorities sufficient to respond to the pleading.

The officers

refused to provide Holli with an electronic copy of this pleading and immediately arrested and
carted Holli to jail after this final complaint re emailing Holli copies of her "work product files" to
avoid default.

During the argument that ensued, it became immediately apparent that one of

the true purposes of the search and seizure was to obstruct and interfere with all civil cases
Holli and others were pursuing; all in violation of the Idaho racketeering laws and 18 USC
section 1505 re federal cases. This application for mandamus writ directing imemdiate return
of her computer equipment is one means by which this court can estopped any future

violations to Holli's access to the courts.

Ill.

Oneida County Sheriff Officials Did Not Have Authority To
Convert Their "General Search" Into A "Warrantless Search"
In State v. Lafferty, Docket No. 28669 (Idaho.App. 2003), the Idaho Appellate

court addressed the issue of a warrantless search under Idaho law, acknowleging from the
outset that a warrantless entry or search of a residence is per se unreasonable and violative
of the Fourth Amendment. The only way a warrantless search may be rendered reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment is by an individual's consent.

State v. Johnson, 11 O Idaho

516, 522, 716 P.2d 1288, 1294 (1986); State v. Abevta, 131 Idaho 704, 707, 963 P.2d 387,
390 (Ct. App. 1998). In such instances, the State has the burden of demonstrating consent by
a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Kilbv. 130 Idaho 747, 749, 947 P.2d 420, 422 (Ct.
App. 1997). Consent to search may be in the form of words, gestures, or conduct. State v..
Knapp, 120 Idaho 343, 348, 815 P.2d 1083, 1088 (Ct. App. 1991).

As the United States

Supreme Court stated:
The Fourth Amendment protects the individual's privacy in a variety of
settings. In none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when
bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual's
home-a zone that finds its roots in clear and specific constitutional
terms: "The right of the people to be secure in their ... houses ...
shall not be violated."
As set forth supra,

unless the State can show that defendant consented

warrantless search of her home and curtilege,

to a

the search was unreasonable and a violation

of the Fourth Amendment. Without clear consent, the government does not have the right to
'fish' through private and privileged files to investigate possible crimes.

1

'People v. Gonzalez,

51 Cal.3d 1179, 1260, 800 P.2d 1159, 1206, 275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 776 (1990), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 835, 112 S. Ct. 117, 116 L. Ed. 2d 85 (1991).
1.
See State v. Prinzing, 907 N.E.2d 87 (Ill. Ct. App. 2009) (officers told the
defendant that they believed that he may have been the victim of fraudulent credit card
charges and asked to search his computer for evidence of the fraud, including computer
viruses; the defendant agreed, and the officers then searched the computer, finding images
of child pornography; the defendant moved to suppress, arguing that he gave the officers
consent to search for viruses and evidence of credit card fraud only ; although the trial court
denied his motion, the appellate court reversed, finding that t,he officers exceeded the scope
of the defendant's consent)

Here,

it was clear that Holli did not give consent to any officer to search her

property and the properties of others for which Holli was the acting power of attorney. As
stated supra, the officers kicked in Holli's front screen door when Holli denied the officers
entrance into her residence as a result of the facially defective warrant. In addition, Holli
repeatedly told the officers that all documents pertaining to her suit against Oneida County
and that were in Holli's possession, were a matter of public record and had been filed with
the various clerks of the various forums that Holli was statutorily required to access ; hence
there was nothing that Holli had on her computers that the sheriff and prosecutor Dustin Smith
did not have easy access to via various public forums. The officers nevertheless broke down
Holli's screen door for a forciable entry into the building.
During the illegal search, Holli argued that the officers were not entitled to access
privileged and private materials, and the record shows that Holli sought to, by words, prevent
the officers from seizing 3rd person client tax files for which Holli was the acting power of
attorney.

Holli gave th-e officers the phone numbers of the third persons for whom she was

acting power of attorney, so that Sheriff Semrad would contact these persons in front of Holli
to verify Holli's status as their power of attorney and to obtain a denial of consent to seize
these third persons private properties in Holli's possession.

Two phone calls were made in

front of Holli to Ferron Stokes and the other to Elham Neilson. Holli heard these third persons
directly instruct the sheriffs officers not to seize any file, paperwork or documentation bearing
these parties names from Holli's premises - as Holli had legal control over these files under a
power of attorney. These persons followed up their oral denials with written denials refusing
to consent to search and seizure of any of their private properties. See exhibit "4" attached for
thiese written denials executed while Holli was in jail on the obstruction charge.

In spite of

these demands by third persons denying consent to the sheriff officers to access their private
properties and in spite of Hollis very vocal denial of consent,

these sheriff officers seized

each and every 3rd person's tax , bank and accounting records on the premise and for which
Holli was admittedly the acting power of attorney. In addition, the sheriff officers seized all of
Holli's "hard copy case files" which included Hollis work product, original evidence, and
witness communications in preparation for trial on the causes of action presented by those
cases;

the latter items were protected priviledged materials under the work product and

witness communication doctrines.

Holli's

lack of consent to any search is evidentiarily

shown by Holli's arrest for obstructing an officer in the performance of his duty. An affirmative
defense to the obstruction charge for which Holli was cited as ·shown in exhibit "5" attached, is

the right to protect property from an illegal taking.
In conclusion therefore, the officers had neither Holli's consent as acting power of
attorney nor the consent of third persons, to seize materials and items from Holli's residence
under a warrantless search theory.

IV.

Enforcement Officers Cannot Use A Search Warrant To
Obtain Privileged Documents Or Communications ; On
The Contrary The Attorney General Of The United States
Has Determined That Such Privileged Documents Or
Communications Will Be Subject To Subpeona Power Only
Agents should make sure that the search will not violate the Attorney General's

regulations relating to obtaining confidential information from third parties.

At Congress's

direction, the Attorney General has issued guidelines for officers who want to obtain
privileged documentary materials from third parties. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-11(a); 28
C.F.R. §59.4(b).

Under these rules,

law enforcement officers should not use a search

warrant to obtain documentary materials believed to be in the private possession of a third
party where the material sought or likely to

be reviewed during the execution of the

warrant contains confidential or privileged information. 28 C.F.R. §59.4(b).

The United

States Attorneys' Manual., §9-13.420 (1997) sets forth the guidelines for serving location
having privileged materials.

Search warrants for "documentary materials" held under a

privilege are governed by 28 C.F.R. 59.4, USAM 9-19.221 et seq. and 42 U.S.C. Section
2000aa-11 (a){3).

In addition, Attorneys' Manual § 9-19.240 provides that where material

sought in a search warrant are in possession of a person holding them as part of their work
product in relation to some form of public communication, seizure of these items shall be
controlled by Title I of the Privacy Act of 1980 ("PPA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000aa, et seq. See
Criminal Resource Manual 661 for the text of 42 U.S.C.§ 2000aa et seq.

The PPA prohibits

the use of search warrants to obtain any work product materials or other documentary
materials possessed by a person reasonably believed to have a purpose to disseminate to the
public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other form of public communication,

except

under the following limited circumstances: (1) when there is probable cause to believe that the
person possessing the materials has committed a criminal act to which the materials relate,
in which case,

a search warrant may not be sought unless the alleged offense involves

classified materials or child pornography; or (2) when there is reason to believe that the

immediate seizure of such materials is necessary to prevent the death of, or serious
bodily injury to, a human being.
The United States Attorneys' Manual provides that the Department of Justice policy
mandates the use of a subpoena or other less intrusive means to obtain privileged evidence
from first or third parties. See 28 C.F.R. §59.4(a)(1); United States Attorneys' Manual, §919.210.

In line with this federal policy, the Minnesota Supreme Court issued a seminole

decision in O'Connor vs. Johnson,

287 N.W.2d 400 which mandated that no privileged

legal documents or communications shall ever be subject to the search and seizure procedure
but could only be obtained by subpeona.

In O'Connor, the police had searched numerous

legal files to find evidence in support of a crime against an attorneys client. The issue,' as the
Minnesota Supreme Court saw it, was "the reasonableness of searching an attorney's office
for documents and files of a particular client.

if police are permitted to search through an

attorney's files for documents listed in an otherwise valid warrant,

said the court, work

product privilege will be rendered a nullity. Cast in the language of search and seizure law,
this is an argument directed to the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment.

A

warrant directing law enforcement officers to seize privileged files will oblige the officers, in
order to obtain that document, to scan dozens, perhaps hundreds, of other documents. The
officers, having scanned those other documents, can hardly be expected to expunge their
contents from memory. Privilege as to those documents would be destroyed, and having been
destroyed, could not be restored. The O'Connor court thus mandated the strongest possible
remedy: In the future, all law enforcement efforts to obtain legal documentary evidence must
proceed by subpoena, never by warrant.
Such is the case at bar. The persons executing the search were opposing parties
in civil rights litigation filed by the Holli 4 months earlier. If these defendant's sought privileged
work product and witness communications from Holli, they should have indentified exactly
what privileged items they sought from Holli in the form of a subpeona; not abused their
offices by obtaining an illegal warrant to seize every item and communication located on
Holli's property, related or not, to the Oneida County lawsuit.
l.RC.P. Rules 26(b)(3) and (b)(5)(A) applies various privileges to all materials
"prepared in anticipation of litigation or trial"

whether prepared

by

a party or its

representative and precludes disclosure of impressions or communications in developing a
case for trial.

See Rule 26(b)(3):

"the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental

impressions, conclusions, opinions, or

legal theories of an attorney or ... party concerning

the litigation, including communications ... whether written or oral."
The US Supreme Court held in Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510 that the work-product
doctrine protects orderly prosecution and defense of legal claims and cannot be violated
except under very exceptional circumstances. "Work product protection exists to promote the
adversarial system by providing "a privileged
prepare cases without interference."

area that enables attorneys (or parties) to

In re Grand Jury Impounded, 138 F.3d 978, 981 (3'd

Cir. 1998). See also Sporck, 759 F.2d at 316 ("preserving the privacy of preparation that is
central to the adversarial role is the central justification for the work product doctrine.).
United Coal Cos. v. Powell Constr. Cos., 839 F.2d

958, 966

prepared for litigation is protected by work product doctrine.);
Insurance Co. v. World Trade Ctr. Props,

(10th

Cir. 1988) (Material

SR International Business

2002 WL 1334821 *6 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (Work

product doctrine protects counsel's legal strategies and thought processes.);

Peralta v.

Cendant Corp., 190 F .R.D. 38, 42 (D. Conn. 1999) (authorities cannot question witnesses
regarding a party's legal strategies as such actions violate the work product doctrine);
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 US 383, 398-401 (1981) (Access to work product not
permitted unless seeking party unable to obtain equivalent material elsewhere and seeking
party meets exceptional circumstances to violate the doctrine.); in re Grand Jury, 599 F.2d at
1233 (the desire to obtain evidence to impeach a witnesses testimony does not avoid the
work product protection.); Delco Wire & Cable v. Weinberger, 109 F.R.D.680, 691-92 (E.D.Pa
1986) (advise given to a witness in preparation for testimony is protected under work product
doctrine.)
As is evidently apparent here, the Oneida County officials sought to explore Holli's
litigation strategies, witness communications, and other protected matter by seizing items and
electronic equipment from Holli's residence which disclosed this information. Illegal seizure of
this protected material allowed the opposing parties to prepare offensive papers to defeat
Holli's litigation.

All materials seized from Holli's property on August 9, 2011 must be

suppressed and the opposing parties must be permanently enjoined from presenting any
argument, claim or defense based on the tainted search and seizure.

V.

Tax Files Seized Under A General Search Warrant Must Be
Suppressed And Cannot Be The Subject Of Another Search
Or Prosecution Under "The Fruit Of The Poisonous Tree" Doctrine
In United States v. Hoang Anh Thi Duong, 156 F. Supp. 2d 564, 572 (D. Va. 2001 ),

Defendant Hoang Anh Thi Duong and her two daughters were charged with conspiracy and
filing false federal corporate tax returns 18 U.S.C. 371and26 U.S.C. 7206(1). Hoang Anh Thi

Duong at 566. The three women ran a restaurant in Arlington, Virginia. Id In 1995, the FBI
was investigating Hoang Anh Thi Duong's son for an unrelated crime of robbery and
confiscated trash from the defendants' residence. Id

The inventory of the trash listed bank

statements and restaurant records that were unrelated to the FBI investigation supporting the
search warrant. The Court commented on the "expansive breadth of the FBI search" in June
1995 and listed the following as seized during that search: The agents seized, inter a/la, (i)
documents relating to Cafe Dalat, including a file folder containing ledgers of Cafe Dalat sales
from February 1994 through May 1995, and Phuoc-Lai bank account statements, insurance
bills, and 1991-1995 deposit records; (ii) defendants' personal records, including school
records, bank and other financial records, warranties, and receipts;

(iii) personal tax returns

of defendants Tu Anh Phan and Danh Anh Phan and of their sister, Anh Minh Phan; (iv) home
videotapes; (v) records relating to rental property owned by Anh Minh Phan and defendant Tu
Phan; and (vi) family life insurance records. [Id At 568.] The Court remarked that very few of
the documents seized related to the targeted robbery conspiracy. Id
At the suppression hearing, the FBI Agent in charge of the robbery investigation
was asked whether any documents that proved to be evidence of the robbery conspiracy were
seized in the search and the FBI agent identified only one note that Hoang Anh Thi Duong's
son wrote to a co-conspirator instructing him where to store the guns that they planned to
steal. Id

The FBI Agent testified further that although he determined that the records were

unrelated to the criminal investigation, he contacted the IRS because he observed that the
documents related to a number of assets that he opined "didn't match up" with the tax
records. Id. At 569.

The FBI Agent referred the case to the IRS, and an IRS Special

agent received and reviewed the documents that she obtained from the FBI.
Subsequently in 1997,

Id.

the IRS Special Agent obtained authorization for a search

warrant for tax-related offenses based on an affidavit that specifically relied upon the
evidence taken during the trash confiscation and the 1995 search by the FBI.

Id. At

570-571.
The Court found that the scope of the search far exceeded the purpose of the
warrant. Id.

The defendants argued that the 1997 search conducted from the IRS Agent's

warrant was tainted because the IRS Agent's affidavit was

b~sed

on items seized during the

illegal 1995 search. Id. At 573-574. See also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484;

~"

- ZL.fl -

83 S. Ct. 407; 9 L Ed. 2d 441 (1963) (The "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine). The Court
observed that the fruits of the 1995 search gave rise to the investigation by the IRS, and
consequently, to the 1997 warrant and search by the IRS. Id At 575.
In addressing various exceptions to suppressing an illegal search and seizure,
the Court explained that it must first identify the portions of the IRS Agent's affidavit
that were tainted by the illegal 1995 search and exclude them from consideration. Id at 576.
Next the Court considered the

"independent source" exception and examined the IRS'

affidavit and warrant to determine if any part of these documents were not related to the illegal
search conducted in 1995. The court found the documents to be wholly derivative of the
results of the 1995 search and therefore the Independent source exception did not save the
IRS. Murray v US, 487 U.S. 533; 108 S.Ct. 2529; 101 LEd2d 472 (1988).

Alternatively, the

Court considered whether the government could rely on the "plain view" exception. Horton v.

California, 496 U.S. 128, 137, 110 L. Ed. 2d 112, 110 S. Ct. 2301 (1990). Under this doctrine,
officers may seize an object without a warrant if (1) the object is actually in plain view;
the officers

have a

lawful right of access to the object itself;

and

(2)

(3) the object's

incriminating character is immediately apparent. United States v. Legg, 18 F.3d 240, 242 (4th
Cir. 1999)(citations and internal quotation marks omitted), cert. Denied, 129 L.Ed.2d 876, 114
S.Ct. 2761 (1994). [Id At 810. ].
In Conclusion:

The Court held that the Defendant was entitled to blanket

suppression of all tax related materials seized in the 1995 search and the whole of all
materials seized in the 2001 IRS search.

The Tax Division,

in order to prosecute the

defendant under a tax related criminal offense, did not obtain this evidence using procedures
detailed in its own policies or authorized under the Fourth Amendment.

First,

the

independent source doctrine will be difficult for the government to establish without purging
the taint of the original 2001 search which was prompted by the illegal 1995 search. The
government possessed that evidence by virture of the illegal searches and expressly relied
upon that illegally obtained evidence for the 2005 tax evasion indictment. Second, the "plain
view" doctrine should not apply since the records obtained in the search did not have an
immediately apparent incriminating character.

At the time of the 1995 search,

the

government had no probable cause to believe that the Defendant had committed a crime
under the tax laws. Therefore, the government is not justified in using the evidence obtained
under the search warrant for a robbery conspiracy in a case where the government intends to
prosecute the defendant for tax evasion.

Having no evidence to continue the prosecution,

d.,3,
-VfZ--
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the IRS mail fraud prosecution is therefore dismissed with prejudice.

VI.

A Conflict With The' Prosecutor Prohibited The Prosecutor From
Executing Any Process In Which That Prosecutor Would Gain
From The Process Executed
In People v Loomis, 70 AD3d 1199 (2010), a New York state judge Stephen

Herrick dismissed the 33-count indictment against five pharmacy operators from Florida
ruling that the defendants' federal civil lawsuit against District Attorney David Soares' office
created a "conflict of interest" that merits removing Albany County prosecutors from the case.
"When an impermissible conflict of interest has been established, disqualification , of the
district attorney's office becomes necessary to prevent the undermining of the public
confidence in our criminal justice system," Judge Herrick stated. "In the present matter, the
court has found a conflict of interest sufficient to warrant dismissal of the indictment obtained
by the conflicted prosecutor.

Likewise, the court finds that this demonstrated conflict of

interest warrants disqualification of the Albany County district attorney's office from further
prosecution of this

matter."

The judge dismissed the criminal indictments against the

principals in the Signature Pharmacy steroid distribution case citing the incompetence of
Albany County District Attorney David Soares.

Soares is the lead prosecutor for a county in

New York who had taken it upon himself to spend possibly millions of dollars of Albany
residents taxpayer money to carry on a nationwide steroid witch hunt dubbed "Operation
Which Doctor".

The ruling means that prosecutor David Soares can no longer seek charges

against Stan and Naomi Loomis, the Signature Pharmacy owners, pharmacist Michael
Loomis or Signature Pharmacy employees Kirk Calvert and Anthony Palladino; charges must
be sought if at all by an out of county prosecutor.
Other courts have similarly held.

See also Haraguchi v. Superior Court, 49 Cal.

Rptr. 3d 590 (Cal. App. 2 Dist.), rev. granted on court's own motion, 149 P.3d 737 (Cal. 2006)
(removal of prosecutor given a pecuniary interest in the result of the criminal proceedings.);
Shillinger v. Haworth, 70 F.3d 1132, 1143 (10th Cir. 1995) (Courts have found removal

especially appropriate when the prosecutor obtained privileged information through his
or her misconduct.); United States v. Omni Int. Corp., 634 F.Supp. 1414, 1440 (D.C. Md.
1986) (disqualifying prosecutors from further involvement with case after finding "entrenched
and flagrant misconduct");

In re Goodman, 210 S.W.3d 805, 814-15 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006)

(granting writ of mandamus and ordering trial court to remove prosecutor, because "requiring

the parties to proceed through a lengthy litigation process, just so Goodman could

later

obtain reversal on appeal, would be a tremendous waste of the parties' (and the judicial
system's) financial and temporal resources").
Reference to exhibit "1" attached shows that the search warrant was prepared and
submitted to the Magistrate Judge David Evans by Prosecutor Dustin Smith; the latter a
defendant in Holli's civil rights and RICO lawsuit against Oneida County. Prosecutor Dustin
Smith had a pecuniary interest that was benefitted by abuse of Dustin Smith's office, to wit: to
use the criminal process against Holli and illegally obtain a criminal prosecution that would
taint the credibility of Holli and Holli's civil litigation. Dustin Smith was prohibited as a matter
of law from participating in any criminal process against Holli, expecially after he became a
tort defendant in civil rights and rico litigation brought by Holli 4 months before the "general
search warrant" was constructed, issued and executed.

Moreover Magistrate Evans knew he

could not sit on any case involving Holli because of a judicial misconduct complaint Holli had
filed against this Magistrate one year earlier complaining of persistent failures to follow the
rules of law controlling Magistrate's Evans non-discretionary judicial conduct.
Because the process was exercised by persons that clearly had a conflict and
prohibition against executing process against Holli, the process was void from the outset and
the officers did not have the right to kick in Holli's screen door and execute the void "general
search warrant" for "fishing purposes"!

VII.

The Officers Did Not Prepare An Accurate Property List
Of The Things Taken From The Defendant's House
Rule 41 (f) requires an officer executing a warrant to "prepare and verify an

inventory of any property seized," and to "return [the warrant]together with a copy of the
inventory to the magistrate judge designated on the warrant," Fed. R Crim. P. 41 (f)(1 )(8), (D).
The defendant herein was released from custody on August 12, 2011. Upon her
return home, she found the property lists taped to her front door.

Defendant and other third

persons conducted an examination of the searched property to note items that were no longer
on the property to: (1) compare these missing items to the government's property list, (2)
report the "non-listed" items on the government's property list as stolen from Holli during the
search and (3) observe if any evidence had been planted on Holli's premises as would be
noticed by a cursory inspection.

Holli also checked her copier that the officers had piled
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heavy boxes on during the search to see if copier had been broken by the officers searching
activities,

The copier had been broken.

Neverthless,

there are a number of computer

devices and software programs that were stolen from Holli's residence and which are not
listed on the government's property list,

as well as other tax files from "unrelated" third

persons that are not contained on the government's property list. Also the government did not
list all of Holli's case files or original evidentiary documents seized which Holli intended on
providing to the court to prove up her civil cases.

It is believed that the government will

destroy these items upon an order by this court to return ALL OF HOLLI'S PROPERTIES
so that HOLL! cannot prove up her cases with best evidence. Therefore, Holli will also
seek a spoliation order against the government which requires any finder of fact to presume
the truth of the matter stated from a copy of any record Holli submits in lieu of an original given
destruction of any original documentation by Oneida County officials.

VIII.

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, defendant requests the following mandamus
relief:
1.

An Order finding the August 9, 2011 General Search Warrant served on

Holli on August 9, 2011, illegal as a matter of law;
2.

An Order commending a blanket supression of all evidence or other

materials or items seized from Holli's residence and curtilege during the total days the search
was executed while Holli was incarcerated in jail on a bad faith obstruction charge;
3.

An Order commanding Oneida County Sheriff Jeff Semrad to immediately

turn over to Holli within 24 hours of granting this Petition :
(a)

His probable cause affidavit used to support the August 9, 2011

"general search warrant";
(b)

All items and materials seized from Holli's residence under the

August 9, 2011 search warrant;
(c)

Monetary compensation for the items broken during the search

commenced on August 9, 2011, and ;
(d)

Monetary compensation for all electronic items stolen from Holli's

property and not reported on the property lists created by the sheriffs office.
4.

An Order of Spoliation of Evidence and a Rule that any trier of fact is to

deem a copy of any record submitted by Holli as an original ·document in light of the bad

faith search and seizure of plaintiff's property;
5.

An Order of Protection preventing any official process - criminal or

civil -- from emanating from the materials, documents, items, communications, or properties electronic or documentary - OR - oral or written - searched or seized on Holli's property
under the illegal August 9, 2011 search warrant for however long that search took place while
Holli was in custody ;
6.

An Order of criminal contempt directed against any person, official or

private, that uses, interferes with, gains, profits or is advantaged from the illegal actions
taken against Holli and other third persons commencing August 9, 2011, and furthermore an
Order stripping any and all privileges from attaching to the illegal actions taken against Holli
and other third persons commencing August 9, 2011.
litigation

This means includes invoking "the

privilege doctrine" in any civil and criminal case pending at the time or brought

therafter, in order to avoid the commands of this decree;

7.

An Order finding that Holli had every right to protect her properties and the

properties of third persons under the possession and control of Holli by virtue of Holli's powers
of attorney form illegal search and seizure by Oneida County officials and that Holli may
therefore use her right to protect property as an affirmative defense to the obstruction charge,
AND:
8.

An Order immediately ordering the removal of Prosecutor Dustin Smith

as the prosecutor of the underlying obstruction charge,

as the prosecutor on any charge

concerning the defendant herein, and as participating as counsel in any litigation involving
the defendant herein whether that litigation be criminal,

Dated: August 22, 2011

Warrant for the serach of Timothy McVeigh's 1977 Mercury Marquis

fiie:///C:/Users/eiham/Desktop/mcveighwarrant.htm

13 tool box from trunk
14 debris from trunk
15 vacuuming from right rear carpet
16 vacuuming from left rear carpet
17 vacuuming from right front carpet
18 vacuuming from left front carpet
19 vacuuming from trunk
20 vacuuming from front rear and rear sears
21 three latent lifts

_IN 'ffffi'UNITE,~~STA'fES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE \\TESTERN

DISTRICT QF OK::L_AHOMA
IN RE: SEARCH WARRANTS
ORDER
Upon motion of the United States of America and of good cause shmvn, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that the original search warrant returns and affidavits

I

presently under seal by Order of the United States District Court for the Western j
District of Oklahoma, may be disclosed to the parties for the limited purpose of I
disco_v.<?9:' !,µ~y;cq.se styled UIJ.ited State9 pfA.merica vs. Timothy James
,J.

Mcyeiqh~d ]fy:rry ,,t,ynnNic,hdls"'filmy-Um-teP.,:S~~~ct Co:qrtfor tjae.

1''

·and that duplic~te_-09.pies 0f9.aifil·iioc.1fill~rrts ~y-be used by eouns~l and-the-.-

-_ -

'We~~~D~ct of Oklahoma, &e N@. CR- 9~u:@-£'.an<l to their att;meys,
Court in such further pr-ecee.diugs as there may be in the said case. IT IS SO
ORDERED this 1st day of September, 1995.

,

Ronald L.Howland

Mc Veigh Trial Homepage
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To Whom This May Concern:
My name is Ferron Stokes:
Holli Telford aka Holli Lundahl was handling some tax matters for me. She had a file
with my name affixed to the face of the file which included privileged information
concerning me. Also she has my-private tax information on her computers seized by
the sheriff of Oneida County. During the search conducted on Holli's house, a
luitenant called me at my cell number provided by Holli and asked me if I wouid
consent to them seizing my labeled file and any other papers bearing my name
including my tax return papers. I EXPRESLLY TOLD THE LUITENANT THAT I DID
NOT CONSENT TO THEM TAKING CUSTODY OF ANY OF MY PRIVATE PAPERS
AND THAT THEY WERE TO LEAVE MY PRIVATE PAPERS AT HOLLI'S
RESIDENCE.
I picked Holli up from jail on August 12, 2011 after Holli had been arrested for
obstructing the police officers in performance of their duties when Holli complained
about seizing mine and others personal tax information, etc. We returned to Holli's
place and surmised what had been taken. All tax files and other personal banking
information, including my own had been seized from the property. THE OFFICERS
DID NOT LEAVE MY PRIVATE AND PRIVILEDGED INFORMATION AT HOLLI'S
HOME LIKE I INSTRUCTED THEM TO DO. HOLLI HAS COMMITTED NO CRIMES
WITH RESPECT TO ANY MATTER CONCERNING ME AND MY FILES HAVE
NOTHING TO DO WITH THE SCOPE OF THE SEARCH WARRANT EXERCISED
ON HOLLI'S PROPERTY ON AUGUST 9, 2011. I INTEND TO SUE IF MY
PROPERTY IS NOT IMMEDIATELY RETURNED AND/OR IF I SUFFER ANY
PREJUDICE WHILE MY PERSONAL INFORMATION WAS IN THE ILLEGAL
CUSTODY OF ONEIDA COUNTY AUTHORITIES.

1f~~
FERRON STOKES

TRANSMISSION VERIFICATION REPORT
TIME

NAME

FAX

TEL

SER.#

DATE, TIME

FAX NO./NAME
DURATION
PAGE(S)
RESULT

MODE

08/11/2011 12:27
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2087652891
00:00:25
Ell

OK

STt>NDARD

ECM

'J!ff

N<e,qx . J ;~ <d1. ~ s 4fr

+o

Holli

-el~~
\
(jff)
,

/

'

'1

~3

I

5

EIDA COUNTY

._,1

SHERiFF

IDAHO UNIFORM CITATION

10507

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE
6TH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, INAND FOR THE COUNTY OF
ONEIDA
STATE OF IDAHO
)
)
COMPLAll'ff AND SUMMONS

r0

_/

I

,,. I -e I

LO

0

+o , ,·
I)

VS,

)

·~

l

0

!2J
ho i I.
L. ~ 0
--=Fi~m~Nam~'-~-'---------,,M~iddie..,,..-,l~nitia~l-

~----'--'---:Lasl~N~ame--------)

T""""f

Infraction Citation
OR
Misdemeanor Citation
Accident Involved

.,,.q

Vio. #2 --------------------=,...,...,,_.,.Code Section

Date

Witnessing ~cer
Serial #/Address
THE STATE OF IDAHO;fO THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT:

You are hereby suri'imoned
,_ District Court of
OUEl QA

5

Dept

IP appear before the Clerk of the Magistrate's Court of the

a

MAL.t.D

County,

. Idaho,

located at _ _ _ _ _
c_c_:.,_'RT_._.H_O_,l.J"""S'"-E-'------- on t h e - - - - - - - - day of
"'-~, 20 _ _ _ , at _ _ _ o'clock_ M.

/. c. 5 ,\

I acknowledge receipt of this summons and I promise to appear at the 1ime indicated.
Qi

1

E

z"'
'E"'

"'c:

·~

'O

"'

d\ I

Defendants Signarure

I. hereby certify service upon

.!!:!
Cl

V- . ~ 0

it•.

:fl. ,

_

th(}lefe~nt ;'rson~ on t\ ~

-1'\,ud;(
Officer '

c

f 1~)

'iL

J6»'v·'.:;--··

,

NOTICE: See reverse side of your copy toi PENALTY and COMPLIANCE instructions.

DEFENDANT'S
COPY.
. .
~

~·-

I ;

,2\JL

4

AMERICA FIRST

HOLLI TELFORD
10621 S OLD HWY 191
MALAD CITY, ID 83252

To the clerk of the court:
Please find attached the wire transcript of America First Credit Union identifying the wire transfer to the
law offices of Linebarger Goggan Blair Sampson, LLP ofTyler, Texas in March of 2011 in the amount of
$4,214.77 as credited from the Loan Proceeds of America First Credit Union Member, Holli Telford.
If you have any further questions please feel free to call.
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Lead Teller

America First Credit Union-North Logan
(435)792-7520
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IFTS Message Print - Message Inquiry Display Dialog Box
User: jkearns

Ba.."lk: America First CU

Date: 08/05/11 18:01:25

Message Status: PNRM
Seq Num: 20110600031100
Related Seq Num: 20110600031200
Pay Method: FED Output
Message ID: FTI0811
Date Recvd: 03/01/2011 13:19:57
Value Date: 03/01/2011
Sender:
324377516
Amount:
$4,214.77
Debit info
Account: 205120
Name:
BRANCH WIRE GL
Addrl:
ACCOUNTING DEPT

MANAGEMENT CENTER

Addr2:
Addr3:

.l:tddr4:
Credit info
Account: 324377516
Name:
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, NA
Addrl:
Addr2:
Addr3:

Addr4:

Advice:
Category:

TELLER

Dept:
DEPTl
Linesheet:

Trancode: DOMESTIC
Create Template:

Message Text:
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Msg Type
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p *
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{2000}000000421477
{3100}324377516*
{3320}20110600031100*
{3400}111000614*
{3600}CTR*
{ 4200 }D0440002020*
LINEBARGER GOGGF.N BLAIR SAMPSOK LLP*
{4320]0574509010767557*
{ 5000} D20512 0 *
BRANCH WIRE GL*
ACCOUNTING DEPT*
~.A.~AGEMENT CENTER *
{5100}D24555120-l*
HOLLI TELFORD*
10621 S HIGHWAY 191*
MALAD CITY*
ID 83252*
{6000)REF: CAUSE# 22,625-B DUSTY MILLER A*
ND CLlL.~ENCE WILLIAMS TRANSACTIONS*

FROM :

FAX NO.

Aug. 23 2011 07:45PM

Certificate of Service
The undersigned certifies that she faxed the foregoing document to opposing
counsel on 8-23-11

Brian K. Julian
Stephen L Adams
250 S. Fifth St. Ste 700

Boise Idaho 83707
fax no. 208-344-5510

Holli Telford

I/
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH IBDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ONEIDA

* * * * * * *
HOLLI TELFORD,
Plaintiffs,

w

)
)
)
) Case No. CV-2011-66

)
) ORDER VACATING HEARING

SANDRA COPELAl\T]), AD MITRA MILLS,
JEANETTE HAR_MON, CODY KELLEY,
PAUL KELLEY, JR., THE ESTATE OF
PAUL KELLEY, SR, SMITH COUNTY
TRUSTEE, TAX ASSESSOR GARY
BARBER, SMITH COUNTY, ARTIE ROSS,
ATTOIThTEY TAB BEAELL, LAW OFFICES)
OF PURDUE, BRAl\T])ON, FELDER,
COLLINS & MOTT; LISA 1'-J'EILSON; AND
DOES 1 - 10
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

The above-entitled matter was set for hearing Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Motion to
Quash and Motion For Summary Judgment on the 26th day of August, 2011. The Court has been
notified that Plaintiff has filed a Petition For Supervisory Mandamus Authority On Significant
Question of First Impression, as well as an interlocutory appeal of prior rulings, with the Idaho
Supreme Court. These filings will need to be resolved by the Idaho Supreme Court and require a
stay on all matters presently pending in this case until those issues and the appeal are responded to.
The Court also notes that Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Continue the hearing of August 26, 2011,
\vith supporting documents and argument, which has been objected to by Defendants. However,
this Motion need not be decided at this time because of the pending appellate matters.

ORDER VACA TING HEARING - I

P.
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Therefore, the hearing of August 26, 2011 is vacateclil and will be rescheduled when the Idaho

Supreme Court has ruled on the matters now pending before them.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 24th day of August, 2011.

I

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 25 fJ- day of
correct copy of the above and foregoing ORDER
person(s) in the manner indicated below:

Holli Telford
10621 S. Old Hwy. 191
Malad, ID 83252

Stephen L. Adams
A"l\TDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP
P.O. Box 7426
Boise, ID 83707-7426

ORDER VACATING HEARING - 2
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, 2011, I served a true and
HEARING to the following

01

IN THE MATIER OF THE PETITION FOR
SlJPERVISORY MANDAMUS
AUTHORITY ON SIGNIFICANT
QUESTION OF FIRST IMPRESSION.

)
)
)
)

--------------------------------------------------------

)

HOLLI TELFORD,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Petitioner,

v.
DISTRICT JUDGE STEPHEN DUNN,
Respondent.

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR
SUPERVISORY MANDAMUS
AUTHORITY ON SIGNIFICANT
QUESTION OF FIRST IMPRESSION
Supreme Court Docket No. 39056-2011
Oneida County Docket No. 2011-66
Ref. No. 11-387

A PETITION FOR SUPERVISORY MANDAMUS AUTHORITY ON SIGNIFICANT
QUESTION OF FIRST IMPRESSION with attachments was filed by Appellant Holli Telford on
August 9, 2011, requesting a supervisory mandamus writ to resolve a significant question of first
impression regarding the statutory construction of a "long arm service statute" under Idaho's
Consumer Protection Act. The Court is fully advised; therefore, good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellant Holli Telford's PETITION FOR SUPERVISORY
MANDAMUS AUTHORITY ON SIGNIFICANT QUESTION OF FIRST IMPRESSION be, and
hereby is, DENIED.
DATED this

'J7- day of August, 2011.
By Order of the Supreme Court

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk/
cc:

Holli Telford, prose appellant
Counsel of Record
District Court Clerk
District Judge Stephen Dunn

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR SUPERVISORY MANDAMUS AUTHORITY ON
SIGNIFICANT QUESTION OF FIRST IMPRESSION - Docket No. 39056-2011

HOLLI TELFORD
AKA HOLLI LUNDAHL
10621 S. Old Hwy 191
Malad, Idaho 83252

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF ONEIDA

HOLLI TELFORD
Case No. CV 2011 -- 00066
Plaintiff

vs.
SANDRA COPELAND, et al.

Defendants

PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO THE
DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS TO DISMISS
SUPPORTED BY:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

The Affidavit of Holli Telford
The Affidavit of LA Greer
The Affidavit of Elham Neilsen
The Affidavit of Kim Vogt
The Affidavit of S. Durfee
Verified Response To Court Order
Dated August 18, 2011
CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

COMES NOW Holli Telford and timely files her OPPOSITION to the defendant's
motions to dismiss within 7 days before the scheduled hearing date of September 7,
2011.

1

1. The Defendants contend that Rule 56 applies to the motions to dismiss.
Plaintiff disagrees. Rule 56 does not apply until after the Court has exercised his
discretion and decided that he is going to consider matters outside of the pleadings. See
In the adoption of John Doe v. Idaho Dept. of Health And Welfare, Docket no. 37936
(Idaho Supreme Court, 2011) (The Civil Rules provide that if matters outside the
pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, a motion under l.R.C.P.
12(b)(6) shall be treated as one for summary judgment. l.R.C.P. 12(b). Glaze v.
Deffenbaugh, 144 Idaho 829, 831, 172 P.3d 1104, 1106 (2007). Here, the Supreme
Court affirmed that it was within the courts discretion to consider or exclude affidavits,
and that if the affdavits were considered, then the judgment would be converted to a Rule
56 judgment. Here, since the Defendant's motions to dismiss were couched under Rule
12 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and the court doesnt exercise his discretion to
convert the motions until the time of the hearing, then the time schedule set out in Rule
7(b)(3).(B) or (E) controls. These provisions read as follows:

STANDARD OF REVIEW
When a court considers a motion to dismiss in a case that would be tried to a
jury,

all facts are to be liberally construed, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn

in favor of the party resisting the motion. G & M Farms, 119 Idaho at 517, 808 P.2d at 854;

Sanders v. Kuna Joint School Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 874, 876 P.2d 154, 156 (Ct. App.
1994 ). Therefore all facts are to be contrued in plaintiffs favor here.

I.

THE DEFENDANrs MOTION TO QUASH LACKS MERIT, AND
FURTHERMORE, THIS DEFENSE WAS WAIVED BECAUSE THE
DEFENDANTS MADE A GENERAL APPEARANCE
On July 18, 2011, this court entered a rule that the Idaho Consumer Protection

Act's long arm service statute does not apply to serving a summons and complaint upon a
non-resident defendant because the word "Summons" was not specifically included in the
language of the service statute. See l.C. Section 48-613:
SERVICE OF NOTICE. Service of any notice, demand or subpoena under this act
shall be made personally within this state, but if such cannot be obtained,
substituted service therefor may be made in the following manner:

(i) Personal service thereof without this state; or
(2) The mailing thereof by registered or certified mail to the last known
place of business, residence or abode within or without this state or
such person for whom the same is intended;

Plaintiff opposed the court's interpretation of this service statute by asserting that the

(B) When a motion is supported by affidavit(s), the affidavit(s) shall be served
with the motion, and any opposing affidavit(s) shall be filed with the court and
served so that it is received by the parties no later than seven (7) days before
the hearing.
(E) Any brief submitted in support of a motion shall be filed with the court and
served so that it is received by the parties at least fourteen (14) days prior to the
hearing. Any responsive brief shall be filed with the court and served so that it
is received by the parties at least seven (7) days prior to the hearing. Any
reply brief shall be filed with the court, and served so that it is received by
the parties, at least two (2) days prior to the hearing.
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of the rules are, in part, to allow
the best chance for each claim to be determined on its merits rather than on some
procedural technicality. Clark v. Olsen, 110 Idaho 323. 326, 715 P2d 993. 996 (1986).

words "Notice" and "Subpeona" in the statute were synonymous to the word "Summons"
by all dictionary references and did authorize service of process upon non-resident
defendants via certified mail. Plaintiff filed a supervisory writ before the Idaho Supreme
Court seeking an order construeing the service statute which had never been previously
interpreted.

On August 29, 2011, the Idaho Supreme Court, without opinion,

summarily denied plaintiff's supervisory writ on the presumptive conclusion that the issue
should be raised on appeal after final judgment. Plaintiff therefore adopts and incorporates herein her argument made in her supervisory writ petition and continues to assert
that she properly served the non-resident defendants by certified mail.
Nevertheless, plaintiff also argues that the defendants waived the defense of
improper service of process when they sought affirmative relief from this court in their
motion to dismiss by asking the court to rule that plaintiff had failed to state any actionable
claim against the defendants for which relief could be granted under Idaho rule 12(b)(6).
See pgs 13-20 of Barber's, et al's Motions to Dismiss. Instructive on this issue is the
Rule in Rhino Metals, Inc. v. Craft. 193 P.3d 866. 146 Idaho 319 (Idaho 09/24/2008).
Chronicling the procedural history in RHINO METALS:

on March 12, 2007, Craft filed

a special appearance. On March 22, 2007, Craft filed a motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction and noticed the motion for hearing. Before the hearing on the motion,
Rhino filed an amended complaint to add a count alleging fraud and to demand an
accounting. In response, Craft filed a motion to strike the amended complaint. The
district court heard Craft's motion to dismiss on April 26, 2007. At that hearing, Rhino
argued that by filing the motion to strike, Craft had made a general appearance in the
action and was therefore subject to personal jurisdiction. The court rejected that argument
and granted Craft's motion to dismiss. Rhino filed a motion for reconsideration, which the
court denied. Rhino then timely appealed.
On appeal the RHINO Court considered the issue of whether Craft's Motion to
Strike constituted a general appearance. The Supreme Court affirmed the following
conclusions of law.
1.

"If a party wishes to insist upon the objection that he is not in court, he must

keep out for all purposes except to make that objection. " Pingree Cattle Loan Co. v.

Charles J. Webb & Co 36 Idaho 442, 446, 211 P. 556, 557 (1922) (quoting from Lowe v.
Stringham, 14 Wis. 222, 225 (1861)). A party who specially appeared to challenge the

-2~"1-
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court's in personam jurisdiction made a general appearance by also moving to change
venue. American Surety Co. of NewYorkv. District Court, 43 Idaho 589, 598, 254 P. 515,
517 (1927}.

A party who specially appeared to challenge the court's in personam

jurisdiction made a general appearance by also moving to change venue. American
Surety Co. of NewYorkv. District Court, 43 Idaho 589, 598, 254 P. 515, 517 (1927). Rule
4(i) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure supports the rule that the party must keep out for
all purposes except to object that he is not in court. Here, after Craft filed his motion
under Rule 12(b)(2) to dismiss for lack of in personam jurisdiction, Rule 4(i) permitted him
to respond to discovery or to a motion filed by Rhino without such action constituting a
voluntary appearance. Craft's motion to strike the amended complaint was neither a
response to discovery nor a response to a motion. Furthermore, the rule provides "If,
after a motion under Rule 12(b)(2), (4), or (5) is denied, the party pleads further and
defends the action, such further appearance and defense of the action will not constitute
a voluntary appearance under this rule.
Here, the defendants have moved to dismiss the case for improper venue specifically asking the court to determine whether plaintiff should be able to prosecute her
breach of contract claims in the forum where the plaintiff sustained damages from
financial obligations incurred and monies expended as a direct result of the defendants
failure to complete the sales transaction and turn over a deed to plaintiff. The defendants
also self servingly and falsely averred that all of the evidence required to prove up
plaintiffs claims - lied in Texas.

To determine if the defendant's claims are credible,

plaintiff was required to submit evidentiary documents going to the merits of her causes of
action.

On August 1, 2001, plaintiff filed an affidavit wherein plaintiff attached the

following critical documents going to the merits of damages sustained by plaintiff as a
direct result of breach of the sales contract between plaintiff and Smith County officials:
Exhibit "2":

A letter of credit /approval

2

from plaintiffs bank representing that

2.
Draws on Letter of Credits permit the applicant to enforce the transaction
subject of the draw. See Synergy Center v. Lone Star Franchising. 63 S.W.3d 561
(Tex.App.-Austin, 2001) (letter of credit is a contract promising payment and can be
specifically enforced or avoided on grounds of breach.) Blickenstaff v. Clegg, Docket n.
29901 (ID, 2004)(1etter of credit is equivalent to a gaurantee of payment.) Loscha Falls
LLC v. State, 207 P.3d 963 (Idaho, 2009) (letter of credit was instrument gauranteeing
payment of costs). SRS Products v. LG Engineering, 994 S.W.2d 380 (Tex.App., 1999)
(The beneficiary of the letter of credit is the seller and the account party is the purchaser.).

plaintiff had been approved for a personal loan up to $18,000 as related to a bid proposal
on property located in Smith County Texas and bearing situs address 14811 FM 2661
Flint, Texas.
Exhibit 11: Numerous draws taken from plaintiffs loan account referenced in
the letter of credit and negotiated to fund the excavation of the subject property for
installation of a home; directly subsequent to representations made to plaintiff in the
April 8, 2011 letter by Smith County employee Lois Mosley that the sale of the property to
plaintiff was conclusive and binding under Texas Tax Code Section 34.23, and that
plaintiff could occupy, possess and improve the property. (See exhibit "5" attached to
Telford Affidavit, paragraph 3 for promise.).
Exhibit "1" attached hereto: Judicial admission that plaintiff wire transfered
$4,214.77 from her loan account secured under the letter of credit, a sum of money
pursuant to the draw demand made by the county defendant's "agent" attorneys, the
Law Offices of Linebarger, Goggan, Blair and Sampson LLC (as admitted in exhibit "4"
attached to the Telford Affidavit filed 8/1 /11) - to pay for the distressed manufactured
home transferred to the subject property and permanently affixed thereto. The wire
transfer transcript (following the bank letter), identifies plaintiffs Idaho address and the
defendant's agent's receiving bank information.
There is no dispute that Plaintiffs bank and employees thereof; are all material
witnesses in this case. These witnesses are residents of the state of Idaho and subject to
the personal jurisdiction and subpeona power of this court. These witnesses would not be
subject to the jurisdiction nor the subpeona power of the Texas courts. The defendants are
are effectively asking this court to judicially prejudice plaintiff by negating these witnesses
to prove up plaintiffs claims - by these defendant's petition to this Court to force venue
jurisdiction over plaintiffs action in Texas. This is clearly a petition for affirmative relief.
Exhibit 8: The picture of the manufactured home affixed to the property. This
home has a security lien attached to it by an Idaho resident - S. Durfee - for funding the
rehabilitation and transportation costs on the home now affixed to the "sold" property.
(See Durfee affidavit attached hereto). This is another "local" obligation to which plaintiff
incurred as a direct result of being promised delivery of the title to the subject property.
Granting the defendant's venue petition would "affirmatively" prejudice plaintiff from
subpeoning this witness at trial as well if Plaintiff were required to try the case in Texas.
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The affidavit of Elham Nielsen:

Elham Nielsen has filed an affidavit claiming

that she is a third party beneficiary of the property sold to plaintiff because plaintiff
entered into a contract to resell the property to Elham after Plaintiff completed the agreed
upon improvements to the property.
It is therefore clear that the defendant's motion to dismiss for improper venue
and/or inconvenient forum (dismissal was admittedly requested by the defendants
because the court cannot change venue from a forum state court to a sister state court)
was a petition seeking affirmative relief from this court. This venue objection was not the
result of any discovery process initiated by plaintiff nor was it a response to a motion filed
by plaintiff; therefore the defendant's venue petition constituted a general appearance.
In addition, it is clear from reading the defendants motions to dismiss, that
they were not limited to Rule 12(b)(2), (4) or (5) motions; rather the defendant's motions
included additional petitions to dismiss each and every merits claim pleaded by plaintiff in
her verified complaint. Rule 4(i) provides: "If, after a motion under Rule 12(b)(2), (4), or
(5) is denied (emphasis added), the party pleads further and defends the action, such
further appearance and defense of the action will not constitute a voluntary appearance
under this rule."

The defendants will not be pleading further in the action because they

merged their rule 12(b)(6) petitions with their rule 12(b)(2),(4) and (5) petitions. Therefore
the defendants have made a general appearance under rule 4(i) because they did not wait
for the court to deny a separate motion under rule 12(b)(2), (4) and (5) before pleading
further. Accordingly, under the Rule set forth in Rhino Metals, Inc. v. Craft, 193 P.3d
866, 146 Idaho 319 (Idaho 2008),

the defendants waived all of their personal

jurisdiction arguments and made a general appearance in the action by law.

II.

VENUE OF THE WITHIN ACTION IS PROPER IN THIS FORUM
The leading case on the determination of proper venue is Burger King Corp. v.

Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1985).

Here, the High

court held that a plaintiff need only show certain factors to establish personal
jurisdiction and venue in the chosen forum. These factors are:
(1) the extent of a defendant's purposeful interjection in the forum state;

b

(2) the burden on the defendant in defending in the forum;
(3) the importance of the forum to the plaintiff's interest in convenient and
effective relief;
(4) the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute; and
(5) the most efficient judicial resolution of the controversy.
Followed in Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113, 107 S.Ct. 1026,
94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987) ("Where a defendant seeks to defeat jurisdiction, [it] must
present a compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would
render jurisdiction unreasonable." OMI, 149 F.3d at 1096. "Modern transportation and
communication have made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in
a State where he engages in economic activity." Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474, 105 S.Ct.
2174 (quoting McGee v. lnt'I Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223
(1957)).

a.

The Burden on Defendant of Litigating in this Forum and Plaintiff's
Interest in Convenient and Effective Relief Are Intertwined And
Favor The Plaintiff

This is a contract transaction wherein plaintiff admittedly obtained several loans
to fund the transaction.

It is undisputed that the defendants have prevented plaintiff

from obtaining the promised deed to the property; they have also corruptly lured the
plaintiff into depleting her loan funds to improve the property; and then they subsequently
interferred with plaintiffs ability to earn an income by thereafter selling the signicantly
improved property to a new buyer.

it is uncontroverted that plaintiff is not regularly employable. Plaintiff has been
adjudicated as permanently physically disabled due to serious health risks, but has been
denied social security disability because of the agency's perception that plaintiff has the
capacity to perform independent jobs out of the regular employment community.
Accordingly plaintiff has no steady monthly income and must earn income off of unique
transactions such as the case at bar.
It is clear that Plaintiff used her borrowing power to fund a transaction that she
could make money off the back end.
from doing so.

The defendants have corruptly prevented plaintiff

Plaintiff has no more assets in which to negotiate a future income, less

1

this Court orders specific performance on the transaction at hand, so that plaintiff can
complete resale of the subject real property and make a marginal profit after all obligations
are satisfied.

Presently plaintiff has no funds that would permit litigation outside the

forum. Also all material witnesses to this case are under the personal jurisdiction and
subpeona power of this Court, where they would not be if this Court were to dismiss this
case to force venue in Texas. Plaintiff is representing herself in part because she lacks
the funds to pay for an attorney.

The Supreme Court has decisioned that Plaintiff may

chose the forum which plaintiff perceives she will receive convenient and effective relief.
Burger King, 471 U.S. At 474. Plaintiff resides at a farm house in Malad Idaho which is
part of a family trust, albiet in serious disrepair. The expenses at the residence are funded
by family members and plaintiff, when and if, plaintiff brings in a random income. The
Supreme Court has decisioned that if a Plaintiff is burdened by litigating in another forum
and that burden would be so overwhelming as to practically foreclose pursuit of the lawsuit, that a Court cannot deny plaintiff her chosen forum. Burger King supra@ 474. Under
the circumstances presented by plaintiff, this court must grant plaintiff her chosen forum.
The defendants on the other hand are well funded. They have hired a
prestigious firm in Boise Idaho that has a strong practice before the Idaho Supreme Court.
The defendants have not shown in any manner, much less a compelling manner, how
they cannot litigate plaintiffs claims in this forum, nor have they provided any compelling
argument why venue of plaintiffs case should not be held in Idaho where plaintiff was
most effected by the defendant's tortious acts.
Furthermore, the defendant's sattelite argument that the Idaho and Texas
Governmental Immunity Acts require venue in Texas, lacks merit.

First, Plaintiff has

not sued the defendants under the Idaho or Texas Governmental Immunity Acts.
Moreover, even if plaintiff had, the Idaho Supreme Court has decisioned that foreign
municipalities may be sued in Idaho courts if they commit a tortious injury against an
Idaho resident.

See Athayv.Stacey, 196 P.3d 325, 146 Idaho 407 (Idaho 2008)

(Following the rule in Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979) that where a foreign
government unit commits a tortious act against a sister state resident, that government
unit is not entitled to immunity from suit.

Here, Athay sued both Idaho and Utah

government officials under the Idaho and Utah Governmental Immunity Acts for causing
him injury in Idaho. The Idaho Supreme Court found that Athay could proceed against

both state municipalities in an Idaho state court and that neither municipalities were
immuned from suit.). In the case at bar, any claim of immunity by the defendants is
likewise non-existent just because of their status as a government unit
Second, under the fact circumstances of the instant case, the Texas
government unit, ie. Smith County Texas, is especially not potected by any governmental
immunity. In State v. Lain, 162 Tex. 549, 349 S.W.2d 579, 581-82 (Tex. 1961) , the
Texas Supreme Court specifically held: "One who takes possession of another's land
without legal right is no less a trespasser because he is a state official or employee, and
the owner should not be required to obtain legislative consent to institute a suit to oust him
simply because he asserts a good faith but overzealous claim that title or right of
possession is in the state and that he is acting for and on behalf of the state .... The
rationale of the rule is that in such cases possession is not in fact held for the sovereign
but is wrongfully held.").

Here, plaintiff claims legal right to the property at issue and

asserts that Smith County is now a trespasser to the land that plaintiff lawfully occupies.
Third,

this case deals with a contract dispute over the right to specifically

enforce the sales contract of property sold to plaintiff and previously owned by Smith
County.

The Texas legislature in 2005 specfically enacted a statute that proscribed the

granting of any immunity to a government unit entering into a contract- following in part
the common law rule in Catalina Development, Inc. v. County of El Paso, 121 S.W.3d
704, 705 (Tex. 2003) ("By entering into a contract, a governmental entity necessarily
waives immunity from liability, voluntarily binding itself like any other party to the terms of
an agreement." The government performs a private function when entering into a
contract with another person.). See Texas H.B. 2039 codified as Local Government
Code §§271.151.160 and providing that "by entering a contract, local governmental
entities waive their sovereign immunity to suit for breach of that contract."

Therefore,

the Texas Governmental Immunity Act enacted to provide immunity protection for certain
acts of government units,

has absolutely no application to the "Breach of Contract

Case" presented herein and does not provide compelling grounds to dismiss the within
action under "non-applicable" venue statutes contained in either the Texas or Idaho
Governmental Immunity Acts.
Accordingly, the defendants have provided no compelling arguments that
venue should be changed from Idaho to Texas.

b.

Forum State's Interest In Adjudicating The Dispute

"States have an important interest in providing a forum in which their residents
can seek redress for injuries caused by out-of-state actors."

OMI, 149 F.3d at 1096.

Here there has been clear injury within the state of Idaho and which was directed at
plaintiff, an Idaho resident. In addition, third party beneficiaries that is also a resident of
Idaho has likewise been injured. See Aff. Of S. Durfee. Idaho therefore has an interest in
adjudicating the within dispute which seeks redress for injuries plaintiff suffered at the
hands of out-of-state actors.

c.

Interstate Judicial System's Interest in Obtaining Efficient Resolution

This factor asks "whether the forum state is the most efficient place to litigate the
dispute." Id. "Key to this inquiry are the location of witnesses, where the wrong
underlying the lawsuit can best be proven and whether jurisdiction is necessary to
prevent piecemeal litigation." Plaintiff adopts her argument supra with respect to Idaho
being the most efficient and only place for effective resolution of plaintiff's claims.

In

Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), the Supreme Court held that venue should be in
the forum where the effect and greatest injury is felt. Plaintiff contends that forum is
Idaho.

The Extent Of The Defendants Purposeful Interjection Into The
State Of Idaho Compels Venue Of The Prosecution In Idaho

d.

(i)

The Defendants Made More Than 9 Phone Calls, 2 Faxes And
6 Emails Into The Forum State To Secure the Sale Of The
Subject Property To Plaintiff

Calling a Texas resident in Texas to solicit a loan is a purposeful contact with
Texas. Rynone Mfg. Corp. v. Republic Indus., Inc., 96 S.W.3d 636, 640 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002.).

At least five federal appellate courts- the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and

Tenth circuits- have held that a phone call from the defendant to the forum state can
create specific jurisdiction when the lawsuit arises from the phone call or other electronic
means. See Neal v. Janssen, 270 F.3d 328, 332 (6th Cir. 2001) ("The acts of making
phone calls and sending facsimiles into the forum, standing alone, may be sufficient to
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confer jurisdiction on the foreign defendant where the phone calls and faxes form the
bases for the action."); Oriental Trading Co. v. Firetti, 236 F.3d 938, 943 (8th Cir. 2001)
(holding that phone calls and faxes into forum created jurisdiction in suit based on those
calls and faxes); Taylor v. Phelan, 912 F.2d 429, 433 n.4 (10th Cir. 1990) ("So long as it
creates a substantial connection, even a single telephone call into the forum state can
support jurisdiction."); FMC Corp. v. Varonos, 892 F.2d 1308, 1313-14 (7th Cir. 1990)
(sending allegedly false faxes to forum state created specific jurisdiction in lawsuit based
on those faxes); Brown v. Flowers Indus., 688 F.2d 328, 332-33 (5th Cir. 1982) (single
telephone call initiated by the defendant was sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction).
Exhibits 3, 4, 5, 6 and 10 attached to the Telford Affidavit show that more than 9
phone calls were made by defendants or their agents to plaintiffs Idaho phone number,
that 2 faxes were sent to plaintiff by Smith County employees, and that 6 emails were
transmitted to plaintiff by the defendants and their agents; all in an effort to culiminate
the sale of the subject property. It is clear that the defendants therefore purposely availed
themselves of this forum when transacting business with plaintiff, an Idaho resident.

(ii)

Single Contracts Executed Over Internet Or Introduced
Into the Forum By Other Means Can Result In Purposeful
Availment Sufficient To Impose Jurisdiction

In McGee v. Intern'! Life Insurance Co., 355 US 220, 222- 223 (1957) : The
US Supreme Court held that entering into a single contract with a forum resident
subjected the defendants to the plaintiffs forum even though no property belonged to the
insurance company in California, no other policies were issued in California and the
insurance company had no offices or agents in California.). See also Zippe Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo.com, 952 F.Supp 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (Where a company
knowingly transmits files over the internet to aid in the execution of contracts, the
company subjects itself to the foreign jurisdiction where the files were transmitted.) ;
Toys "R" Us Inc v. Step Two SA, 318 F.3d 446, 452 (3rd Cir. 2003) (the Zippo decision has
become seminole authority for all cases involving internet business.)

Same Cadle Co.

v. Schlitchmann, 123 Fed. App'x 675, 678 (6th Cor. 2005); Gator.com Corp. v. L.L.
Bean Inc, 341F.3d1072, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 2003); Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467 (5th Cir.
2002); ALS Scan v. Digital Serv. Consultants Inc. 293 F.3d 707, 714 (4th Cir. 2002);
Followed in Pro Axess Inc. v. Orlux Distribution Inc., Nos. 03-4179, 03-4189 (1 oth Cir.
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2005) (Exercising personal jurisdiction where a contract was culminated through the
internet with a trench defendant and plaintiff committed to obligations in the forum state in
perfomance on the contract.).
Citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478, 105 S.Ct. 2174, "with respect to interstate
contractual obligations, parties who reach out beyond one state and create
continuing relationships and obligations with citizens of another state are subject
to regulation and sanctions in the other State for the consequences of their
contractual activities."
Here, it is clear that Smith County created a contractual relationship with an
Idaho resident and cause plaintiff to commit to obligations in the state of Idaho in order to
meet the terms of the contracts with the defendants. Under Supreme Court Rule in
Burger King supra, the defendants actions constituted purposeful interjection into the
state of Idaho, sufficient to sustain personal and venue jurisdiction in Idaho.

Based on the foregoing, all defendants have waived any contest to this court
exerting personal jurisdiction over the defendants, the defendants have made a general
appearance in the action, and Idaho is the proper venue to hear plaintiff's breach of
contract case.

Ill.

PLAINTIFF HAS NOT FAILED TO ALLEGE A PRIMA FACIE
CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS
A.

Plaintiff Has Properly Stated A Claim For Specific Performance

Commecing pages 13-20 of both motions to dismiss, the defendants have
collectively argued that plaintiff has failed to state a prima facie case against the
defendants and therefore have asked this court grant rule 12(b)(6) dismissals with
prejudice on each of plaintiffs causes of action.
As to plaintifs first cause of action for Specific Performance on the sales
contract, the defendants argue that because no written contract was signed, that there is
no contract to specifically enforce.

In the alternative, the defendants argue that even if

there was a contract, the contract cannot be enforced because it was not committed to in
writing and therefore is barred by the statute of frauds. See County defendants motion to
dismiss@ page 14, paragraph 2.

The Idaho Supreme Court has specifically addressed the defendants arguments
in Simons v. Simons, Case No. 25001 (Idaho 2000) favorably to Plaintiff. Here, the
district court determined that Delila must deed the home and sixty acres to Newell and
Carol pursuant to an oral agreement made between the parties. Delila argued that the
district court could not issue such an order because the contract related to a land
transaction which must be in writing under the state of frauds. The record showed that
there was no dispute that an oral agreement existed to convey land to Delila's relatives
Newell and Carol.

Newell and Carol fully performed their part of the oral agreement.

The Supreme Court affirmed that under the doctrine of part performance, when an
agreement to convey real property fails to meet the requirements of the Statute of Frauds,
the agreement may nevertheless be specifically enforced when the purchaser has partly
performed the agreement. Bear Island Water Association, Inc. v. Brown, 125 Idaho 717,
722, 874 P.2d 528, 533 (1994).

"What constitutes part performance must depend upon

the particular facts of each case and the sufficiency of particular acts is matter of law." Id.
at 722, 874 P.2d at 533; (citing Boesiger v. Freer, 85 Idaho 551, 381 P.2d 802 (1963)).
"The most important acts which constitute a sufficient part performance are actual
possession, permanent and valuable improvements and these two combined." Roundy v.
Waner, 98 Idaho 625, 629, 570 P.2d 862, 866 (1977). The Simons Court affirmed the
judgment of the district court who found that Newell and Carol met the elements of part
performance and therefore were entitled to an order of specific performance requiring
Delila to convey the property to Newell and Carol.
Likewise in the case at bar. There is no dispute that plaintiff won the sole and
only bid on the subject property. See Affidavits of Vogt, Neilson, Telford and Greer.
There is also no dispute that the County failed to perform the required appraisal of the
property to assess it's true market value before placing the property for sale as required
under Texas' Local Government Code.

Further, there is no dispute that the County

failed to accurately describe the property for sale as required under Texas' Local
Government Code. There is also no dispute that plaintiff submitted a rebid for the true
market value of the property (which no other person bid on) and that the selling agent for
the county was committed by law to accept Holli's counterbid as the highest and only bid
proferred. It is undisputed that the selling agent faxed Holli a letter confirming that the resale bid was a conclusive and binding contract between Holli and the County and that

Holli could take immediate possession of the property pending delivery of the deed. See
exhibit "5" attached to Telford Affidavit for letter faxed to plaintiff. Finally, there is no
dispute that plaintiff tendered nearly $9,700 to the county or their agents under the letter of
credit for purchase of a "distressed" home that was transferred and affixed to the subject
property and there is no dispute that plaintiff committed herself to another $35,000 in loan
commitments to rehabilitate the manufactured home and develop residential
infrastructure.
Based on the foregoing, plaintiff has met "The most important acts which
constitute a sufficient part performance ... to wit: actual possession, permanent and
valuable improvements and these two combined." Roundy v. Waner, 98 Idaho 625, 629,
570 P.2d 862, 866 (1977). Accordingly, plaintiff was not required to meet the Statute of
Frauds - when the defendants refused to convey the deed to plaintiff in writing, And, the
Doctrine of Part Performance allows plaintiff to obtain a decree from this Court directing
the defendants to specifically perform on the oral contract and convey the property to
plaintiff as a matter of law.

B.

Plaintiff Has Properly Stated A Claim For Breach Of Contract
And The Covenant Of Good Faith And Fair Dealing

The defendants argue that because there was no written contract conveying the
property to plaintiff, that plaintiff cannot state a claim for Breach of Contract and of the
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. For the reasons stated supra, there was an
oral contract and plaintiff clearly performed on that contract thus avoiding the Statute of
Frauds and making an enforceable contract. A party may sue for breach of an Oral
contract of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing inherent in that contract. See
Mancinelli v. International Business Machines, 87 F.3d 1320 (9 1h Cir, 1996) (If an oral
contract exists, plaintiff may sue for all breaches inherent in that contract including for a
breach of the convenant of good faith and fair dealing.)
Since an oral contract did exist in this case, plaintif may likewise sue fo it's
breach.
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C.

Plaintiff Has Stated A Claim Against The Defendants Under The
Idaho Consumer Protection Act

The Defendants argue that because the Idaho Consumer Protection Act does
not specifically include government entities in it's legal definition, l.C. Section 48-603,
that the County defendants are excluded from answering to plaintiffs claim against these
defendants under this act. Plaintiff disagrees. The statute very clearly states "any other
legal entity". The defendants are clearly covered under this escape clause so that the Act
can meet it's purpose.

It would be nonsensical for foreign municipalities to violate the

rights of sister state citizens and then avoid liability for it's actions simply because it is a
municipality.

See Nevada v. Hall supra holding that foreign sovereigns are liable to

injuries commited against citizens of sister states.
Moreover, the defendants cite to 48-602(9) as an omissive statute that allows
them to escape liability. This statute defines trade and commerce and does not exempt
the defendants from liability because the defendants were in fact conducting trade and
commerce within the meaning of it's terms with plaintiff.

Specifically, the defendants did

advertise, offer for sale, sell, collect debts arising out of the sale of goods to ... locations
within the state of Idaho, or directly or indirectly affecting the people of this state.
Contrary to the defendants contention, this statute does not require the goods
sold to plaintiff be located within the state, it only requires that a good be advertised, sold,
debts be collected arising out of the sale or that these acts . . . directly or indirectly affect
the people of this state.

The defendants claim that since the real property is in Texas

and cannot be delivered to this state in consummation of the sale, that the defendants
cannot be held liable under this act for any breach therefore.

The defendants misstate

the transferable item that plaintiff was sold. Plaintiff was sold the deed to the subject
property and promised delivery of the deed in this state by the counties' legal agents
preparing the deed. See exhibit "4" attached to Telford Affidavit which promises plaintiff a
copy of the deed via email from Charlene Fugler and then promises to mail to plaintiff in
Idaho, the original deed.

D.

Plaintiff Has Stated An Idaho AND Utah Racketeering Act
Claim Against The Defendants

As set forth in the Affidavit of Holli Telford filed on August 1, 2011, pargraph 3,
Holli is stating an Idaho Racketeering Act claim, 18 USC Section 7801. et seq. against
the defendants. Plaintiff has asserted the following predicate acts as LC. Sections: (1)
18-2403 (Theft by unauthorized transfer); (2) 18-2403(d) (Theft by false promise); (3)
18-2403 (e) (Theft by extortion) ; 18-2407 (Extortion by a public servant and resulting in
grand theft); and 18-1905 (Falsification of corporate books). Plaintiff has also alleged
that the defendants associated in fact to create an enterprise and conspired to comit
racketeering acts against plaintiff, depriving plaintiff of personal and business properties.
The defendants argue that because plaintiff is not a prosecuting attorney, she
has no standing to prosecute the crimes alleged supra, and moreover, that the legislature
specfically prohibits plaintiff from prosecuting said crimes because there is no private
cause of action under the criminal statutes.
First and foremost, the Supreme Court in Rotella v. Wood et al., 528 U.S. 549
(2000) held that a private party becomes "a private attorney general" with authority to
prosecute crimes on behalf of the state if they are the victims of those crimes under the
RICO act. Hence plaintiff has standing to prosecute predicate crimes.

Secondly, the

Idaho Racketeering Act is the legislative rule that provides for a private cause of action
when certain predicate crimes are commited under the act.

Accordingly, plaintiff does

state a RICO claim against the defendants which she is permitted to try before a jury.
With respect to plaintiffs alleged Utah RICO crime, plaintiff dismisses this
charge without prejudice and replaces with her charges under the Idaho RICO Act.

E.

Plaintiff Has Stated A RICO Conspiracy Claim Against All
Defendants

The Defendants argue that there is no cause of action for a conspiracy claim in
the state of Idaho .

Plaintiff disagrees . Idaho Code Section 18-7804. Prohibited

activities specifically provides: ... (d) It is unlawful for any person to conspire to
violate any of the provisions of subsections (a) through (c) of this section.

Whoever

violates the provisions of this subsection is guilty of a felony.
Plaintiff alleged that the defendants associated in fact and conspired to commit
the predicate crimes set forth supra, especially Tad Beall and his lawfirm.

On June 2,

2011, Plaintiff specifically informed this defendant that he was committing violations

under Idaho's racketeering act and that if he didnt withdraw from the conspiracy and direct
immediate turn over of the deed to plaintiff,

that plaintiff would sue him and his lawfirm

as part of an ongoing RICO conspiracy continuing into the future.

Plaintiff is entitled to

send this claim to a jury under Idaho law.

F.

Plaintiffs Has Stated A Fraud Claim

The Defendants argue that plaintiff cannot meet all of the elements of a fraud
claim. Addressing each element:
(1) A statement or representation of fact:
Plaintiff and those working with plaintiff were all told that: (i) plaintiff had
won the bid with Smith County, (ii) plaintiff's bid offer was conclusive and binding, (iii)
Smith County had sold the subject property to plaintiff, (iv) plaintiff could possess the
property and improve it, and (v) the Law offices of Linebarger, Goggan, Blair and
Sampson were preparing the deed to turn over to the plaintiff. These facts are
undisputed. (See exs. 3-6 attached to Telford affidavit and the whole of the affidavits
presented by Telford, Nielsen, Vogt, Greer and Durfee.)
(2)

it's falsity:
(i) The defendants did not hold plaintiff's bid conclusive and binding; (ii)

the defendants denied that they sold the subject property to plaintiff; (iii) the lawyer
agents did not deliver to plaintiff the deed to the property, and (iv) the defendants denied
that they knew plaintiff had significantly improved the property at the time the defendants
turn over the property to the prior owners on June, 1, 2011.
(3)

its materiality:
All of the misrepresentations made to plaintiff and others - directly caused

the damages to which plaintiff and others have averred in their affidavits.
(5)

the speakers knowledge of its falsity:
On June 1, 2011 and June 2, 2011, County agent Lois Mosley and attorney

Tad Beall both informed plaintiff that they were withdrawing the sales contract with plaintiff
and that plaintiff therefore had no remedy for the tens of thousands of dollars of improvements plaintiff made to the property.

Tad Beall is an attorney and as a matter of law

would have to have known that plaintiff did have a remedy, to wit: a lawsuit against the
defrendants.
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(6)

the speaker's intent that there be reliance:
The County defendants intended that plaintiff rely on their promises that

plaintiff had been sold the property owned by the Couny - as the County defendants knew
of plaintiffs plans to improve the property immediately with the manufactured home that
plaintiff had simultaneously purchased from the County, the county knew plaintiff had
obligated herself to liens to rehabilitate the home and the property, and the County
waited until after plaintiff performed these substantial improvements before telling plaintiff
that they had decided not the sell the property to plantiff.
(7)

The hearer's ignorance of the falsity of the statements:
The record establishes that plaintiff obtained 2 loans, one in the amount of

$18, 000 to support the letter of credit and the other in the amount of $35,000 to subsidize
the rehabiliation of the property and home and to cover costs for transfer and installation
of the home. The record shows that $9700 was already paid out to the county for the
distressed home and transport. Plaintiff has testified that she was ignorant of the
defendants fraud until June 1, 2011 when Smith County employee Lois advised plaintiff
they were not going to tender plaintiff a deed to the property and that plaintiff had no
remedies against the county to force turn over of the deed. Tad Beall, one of the county's
attorneys butressed these statements.
(8)

Reliance by the hearer:
Plaintiff incorporates hereunder her response in subsection (7) supra and

reasserts that she made improvements and obligated herself on loans because she relied
on the counties promises to deliver plaintiff the deed.
(9)

Resultant Injury.
Credit Injury because plaintiff has not been able to make the payments

under the loans; actual loss injury in applied liens in the amount of $53,000 to date; any
injury plaintiff has suffered from damage to the home and property while Elham Nielson
has not been able to purchase and occupy the property nor been able to secure insurance
on the property because of the county's refusal to deliver laintiff the deed; emotional and
mental distress damages; and punitive damages for outrageous conduct on the part of
the defendants.
There is no question that the records on file show that plaintiff can prove up a
claim for fraud against all defendants.

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, plaintiff contends that the defendants have
waived any allege defect in service of process or any other defense of lack of personal
jurisdiction - by making a general appearance before this court both in their venue motion
and because they simultaneously asked this court to grant affirmative relief under their
Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss with prejudice all of plaintiffs pleaded claims for relief
upon plaintiffs alleged failure to state any claim upon which relief may be granted.
Plaintiff also asserts that venue in this jurisdiction is proper, and furthermore,
that the defendants waived their defense of improper venue when they sought affirmative
relief under Rule 12(b)(6) - to essentially kills plaintiffs claims and walk away with a
windfall.
Finally,

plaintiff requests that she be granted in cross, a summary judgment on

all of her claims for relief if the court considers affidavits outside the four corners of the
complaint.

Dated: August 31, 2011

Certificate of Service
The undersigned certifies that she faxed the foregoing document to the following
parties on August 31, 2011.

Brian Julian, Stephen Adams
250 South Fifth Street Ste 700
PO Box 7426
Boise Idaho 83707
Fax no. 208-344-5510
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HOLLI TELFORD
10621 SOLD HWY 191
MALAD CITY, ID 83252

To the clerk of the court:
Please find attached the wire transcript of America First Credit Union identifying the wire transfer to the
law offices of Linebarger Goggan Blair Sampson, LLP of Tyler, Texas in March of 2011 in the amount of
$4,214.77 as credited from the Loan Proceeds of America First Credit Union Member, Holli Telford.
If you have any further questions please feel free to call.
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HOLLI TELFORD
10621 S. Old Hwy 191

Malad, Idaho 83252
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DIS~,~========i
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF ONEIDA
HOLLI TELFORD

Case No. CV 2011 - 00066

Plaintiff
NOTICE TO THIS COURT THAT
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT SERVED
WITH THE DEFENDANT'S REPLIES

vs.

FILED IN

SANDRA COPELAND, et aL

Defendants

ro THE COURT RECORD

ON AUGUST i 8, 201 i UNTIL THE CLERK
TENDERED COPIES OF THESE
REPLIES TO PLAINTIFF ON SEPTEMBER

2,2011
PLAINTIFF FILED AN OPPOSITION
TO THE DEFENDANTS MOTIONS

TO DISMISS ON AUGUST 31, 2011
AND AN AMENDED OPPOSITION
ON SEPTEMBER 1, 2011
THIS COURT SHOULD DIRECT THE
DEFENDANTS TO FILE REPLIES
TO PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED OPPOSITION
-··

--

-----· ·---

J'

--J _, --- -· ·-

HEARING SCHEDULED FOR SEPTEMBER
7, 2011
EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR OSC

RE CONTEMPT AGAINST OPPOSING
PARTIES AND THEIR ATIORNEYS OF
RECORD

COMES NOW Plaintiff and Notices this court that she was never served with
copies of any defendants Replies filed into the court record on August 18, 2011. As this court
is well aware, plaintiffs home was search and seized on August 9, 2011 and for days
afterword, on a general search warrant All of plaintiff's case files, electronic records, paper

records, evidence, computers, electronic devices, etc. were taken. Plaintiff filed a
mandamus writ for the return of hers and other third person's properties lawfully in plaintiff's
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possession and illegally seized In violation of the fourth amendment. That Writ was attached
to plalntiff's August 23, 2011 response to this Court's August 18, 2011 OSC to plaintiff. On or
about August 25, 2011, the criminal judge over plaintiffs obstruction case, dismissed
plaintiffs Mandamus petition for an alleged rule violation but then reinstated the petition after
learning of the error in his ruling and set a hearing for September 9, 2011.
Neverthless, plaintiff has not received her files or computer equipment back from
the Sheriff's office.

Irrespective, on August 31, 2011, plaintiff completed the construction of

another Opposition To The Defendant's Motions To Dismiss given her inability to obtain her
draft of this Opposition contained in her computer that the Sheriff seized on August 9, 2011
and after obtaining new copies of the defendant's motions to dismiss from the court's file.
Plaintiff amended her Opposition on September 1, 2011. Opposing counsel was fax filed
plaintiffs Original opposition on August 31, 2011 and plaintiffs Amended Opposition on
September 1, 2011. See attached electronic phone log showing the fax filing to opposing
counsel's office on August 31, 2011 attached hereto as exhibit "1 ".
On September 2, 2011 plaintiff was advised that opposing counsel had filed Replies
to their motion to dismiss on August 18, 2011, in spite of this court's OSC to plaintiff to
explain why she had not filed her Opposition by August 11, 2011 (during the time plaintiff was
in jail on the obstruction charge for resisting the illegal search of her home.). As aforestated,
plaintiff was not served with these replies unless the sheriff seized plaintiff's mail while plaintiff
was in jail and these replies were in the seized mail.
Nevertless, this court should order the defendants to file responses to plaintiff's
Amended Opposition fax served on opposing counsel's office on September 1, 2011 to
permit the defendants to file new replies. Otherv..rise, plaintiff seeks an OSC re contempt
against the defendants for making certain false statements in their replies to avoid this court's
jurisdiction. Specifically:
Defendant Tab Beall denies he called plaintiffs Idaho phone number on June 2,
2011.

Exhibit "1 O" attached to plaintiffs affidavit filed on August 1, 2011 is the phone log

reflecting Tab Beall's incoming phone call from 903-525-3100. Given plaintiffs phone device
was seized by the sheriffs office and therefore plaintiff is unable to bring this device to the
court on September 7, 2011,

plaintiff requests that this Court issue an OSC against

defendant Tab Beall to produce a copy of his phone bill designated with the phone number
903-525-3100 for the date of June 2, 2011 to prove what phone number this defendant called.
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Plaintiff's Idaho phone number 208-473-5800 will most definitely be on this defendant's phone

bill.
As to the County defendants Reply, their attorney has made two credibility attacks

against plaintiff,

to wit:

(1) the plaintiff is not the true party in interest given an unexecuted

contract with Elham Nielsen - irrespective that plaintiff has presented substantial damages to
this court that attach directly to plaintiff, and ; (2) the plaintiff is practicing law without a
license because plaintiff bought a tax deed property which she sought to "flip" and sell to Ms.

Neilsen in order to earn an income. Both of these arguments are rediculous and frivolous and
this court should issue an OSC to counsel to answer why the court should not sanction
counsel for filing such a fivolous argument.
Dated: September 3, 2011

Holli Telford

The undersigned certifies that she faxed the foregoing document to the following parties on
September 3, 2011 with the foregoing document by fax ..
Brian Julian, Stephen Adams
250 South Fifth Street Ste 700

PO Box 7426
Boise Idaho 83707
Fax no. 208-344-5510
Judge Stephen Dunn

208-236-7012
Clerk of the Oneida County Court

208-766-2990
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Holli Telford
10621 S. Old Hwy 191

Malad City, Idaho 83252
208~ 766-5559

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF ONEIDA

HOLLI TELFORD

Case No. CV 2011 - 66

Plaintiff

vs.
SANDRA COPELAND, et al.

AMENDED RETURN OF "PERSONAL
SERVICE" ON DEFENDANT SMITH
COUNTY ASSESSOR GARY BARBER

Defendant

COMES NOW Plaintiff Holli Telford and submits this Amended Return of
"personal service" on defendant Smith County Assessor Gary Barber. While plaintiff
does not agree that she is required to personally serve the defendants with the summons
and complaint in the instant action, the appearing defendants have successfully obtained
an order to quash service of the process which was initially served upon them by certified
mail as required under the service statute via Idaho's Consumer Protection Act. Plaintiff
intends to perform "personal service" on the appearing defendants only. On appeal
plaintiff will challenge the court's ruling that service by certified mail on the non-appearing
defendants was improper under the specific seNice statute set forth under the Idaho
Consumer Protection Act
Plaintiff has now effected personal service of the summons and complaint
upon the defendant Smith County Assessor Gary Barber pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure Rule 4(d)(2): Service upon individuals ... by delivering a copy of the summons
and of the complaint to the individual personally or by leaving copies thereof at the
individual's ... usual place of abode with some person over the age of eighteen (18)
years residing therein.
Attached hereto as exhibit '"1" is the notarized Affidavit of Service on Smith
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County Tax Assessor Gary Barber showing that this defendant received personal service
of the Summons and Verified complaint on September 13, 2011 by a licensed process
server in in Smith County Texas.

This Amended Return of Service should nowmoot the defendant's pending
motion to quash service of process via certified mail.

Dated: September 16, 2011

Certificate of Service

The undersigned certifies that she faxed the foregoing document to the
following parties on September 16, 2011.
Attorneys Brian Julian and Stephen Adams

250 South Fifth Street Ste 700
PO Box 7426
Boise Idaho 83707
Fax no. 208-344-5510

p

ROM

FRX t'-10.

Sep, 16 2011 10:10AM

ATE OF

"MY·niime bi S.l\RAJI GARNl:ac lain over t!Ji; age of .l &yi:.ars of ago, ;omd
1reside iri Smit.h ¢oi:1m;.<,, Tc~"a"' I am full~· cOmpetent to · zt)ake thls
nffklfwit lhiivr~ i'.ie1:s0nal knowledge of the facts srnt,;;!d h~rein 1 !l.6d
ili~)>: Mc , ifiie iill<l (:t1rr0ct"

()n ~>r ab<)\Jts Sep11~rnber It ipn t reci!.ivecl .a (l}Stf~~MONS .~2) i/tv.fF'i'f;b
C(}M:PLA!r\:'1.' ;ro BE'. SE1~.'.\i'"Ell (r]>iJN SMlttr d.)JJj'lfIY TAXill(SS'lt&5-i:JR GAR~1
l{AJ~:¢j{; .· Cti~E .NAME: .J:lOLLlTEti~dRD ~SSll;:.ilCC to Ni!) rimT tr:u;>t (Pllfbiti'ft},; SANl~RA

C·QJ~E!.A.Nn~Am~llTRAMILl~i J'[ANETl'E HARMON; CODY· KE.tLEYi fti.YL.~Et~EYJR;
1]J~ ~~'~\~~l~lt {)~\'p;c\ iiL "fc:~~LEYSF,;,SMITlI. C()l)NTY TR l}STr:E; f..S.SE.$SQR ::;A.'~~::t~~RY
BARB~!R'f Sl\UTH emJNTY~ .J\,J.:t'.EIE ROSS; .ATTOR'NE'Y TAB BEALL; L.4,'W OF:PlCE .OF
Hn~liQtt~ :l~RANij(>:N, ©Etin£1~~ .• ·C6L1. .1N:s, & MOTT;. usA. NE!Ls.oN A.1~to .· riur:s: i~rp.
(Het¢nilarits} ••.• i?'I THE).fiIS';fRIC'T'· tOllRt(~F']\ftE'SD:~'J'R·~TCD~t:t)lL l)I$Tl~1cr
THE:stA''f'.¢
6]\'Il),~Ho;;n\l :.A\'."+D FOR fiti:S CCHJNTY OF ONIEDA; CASE .NO. '21:i1 !;•tv.:o{i0~6;: StJrVlCE :WA5! .
·; -,-· .",,". ·:. ·:··".,: ~,:.·::.r·~~··;: ):~·>-~ ·:·\::.~:"···-··· ·· ." <#. -'..;: ':··::' ...
:~ ..,·~··:r. ~": ,·
".·:.'-:-;;~··«:;;«!:".'·( "'"·:.:·}···1·-.'·.···.: .... :·
CQMP.LETI::H OP!JN SEP 1hM13ER.J;4, 201 l /\ r ].~111 %.FRf:iN'I I\ Lc.f,TX 7:.ulJ,_ (\1).2:00 l:M ·•Upot1
--~ .. ·.·---z~-.~-~·:·~·.,.~··
.
.
-.
.~:,·
,
..
1..d\R'\ {$g..R~li:.li;,.• ·

or

.S·•.,.; ~i:p~-;; ..1· '.N•·c·:J.•T. ·

.·

·'.'l:J~·L ..,

· ..

Primed ,Name_,,.,;_..;_;__~--,,,,,,. . _;;,,."',,,_·,..._,,,. ~- ..
iVfy c.ommissioi],

P~

FAX NO.

Sep. 16 2011 10:11RM

Holli Telford
10621 S. Old Hwy i91
Malad City, Idaho 83252

208-766-5559
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF ONEIDA

HOLLI TELFORD
Case No. CV 20i 1 - 66
Plaintiff
vs.
SANDRA COPELAND, et al.

AMENDED RETURN OF "PERSONAL
SERVICE" ON DEFENDANT TAB
BEALL

Defendant

COMES NOW Plaintiff Holli Telford and submits this Amended Return of
"personal service" on defendant Tab Beall.

While plaintiff does not agree that she is

required to personally serve the defendants with the summons and complaint in the
instant action, the appearing defendants have successfully obtained an order to quash
service of the process which was initially served upon them by certified mail as required
under the service statute via Idaho's Consumer Protection Act. Plaintiff intends to perform
"personal service" on the appearing defendants only. On appeal plaintiff will challenge
the court's ruling that service by certified mail on the non-appearing defendants was
improper under the specific service statute set forth under the Idaho Consumer Protection

Act
Plaintiff has now effected personal service of the summons and complaint
upon the defendant Tab Beall pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 4(d)(2):
Service upon individuals ... by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to
the individual personally or by leaving copies thereof at the individual's ... usual place of
abode with some person over the age of eighteen (18) years residing therein.
Attached hereto as exhibit "1" is the notarized Affidavit of Service on Tab Beall
showing that this defendant was personally served by leaving copies at his usual place of
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abode during business hours and with a person over the age of 18 residing therein for
business purposes (and designated as the officer manager of the business). The service

of the Summons and Verified complaint was effected on September 13, 2011 by a
licensed process server in in Smith County Texas.

This Amended Return of Service should nowmoot the defendant's pending
motion to quash service of process via certified mail.

Dated: September 16, 2011

Certificate of Service
The undersigned certifies that she faxed the foregoing document to the
following parties on September 16, 2011.

Attorneys Brian Julian and Stephen Adams
250 South Fifth Street Ste 700
PO Box 7426
Boise Idaho 83707
Fax no. 208-344-5510
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STATE Of TEXAS

_
BEFORE .ME, the :-mdcrs1gned authority. on this day pe1;sunn1ly appeared Sarah
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Holli Telford

10621 S. Old Hwy 191
Malad City, Idaho 83252

208-766-5559
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF ONEIDA

HOLLI TELFORD
Case No. CV 2011 - 66
Plaintiff
vs.

AMENDEDRETURNOF "PERSONAL
SERVICE" ON DEFENDANT THE LAW
OFFICES OF PURDUE, BRANDON,
FELDER, COLLINS @ MOTT LLP

SANDRA COPELAND, et al.
Defendant

COMES NOW Plaintiff Holli Telford and submits this Amended Return of
"personal service" on defendant the Law Offices of Purdue, Brandon, Felder, Collins @
Mott llp.

While plaintiff does not agree that she is required to personally serve the

defendants with the summons and complaint in the instant action, the appearing
defendants have successfully obtained an order to quash service of the process which
was initially served upon them by certified mail as required under the service statute via
Idaho's Consumer Protection Act. Plaintiff intends to perform "personal service" on the

appearing defendants only. On appeal plaintiff will challenge the court's ruling that
service by certified mail on the non-appearing defendants was improper under the specific
service statute set forth under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act
Plaintiff has now effected personal service of the summons and complaint
upon the defendant Tab Beall pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 4(d)(4).
Service upon domestic or foreign corporations. (A) ... by delivering a copy of the
summons and complaint to an officer, managing or general agent of the Law Offices of
Purdue, Brandon, Felder, Collins @ Mott.
Attached hereto as exhibit "1" is the notarized Affidavit of Service on the Law
Offices of Purdue, Brandon, Felder, Collins @ Mott, showing that this defendant business
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partnership was personally served by leaving copies of the summons and complaint wlth
the Officer Manager Stephan Golden

The service of the Summons and Verified

complaint was effected on September 13, 2011 @ 1:30 p.m. by a [icensed process server

in Smith County Texas.
This Amended Return of Service should now moot the defendant's pending
motion to quash service of process via certified maiL

Dated: September 16, 2011

Certificate of Service
The undersigned certifies that she faxed the foregoing document to the

following parties on September 16, 2011.
Attorneys Brian Julian and Stephen Adams
250 South Fifth Street Ste 700
PO Box7426
Boise Idaho 83707
Fax no. 208-344-5510
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Holli Telford

10621 S. Old Hwy 191
Malad City, Idaho 83252
208-766-5559
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO

COUNTY OF ONEIDA

HOLLI TELFORD

Case No. CV 2011 - 66
Plaintiff

AMENDED RETURN OF "PERSONAL
SERVICE" ON DEFENDANT SMITH

vs.

SANDRA COPELAND, et a!.

COUNTY AKA SMITH COUNTY TRUSTEE,

Defendant

COMES NOW Plaintiff Holli Telford and submits this Amended Return of
"personal service" on defendant Smith County aka Smith County Trustee.

While

plaintiff does not agree that she is required to personally serve the defendants with the
summons and complaint in the instant action, the appearing defendants have
successfully obtained an order to quash service of the process which was initially served
upon them by certified mail as required under the service statute via Idaho's Consumer
Protection Act.

Plaintiff will perform "personal service" on the appearing defendants

only. On appeal plaintiff will challenge the court's ruling that service by certified mail on
the non-appearing defendants was improper under the specific service statute set forth
under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act.
Plaintiff has now effected personal service of the summons and complaint
upon the defendant Smith County aka Smith County Trustee pursuant to Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure Rule 4(d)(4). Service upon domestic or foreign entities. (A) ... by
delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to to an agent authorized by
appointment or by statute to receive service of process.

In the state of

Texas, the agent of service fo:c smith cm.mty is county judge Joel Baker
pursuant to Tex. Civil Prac. & Rem. Section 17.024(a).
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Attached hereto as exhibit "1" is the notarized Affidavit of personal Service on
County Judge Joel Baker as the agent of service for Smith County aka Smith County
Trustee. As attested therein, County Judge Joel Baker was personally delivered the
summons and complaints on Smith County and Smith County Trustee . The service of
the Summonses and Verified complaints were effected on September 15, 2011 @ 11 :15

a.m. by a licensed process server in Smith County Texas.
This Amended Return of Service should now moot these defendant's pending

motion to quash service of process via certified mail.

Dated: September 16, 2011

Certificate of Service
The undersigned certifies that she faxed the foregoing document to the
following parties on September 16, 2011.
Attorneys Brian Julian and Stephen Adams
250 South Fifth Street Ste 700

PO Box 7426
Boise Idaho 83707
Fax no. 208-344-5510
Holli Telford
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Register #CV-2011-0000066
)
)
)
)
)

HOLLI TELFORD
Plaintiff,

)

~~

)
SANDRA COPELAND; ADMITRA MILLS
)
JEM1ETTE HARMON; CODY KELLY;
)
PAUL KELLEY JR.; THE ESTATE OF PAUL
)
KELLEY SR.; SMITH COUNTY TRUSTEE;
)
TAX ASSESSOR GARY BARBER; SMITH
)
COUNTY; ARTIE ROSS; ATTOR."t\J'EY TAB
)
BEALL; LAW OFFICES OF PERDUE
)
BRANDON, FIELDER, COLLINS & MOTT; LISA )
NEILSON, A.J\TD DOES 1 - 10,
)
)
Defendants.
)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
ON DEFEN'DANTS' MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Re: SMITH COUNTY TEXAS;
SMITH COlJNTY TAX ASSESSOR
G.t\R.YBA.RBER;ATTOR.~EYTAB

BEALL; LAW OFFICES OF
PERDlJE BRMTDON, FIELDER,
COLLINS & MOTT

This matter is before the Court on a motion to dismiss, motion to quash and motion for
summary judgment (Motion) filed by the Defendants Smith County Texas, Smith County Tax
Assessor Gary Barber, Tab Beall, and the law offices of Perdue Brandon Fielder Collins & Mott
(Defendants).

A hearing on the Motion was held September 7, 2011.

The Defendants were

represented telephonically by their counsel Stephen L. Adams. Ms. Telford (Plaintiff) appeared pro
se. After careful consideration of the record, briefs, affidavits, and arguments of the parties the
Court issues its decision and

GRA.~TS

Defendants' Motion.

STAi.""IDARD OF REVIEW
A Motion to Dismiss is governed by LR. C .P .12(b), which provides, in part: "Every defense,
in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, ... , shall be asserted in the responsive pleading
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thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses shall be made by motion: ... (2) lack of
jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of
service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, ... " 1 Further,
I.R.C.P. 12(c) provides that: "After the pleadings are closed but ·within such time as not to delay the
trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings."2
A motion to dismiss may be granted where "the plaintiff can prove no set of facts upon
which the court could grant relief," and in such a case, "the complaint should be dismissed."3 In
addition, "the nonmoving party is entitled to have all inferences from the record viewed in its
favor." 4 If additional "matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court,
the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment."5 All parties are given a reasonable
opportunity to present material that would be pertinent to a motion for summary judgment. The
dispositive question is whether the nonmovant has alleged sufficient facts in support of her claim
which, if true, would entitle her to relief. 6
Vv'hen reviewing a motion to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction, the Idaho
Supreme Court applies the same standard it uses when it reviews appeals from orders of summary
judgment. The facts and evidence presented are construed in favor of the party opposing the order
and accord that party the benefit of all inferences which might be reasonably drmvn. 7
"Summary judgment is proper 'if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
1

l.R.C.P. 12 (b)(6).

2
3

Id

Johnson v. Boundary School Dist. No. JOI, 138 Idaho 331, 334, 63 PJd 457, 460 (2003) (citing Gardner v. Hollifield,
96 Idaho 609, 611, 533 P.2d 730, 732 (1975)). See also Ernstv. Hemenway and Moser Co., Inc., 120 Idaho 941, 946,
821P.2d996, 1001 (Ct. App. 1991) ("For a complaint to be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) on the ground that the
complaint fails to state a claim, it must appear beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim which would entitle him to relief").
4
Johnson, 138 Idaho at 334, 63 P.3d at 460; Ernst, 120 Idaho at 946, 821 P.2d at 100 l.
5
LR.C.P. 12(c).
6
Serv. Emp. Intern. v. Idaho Dept. ofH. & W, 106 Idaho 756, 758, 683 P.2d 404, 406 (1984).
7
Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 74-75, 803 P.2d 978, 980-81 (I 990) (citing lntermountain Bus.
Forms, Inc. v. Shepard Bus. Forms Co., 96 Idaho 538, 540, 531P.2d1183, 1185 (1975)).
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together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw. "'8 \Vhen considering a motion for
summary judgment, a court should liberally construe all facts and draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of the nonmoving party. 9 Normally, summary judgment must be denied where reasonable
persons could reach different conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence
presented. 10
The moving party has the burden of showing the lack of a genuine issue of material fact. 11
To meet this burden, the moving party must challenge, in its motion, and establish through evidence
that no issue of material facts exists on an element of the nonmoving party's case. 12

The

nonmoving party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but
the party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts
shO\ving that there is a genuine issue for trial." 13 Summary judgment is properly granted in favor of
the moving party, when the nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an element essential
to that party's case upon which that party bears the burden of proof at trial. 14
Once the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue the burden shifts to the
nonmoving party to make a showing of the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. 15 This
standard is set out in Cellotex Corp. v. Catrett, 16 and adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court in Badell
v. Beeks:

8

I.R.C.P. 56(c); Arreguin v. Farmers Ins. Co. ofIdaho, 145 Idaho 459, 460, 180 P.3d 498, 500 (2008); Northwest BecCorp v. Home Living Service, 136 Idaho 835, 838, 41P.3d263, 267 (2002); see also Cox v. Clanton, 137 Idaho 492,
494, 50 P.3d 987, 989 (2002).
9
Loomis v. City ofHailey, 119 Idaho 434, 807 P.2d 1272 (1991).
IO Id
II Northwest Bee-Corp, 136 Idaho at 838, 41 P.3d at 267.
12 Id
13
Id (quoting l.R.C.P. 56 (e)).
14
Smith v. Meridian Joint School Dist. No. 2, 128 Idaho
719, 918 P.2d 583, 588 (1996).
15
Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527, 530-31, 887P.2d 1034, 1037-38 (1994).
16
477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
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The plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of Summary Judgment, after adequate
time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient
to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party
will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be no genuine issue as to
any material fact, since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the
non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The moving party is
entitled to a Judgment as a matter of law.... 17
Thus, a responding party cannot raise meritless defenses or claims to defeat Summary Judgment.
Rather, a party must introduce facts into the record that support each element of each defense or
claim asserted.

FACTS
Plaintiff saw an internet advertisement for the sale of real property by the Smith County
Tax Assessor's Office.

18

The Smith County Tax Assessor's Office is a government entity

located in Smith County, Texas. The properties that were to be sold were also located in Smith
County, Texas. 19

Plaintiff traveled to Smith County on February 8, 2011, to complete the

necessary formalities allowing her to bid for a..11d, if the winning bidder, purchase one of the
properties. 20 Plaintiff verified the parcel number and address with the tax assessor's office prior
to bidding. 21

Plaintiff submitted a bid for a parcel being sold by the Smith County Tax

Assessor's Office and located in Smith County, Texas. 22

Plaintiffs bid won the auction. 23

Smith County telephoned the Plaintiff at home in Idaho to inform her she won the auction. 24
Smith County employees also sent a confirmation email to the Plaintiff.

25

17

115 Ida.11.o 101, 102 (1998).
Affidavit of Holli Telford, p. 1, , 4, July 18, 2011
19
Complaint, Jun. 3, 2011, Exhibit 1.
20
Affidavit of L.A. Greer, p. I,, 3, July 22, 2011; Affidavit ofElham Neilsen, p. 2,, 6, July 25, 2011; see Affidavit
of Holli Telford, p. 2, , 6, July 18, 2011.
21
Affidavit of Holli Telford, p. 2,, 5.
22
Id p. 1,, 4
23
Id p. 4, ~9.
24 Id.
25
Id. p. 4,, 10.
18
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On April 30, 2011, Plaintiff again traveled to Texas to inspect the purchased property.2 6
Upon entering the property Plaintiff thought she had purchased she was informed that she was on
the \Vrong property. 27 Plaintiff discovered that there was an error in the address on the property
list posted on the website. 28 After Plaintiff advised Smith County of the error she was directed to
the property that Smith County actually owned and that she had purchased. 29 The parcel Plaintiff
purchased was significantly different than anticipated. 30 Because of this error the Smith County
Tax Assessor's Office allowed her to adjust her bid to reflect the value of the correct property. 31
Plaintiff changed her bid to reflect the value of the property and began to improve the property to
suit her intended purposes. 32 After Plaintiff had incurred substantial costs improving the land,
Plaintiff was notified that the former owner had redeemed the property and that the Smith
County Tax Assessor's Office was revoking the sale. 33
Plaintiff threatened to sue Smith County if the trustee's deed was not delivered to her
immediately. 34 Tab Beall, an attorney with Perdue Brandon Fielder Collins & Mott, called
Plaintiff's Idaho residence to discuss the basis of her threatened lawsuit or any potential claims
she might bring against Smith County. 35 Plaintiff threatened to include Mr. Beall and his law
firm in her lawsuit unless they '\vithdrew from the County's conspiracy to commit various
racketeering violations. " 36
Plaintiff did sue Defendants in Oneida County Idaho claiming breach of contract, and

26

Id
Id.
2s Id.
29 Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.

p. 4-5, ~ 12.

21

at p.
at p.
p. 6,
p. 7,

5, ~ 13-14.
5, ~ 14.
~ 15-16.
~ 20.
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violations of both the Idaho Consumer Protection Act and the Idaho Racketeering Act. 37
Plaintiff requests all compensatory, special and punitive damages allowed, treble damages if
allowable, specific performance, pre and post judgment interest, attorney's fees and court costs,
.
. 138
and a Jury
tna.

Defendants seek to have all of the Plaintiff's claims dismissed, asserting that this Court
lacks jurisdiction. Defendants assert that they have done nothing to subject themselves to the
jurisdiction of Idaho courts because their appearances have been special appearances to contest
jurisdiction or made motions incidental to contesting jurisdiction.
ANALYSIS
I.

Does Idaho's Long-Arm Statute allow Idaho courts to exercise jurisdiction over
non-resident defend ants when the controversy arises out of the sale of real
property located in Texas to an Idaho resident when the negotiations and
contract formation 39 occurred in Texas?

Prior to exercising jurisdiction over nomesident defendants Idaho courts must satisfy two

°

criteria. 4 First, the court must determine that the nomesident defendant's actions fall within the
scope of Idaho's Long-Arm Statute. 41

Second, the court must determine that exercising

jurisdiction over the nomesident defendant complies with the constitutional standards of due
process. 42
A. May this Court exercise its jurisdiction over the nonresident Defendants under
Idaho's Long-Arm Statute?

Idaho's Long-Arm Statute extends jurisdiction over persons involved in the transaction of

37

Complaint, Jun. 3, 2011.
Id p. 9.
39
Defendants dispute that a valid contract was ever formed. However, for the purposes of this motion onlv, the
Court will infer a valid contract existed between the parties.
0
" McAnally v. Bonjac, Inc., 137 Idaho 488, 491, 50 P.3d 983, 986 (2002); St. Alphonsus Reg'! Med Ctr. v. State of
Washington, 123 Idaho 739, 742, 852 P.2d 491, 494 (I 993).
41
McAnally, 137 Idaho at 491, 50 P.3d 983.
42 Id
38
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"any business within this state .... " 43

The term transact is defined as "carry[ing] on or

conduct[ing] negotiations or business. " 44 The phrase "within this state" requires that at least
some part of the negotiations or business be performed in Idaho. Therefore, to be within the
scope of the long-arm statute at least some negotiations or business must be performed in Idaho.
The broad wording of the statute is intended to provide a forum for Idaho residents to resolve
their complaints and should be liberally construed. 45 However, even this broad wording has its
limits. For example, the Idaho Supreme Court ruled that a contract alone will not be sufficient to
subject a nonresident to the jurisdiction of Idaho courts. 46 Instead, the actions of the parties prior
to and after formation of the contract must be examined to determine if the parties' actions rise to
the level of transacting "business within th[e] state .... " 47
The cases of Southern Idaho Pipe & Steel Co. v. Cal-Cut Pipe & Supply, Inc. and

Akichika v. Kelleher are helpful in determining what constitutes transacting business in the state.
In Southern Idaho Pipe & Steel, Cal-Cut Pipe & Supply, Inc. did not have any offices or
employees in Idaho. Instead Cal-Cut Pipe & Supply Inc. sent advertising circulars directly to
Southern Idaho Pipe & Steel resulting in periodic sales over a ten year period. 48 The court found
that the active solicitation to targeted buyers in Idaho for a substantial period of time constituted
the transaction of business within the state bringing Cal-Cut within the scope of Idaho's LongArm Statute and providing a basis for Idaho courts to exercise jurisdiction over Cal-Cut. 49

Like printed advertisements in the past, the internet has become a convenient method to
advertise and attract potential buyers. In cases where the internet advertisement is analogous to

43

LC.§ 5-514(a).
Black's Law Dictionary, Online (2009).
45
Doggett v. Electronics Corp. ofAmerica, 93 Idaho 26, 454 P.2d 63 (1969).
46
W. States Equip. Co. v. Am. Amex, Inc., 125 Idaho 155, 158, 868 P.2d 483, 486 (1994).
47 Id
48
Southern Idaho Pipe & Steel Co. v. Cal-Cut Pipe & Supply, Inc., 98 Idaho 495, 567 P.2d 1246 (1977).
49
Id at 498, 567 P.2d at 1249.
44
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an advertisement in a national magazine, courts usually hold there is no basis for jurisdiction.
However, if the advertisement provides the method to consummate a transaction courts have
found a sufficient basis for the state where the website was accessed and the transaction
consummated to exercise jurisdiction over the advertising company. "[T]he dealings between
the parties both prior to, and following, the execution of the contract must be examined" to
determine if Idaho's Long-Ann Statute will empower the court with jurisdiction over the
nomesident. 50
Here, unlike in Southern Idaho Pipe & Steel, the Defendants did not directly solicit
business from the Plaintiff in Idaho.

The online advertisement did not allow viewers to

consummate a transaction online. The Smith County Tax Assessor's Office placed a passive
advertisement on the internet inviting interested parties to contact them to initiate a business
transaction. Because the internet can be accessed and information viewed globally it is obvious
that Smith County intended to attract as many potential buyers as possible. However, there is no
evidence that Smith County intended to travel to the jurisdiction of each interested buyer and
there consummate a sale of real property located in Texas. Instead, the Smith County Tax
Assessor's Office required interested parties to contact it, and travel to Texas, to purchase the
property. Under this system neither the Tax Assessor's Office nor its officers traveled to any
foreign jurisdiction or sent goods into any foreign jurisdiction. They simply invited interested
buyers to come to them to transact business. In this manner Smith County limited its exposure to
foreign jurisdictions. The Plaintiff responded to the passive internet advertisement that was not
targeted at Idaho or any of its residents. She traveled to Smith County, Texas to initiate and
transact her business.
In Akichika, an Idaho resident found a Portland based newspaper in the Boise airport
50

W. States Equip. Co. v. Am. Amex, Inc., 125 Idaho 155, 158, 868 P.2d 483, 486 (1994).
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advertising a truck for sale in the Portland area.

51

The Idaho resident travelled to Oregon to

purchase the truck. The negotiations, sale, and delivery of the truck all occurred in Oregon.
While traveling back to Idaho the truck broke down.

While the truck was being repaired

Akichika discovered that the truck was not as represented in the advertisement.

The

advertisement claimed the truck was a 1971 model. In reality the truck was rebuilt from various
model years. Akichika stopped making payments. Kelleher made phone calls to Akichika and
even came to Idaho to attempt to repossess the truck. Akichika eventually sued Kelleher in an
Idaho state court. Akichika argued that the phone calls and the attempted repossession showed
that Kelleher transacted business in Idaho allowing Idaho courts to exercise jurisdiction over
him.

The Idaho Supreme Court held that Kelleher's action did not amount to transacting

business in Idaho, therefore, Idaho courts could not exercise jurisdiction over Kelleher under the
long-arm statute. 52 The Court further instructed that Kelleher' s attempts to receive payment or
recover the truck were incidental to the business transaction that occurred in Oregon and could
not be the basis for jurisdiction in Idaho. 53 Akichika is instructive because unless at least some
part of the business is transacted in Idaho, the fact that one party to the transaction is an Idaho
resident is insufficient to provide Idaho courts with jurisdiction. Additionally, incidental contact
with Idaho by the nonresident in relation to the transaction cannot be the basis for jurisdiction.
Here the facts are similar to Akichika. The Plaintiff saw a general internet advertisement,
posted by a Texas governmental agency, to sell property in Texas. She initiated the transaction
by traveling to Texas to complete the necessary formalities to bid on the real property located in
Texas.

Her bid was sent to Texas and received by Smith County.

The negotiations and

formation of the sales contract occurred in Texas. The only contacts that Defendants had with
51

Akichika v. Kelleher, 96 Idaho 930, 932, 539 P.2d 283, 285 (1975).
Id
53 Id.
s2
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the Plaintiff were phone calls and emails informing the Plaintiff that she won the auction,
updating her about the transfer of the deed, ru'ld inquiring into the basis of her claims against the
Defendants. These contacts, like the contacts of Kelleher in Akichika, were incidental to the
business transacted in Texas. Just like in Akichika they cannot be the basis for jurisdiction in
Idaho.
Examining the actions of both parties prior to and after the formation of the sales contract
there is no genuine issue of material fact that Defendants did not transact business in Idaho
subjecting them to the jurisdiction ofidaho courts under Idaho's Long-Arm Statute.
B. May this Court exercise its jurisdiction over the nonresident Defendants in
compliance with the United States Constitution's Due Process requirements?

Even if the long-arm statute was applicable allowing Idaho courts to exercise jurisdiction
over the Defendants, their contacts with Idaho would be insufficient under the Due Process
Clause of the U.S. Constitution to permit jurisdiction. The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution permits a state to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant when
that defendant has certain minimum contacts with the state such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." 54 The court focuses on
"the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation." 55 If the "defendant's
conduct and connection with the forum state" is such that the defendant "should reasonably
anticipate being haled into court there" then jurisdiction in that state will not violate the notion of
fair play and justice. 56

This reasonable anticipation of being haled into court provides the

nonresident a fair warning that they may be sued in that foreign jurisdiction.
This reasonable anticipation is presumed to exist when a nonresident purposefully targets

54

International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158, 90 L Ed. 95, 101-02 (1945).
Shafferv. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204, 97 S. Ct. 2569, 2579 (1977).
56
World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S. Ct 559 (1980).
55
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Idaho or Idaho's residents with their actions and these actions result in alleged injuries that "arise
out of or relate to" those actions. 57 A targeted approach where the actions are aimed at a target
state will lead to a strong relationship between the parties and the forum state. This strong
relationship allows the forum state to exercise jurisdiction over the parties without offending the
notions of fair play and justice. However, not all targeted contacts will be sufficient to provide
jurisdiction. In Saint Alphonsus Regional A1edical Center v. Washington, the Idaho Supreme
Court found that sending communications and payments to medical providers in Idaho was not
sufficient to establish minimum contacts and any exercise of jurisdiction under these or similar
circumstances violated due process. 58
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted a three part test to address whether
jurisdiction can be exercised over nomesidents. 59 Only compliance with all three parts will
allow a court to exercise jurisdiction over a nomesident. First, the nomesident defendant must
"purposefully direct his activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or resident
thereof; or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of
conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws."60
Second, the claim must be one which "arises out of or relates to the defendant's forum-related
activities."61 Finally, the exercise of jurisdiction must "comport with fair play and substantial
. . i.e.,
. it
. must be reasonabl e. " 62
JUSt1ce,
Under either the Idaho Supreme Court's analysis in Saint Alphonsus or the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals' test this Court finds that the Plaintiff has not established purposeful availment
on the part of the Defendants. The initial untargeted actions of the Defendants are insufficient to
57

Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774, I 04 S. Ct. 1473 (1984).
Saint Alphonsus Reg'! Medical Ctr. v. Wash., 123 Idaho 739, 744-45 (1993).
59
Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1016 (2008).
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
58
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allow an Idaho court to exercise its jurisdiction. The actions of the Defendants only targeted the
Plaintiff and Idaho after she had initiated the transaction in Texas.

The minimal contacts

between the Plaintiff and Defendants arose incidentally from the transaction to sell property in
Texas. The Plaintiff traveled to Texas, negotiated for the sale of the property in Texas, and
consummated the contract in Texas. The phone calls and emails from the Defendants to the
Plaintiff are incidental to the transaction and are insufficient to forewarn the Defendants that they
could be haled into an Idaho court.
Even though Idaho has an inclusive long-arm statute intended to protect its residents by
exercising jurisdiction over nonresident parties it is not without limits. The Defendants' actions
must fall within the scope of the long-arm statute and the exercise of jurisdiction must not violate
due process. Because the Defendants' actions do not fall 'Within the scope of Idaho's long-arm
statute it would violate due process for an Idaho court to exercise jurisdiction over them.
Because this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear the case it must be dismissed unless the
Defendants have waived their ability to challenge, and have submitted to jurisdiction in Idaho by
making a general appearance.
II.

Did Defendants make a general appearance subjecting them to Idaho courts'
jurisdiction by including additional defenses seeking affirmative relief from the
Court when they contested jurisdiction?

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have consented to Idaho courts' jurisdiction by filing
additional defenses and seeking affirmative relief in the form of challenging the venue and
dismissing the lawsuit for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."63
Plaintiff's assertion is unfounded and inaccurate for the following reasons.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(g) requires a party to assert the affirmative defense of
lack of personal jurisdiction by motion "prior to filing a responsive pleading and prior to filing
63

Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, p. 3, Sept. l, 2011; I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).
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any other motion" or the defense is waived. 64 This defense is not waived if it is 'joined with one
or more other motions or by filing a special appearance under Rule 4(i)(2)." 65 Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 4(i)(2) allows any party making a special appearance to join other defenses in a
motion under Rules 12(b)(2), (4) or (5). 66 The joining of these additional defenses will not
"constitute a voluntary appearance by the party under this rule. " 67 Therefore, additional defenses
included in a motion to challenge jurisdiction over the person, insufficiency of process, or
insufficiency of service of process will not constitute a general appearance.
Defendants filed special appearances on June 30 and July 5, 2011. 68
appearance was the Defendants' first filing with the court in the matter.

The special

In these special

appearances Defendants declared they intended to contest jurisdiction and filed a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 69 The motions filed do in
fact contest jurisdiction and challenge the service of the summons and complaint. Motions of
this nature are expressly classified as special appearances. 70 Additionally, the motion challenges
that venue is proper in Oneida County and assert that the Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for
which relief can be granted. 71

Because Defendants made a special appearance to contest

jurisdiction, a 12(b)(2) motion, the inclusion of the additional defenses in that motion does not
morph their special appearance into a general appearance.
Because the issue of jurisdiction is dispositive this Court need not address any other
issues raised by either party.

64

LR.C.P. 12(g).
Id.
I.R.C.P. 4(i)(2).
67 Id.
68
Notice of Special Appearance, June 30, 2011; Notice of Special Appearance, July 5, 2011.
69 Id.
70
I.R.C.P. 4(i)(2).
71
See Memoranda in Support of Motion to Dismiss, Motion to Quash and Motion for Summary Judgment, July 13,
2011.
65
66
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•
CONCLUSION
An examination of the undisputed facts showing Defendants' actions prior to and after

the formation of the contract results in the conclusion that the Defendants have not transacted
business in the state of Idaho. The Plaintiff transacted business in Texas. The Defendants'
incidental contacts with Idaho, arising from the business transacted in Texas, are an insufficient
basis to establish jurisdiction under Idaho's Long-Arm Statute. Furthermore, even if the longarm statute were applicable the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution would
prohibit jurisdiction in Idaho because the Defendants have not purposefully availed themselves
to the jurisdiction of Idaho or had sufficient contact with Idaho to reasonably anticipate being
haled into an Idaho court. Because the Defendants have not submitted to jurisdiction in Idaho
through any other means this Court lacks jurisdiction. Therefore, the Plaintiffs claims against
the Defendants who have specially appeared are DISMISSED. A final judgment cannot yet be
entered as there remain Defendants who have not yet been properly served. No disposition can
yet be entered as to those Defendants.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this

3rd

day of October, 2011.

A;LA.....

STEPHENS. DUNN,
District Judge
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HOLLI TELFORD
AKA HOLLI LUNDAHL
10621 S. Old Hwy 191
Malad, Idaho 83252

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF ONEIDA

HOLLI TELFORD
Case No. CV 2011 -- 00066
Plaintiff
vs.
SANDRA COPELAND, et al
Defendants

l.R.C.P RULE 11 (a)(2)(B) MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE
COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN FAVOR OF GARY
BARBER, TAB BEAL, LAW OFFICES
OF PURDUE, BRANDON, FELDER,
COLLINS & MOTT, AND SMITH COUNTY
REQUEST FOR RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATION
AFTER RECONSIDERATION OF THE
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ABOVE STATED
REQUEST FOR RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATION
OF THE RULE 68 SETTLEMENT JUDGMENT
BETWEEN LISA NIELSEN AND HOLLI
TELFORD
REQUEST TO CERTIFY AS A FINAL
JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 54(b) THE
COURT'S ORDER DENYING DEFAULTS
AND DEFAULT JUDGMENTS AGAINST
THE REMAINDER DEFENDANT'S
BECAUSE PLAINTIFF SERVED THESE
THESE DEFENDANTS BY CERTIFIED
MAIL VERSUS PERSONAL SERVICE
UNDER IDAHO'S CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT'S SERVICE STATUTE
AS PERMITTED FOR TORTFEASORS
RESIDING OUT OF STATE
MOTION TO STAY THE TRIAL
PROCEEDINGS AS TO THE REMAINDER
DEFENDANTS UNTIL THE SUPREME
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HAS INTERPRETED IDAHO'S CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT'S SERVICE STATUTE

COMES NOW PLAINTIFF and moves this court to:

(1)

reconsider it's

October 3, 2011 summary judgment order entered in favor of Gary Barber, Tab Beall, The
Law Offices of Purdue, Brandon, Felder, Collins & Mott and Smith County, (2) enter Rule
54(b) certifications of (a) the (reconsidered) summary judgment in favor of Barber, Beall,
Purdue and Smith;

(b)

the rule 68 settlement judgment in favor of defendant Lisa

Nielsen, and; (c) the Court's Order denying entry of defaults and default judgments in
favor of plaintiff as to the remaining defendants, and (3) stay the trial action as to the
remainder defaulted defendants until the Supreme Court has as a matter of first
impression interpreted the specific service statute provided under Idaho's Consumer
Proection Act with respect to constitutional service on out of state defendant tortfeasors.

I.

The Court Is Authorized To Reconsider It's Summary Judgment
Ruling And Take In New Evidence Under IRCP Rule 11 (a)(2)(B)
In Noreen v. Price Development Co. Limited Partnership, 135 Idaho 816,

25P.3d 129 (Idaho App. 2001), the Idaho Supreme Court re-affirmed that

l.R.C.P. 11 (a)

(2)(B) was the proper rule to move for reconsideration of a summary judgment ruling and
to move for the submission of additional evidence.

The Noreen Court cited to First Nat'I

Bank v. David Steed & Assoc., Inc., 121 Idaho 356, 825 P.2d 79 (1992) where the Idaho
Supreme Court opined: Until a final judgment had been entered under rule 58(a) or a
certificate granted by the trial court pursuant to l.R.C.P. 54(b), the order dismissing DSA's
counterclaim was not final and appealable. Therefore, it was incorrect for the trial court to
strike the banking expert's additional affidavit which attached the Bank's loan manual in
further dipsute of the claim.

Thus the Noreen Court re-affirmed in accordance with

Steed supra that until entry of a final judgment under rule 58(a) or a certificate under Rule
54(b), an order for summary judgment must be considered interlocutory and subject to

reconsideration under l.R.C.P. 11 (a)(2)(B).

II.

1

The Court Has Failed To Liberally Construe And Reasonably
Infer All Facts Presented During The Proceedings In Favor
Of Plaintiff As Required By Law
At page 2 of plaintiffs Amended Opposition to Smith County's motion to

dismiss (see caption page attached hereto as exhibit "1 "),

plaintiff argued that when a

court considers a motion to dismiss in a case that would be tried to a jury (in this case
plaintiff demanded a jury trial), all facts are to be liberally construed and all reasonable
inferences must be drawn in favor of the party resisting the motion. G & M Farms, 119
Idaho at 517, 808 P.2d at 854; Sanders v. Kuna Joint School Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 874,
876 P.2d 154, 156 (Ct. App. 1994).
Plaintiff contends that: (1) this court did not construe all facts in plaintiffs favor,
(2) this court inserted facts into it's Summary Judgment Decision which were neither in
the record nor supported by any of the evidence founded upon the record, and

(3) this

court failed to conduct a contacts analysis under plaintiffs tort causes of action sounding
in civil and criminal fraud.

2

See Hudson v. Cobbs, 797 P.2d 1322; 118 Idaho 474 (ID

1990) (This case was reversed as a wholesale compilation of judicial error.

Here, the

district court decided how the case would be tried, ignored the theories presented by the

1. Furthermore, the Noreen Court denied Attorney Fees under l.C. § 12121 and l.R.C.P. rule 54(e)(1) on direct trial of the case and on appeal on the grounds
that when a party presents a question of first impression for decision to a court, such
proceeding cannot be construed as frivolous. Here, Noreen presented a first impression
question as to the ramifications of a violation of the Assumed Business Names Act.
2. The Court errored when it limited anaylsis of plaintiffs case to a contract
case and ommitted material facts to fashion a decision which denied plaintiff jurisdiction
in the state of Idaho. See Yahoo Inc v. La Ligue Contre Lw Raciseme Et L'Antisenitiseme,
433 F.3d 1199 (91h Cir. 2006) (We treat "purposeful availment" somewhat differently
In tort claims, we inquire whether a
when addressing tort and contract claims..
defendant "purposefully direct[s] his activities" at the forum state, applying an "effects
test" that focuses on the forum in which the defendant's actions were felt, whether or not
the actions themselves occurred within the forum. See Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 803
(citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984)). By contrast, in contract claims,
we inquire whether a defendant "consummate[s] [a] transaction" in the forum, focusing
on activities such as delivering goods to or executing a contract in the forum state. Both
anaylsis' must be conducted to determine if one or the other will sustain jurisdiction.
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3

parties,

and refused to grant a motion for reconsideration in spite of acknowledged

judicial error.).
Moreover, the record shows that the court's factual conclusions that plaintiff
executed , consummated and signed the contracts to purchase the subject real property
and the manufactured home placed thereon - in Texas,

are wholly incorrect, and

accordingly, taint this Court's "purposeful availment analysis" under plaintiff's contract
claims presented in her complaint.
Based on all of the foregoing,

plaintiff asserts that the Court wrongfully

deprived her of the proper, most convenient and a fair forum to try her claims.

(1)

Many Of The Court's Facts And Legal Conclusions Supporting
The Court's Purposeful Availment Analysis Under Plaintiffs
Contract Claims Are In Error As All Transactions Were
Consummated In The State Of Idaho - Not Texas
Plaintiff contends that the Court's factual conclusions in analyzing the

defendant's "purposeful availment" contacts under plaintiff's contracts claims are either
disputed by the record, or completely lack foundation from the evidence submitted into
the record, or are contrary to the judicial admissions made on paper or in open court. In
addition with the new evidence submitted by plaintiff, there is no doubt that the court's
factual conclusions are wrong. Before addressing each factual error, plaintiff presents
the following conclusions of law applicable to a "contract contacts" analysis:
(1)

Under the doctrine of lex loci contractus, a contract is considered
consummated, formed and executed where the contract is signed.
See Gates v. Collier, 378 F.2d 888 (9th Cir. 1967) (This circuit adopts
the rule of lex loci contractus set forth in Restatement of the law of
the Conflicts of Law § 332 and which makes the law of the place where
the contract is signed determine the validity, meaning and effect of an
agreement.). Followed in Yahoo Inc v. La Ligue Cantre Lw Raciseme
Et L'Antisenitiseme, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006) (... in contract cases,
we typically inquire into whether a defendant ... "consummate[s] [a]
transaction" in the forum, focusing on activities such as delivering goods
to or executing a contract in the forum state. See Schwarzenegger,
374 F.3d at 802.); Pro Axess Inc. v. Orlux Distribution Inc., Nos. 03-4179,
03-4189 (10th Cir. 2005) ( Exercising personal jurisdiction where a
contract that was presented through the internet by a French defendant
was signed in Utah and committed Plaintiff to obligations in Utah in

perfomance on the contract.).
(2)

A contract is consummated where it is reduced to writing and signed.
Rayv. Frasure, 200P.3d1174, 146 Idaho 625 (ID 2009) (a contract
is consummated when it is reduced to writing and signed.); See Toivo
Pottala Logging v. Boise Cascade 733 P .2d 71 O; 112 Idaho 489 (Idaho
1987) (if plaintiff wished to consummate the contract to purchase, he
usually must sign the standard form prepared by the manufacturer and
tender consideration.); Black's Law Dictionary's two definitions for
"executed contract", are: a written and signed contract, or a contract
that has been fully performed. (9th ed. 2009).

(3)

Contract formation occurs when consideration is tendered to form the
contract. Mitchell v. Siqueros, 582 P.2d 1074; 99 Idaho 396 (Idaho
1978) (Contract formation occurs when consideration is given to form the
contract.); l.C. § 28-2-204, dealing with formation in general provides
that "[a] contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner ...
including conduct by a party which recognizes the existence of such
a contract."); Hudson v. Cobbs, 797 P.2d 1322; 118 Idaho 474 (ID
1990) (The contracts were formed when Hudson signed them, relying
on the representations of Cobbs and Kennevick that the leases were
valid contracts under which they intended to be obligated. ).

(4)

Unilateral contracts are consumatted where the offeree accepts the terms
of the unilateral offer and performs thereunder to secure the promises
in the offer. See Evanston Insurance Company v. Westchester Surplus
Lines Insurance Company; Case No. 10-36133 (9th Cir. 10/03/2011) ,
the gth circuit re - affirmed the factual circumstances under which a
unilateral contract will be formed, executed and subject to enforcement.
The Ninth circuit cited to Black's Law Dictionary's two definitions for
"executed contract", to wit: a written and signed contract, or a contract
that has been fully performed. (9th ed. 2009). Accordingly, "A unilateral
contract exists when one party offers to do a certain thing in exchange for
the other's performance, and performance by the other party constitutes
acceptance and execution of the contract." Here, the fax from Bellevue
Master to Northwest on February 22, 2001 was an offer: Northwest would
be able to continue working as a subcontractor at the construction project
provided it complied with Bellevue Master's insurance requirements. When
Northwest contacted its insurance broker and requested that the broker
issue the insurance certificate to Bellevue Master, Northwest accepted the
unilateral contract, and a contract was thereby formed, executed and
subject to enforcement." Idaho also concurs that a unilateral contract will
be formed and executed when the offeree performs upon the terms of the
offer in Shore v. Peterson, 204 P.3d 1114, 146 Idaho 903 (Idaho 2009)
("where the offeror makes a promise that is conditional on the offeree"s
acceptance, an offeree accepts by rendition of the requested performance.")
citing CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 21 at 52 (1963) (An offer for a
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unilateral contract calls for acceptance by rendition of the requested
performance.) J. CALAMARI and J.PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§ 1-10 (1977). Deer Creek, Inc. v. Clarendon Hot Springs Ranch, Inc., 107
Idaho 286, 291, 688P.2d1191, 1196 (Ct.App.1984).
(5)

Loan obligations created in the forum state to fund contracts creates
contacts in the forum state where the payments on the loans are expected
to generate. Rynone Mfg. Corp. v. Republic Indus., Inc., 96 S.W.3d@ 640,
(Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002.) ("Calling a Texas resident in Texas to solicit a
loan is a purposeful contact with Texas under a contracts anaylsis.) See
also Pro Axess Inc. v. Orlux Distribution Inc., Nos. 03-4179, 03-4189
(10th Cir. 2005) (Exercising personal jurisdiction where a contract that
was presented through the internet by a French defendant was signed
in Utah and committed Plaintiff to monetary obligations in Utah in
perfomance on the contract.); Vreeken v. Lockwood Engineering, B.V.,
218 P .3d 1150, 148 Idaho 89 (Idaho 2009) (loans obtained locally for
business purposes result in contact with forum.) same Hsu v. Liu, Case no.
07-1046 (Texas Supreme Court 2007)

(6)

Phone calls, faxes, letters, and emails sent in the forum state to firm up
contract negotiations or correct contract errors, are contacts with the forum.
Neal v. Janssen, 270 F.3d 328, 332 (6th Cir. 2001) ("The acts of making
phone calls and sending facsimiles into the forum, standing alone, may be
sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the foreign defendant where the phone
calls and faxes resulted in a consummated contract where consideration
generated from the forum state.); Oriental Trading Co. v. Firetti, 236 F.3d
938, 943 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that phone calls and faxes into the forum
created jurisdiction in suit based on those calls and faxes); Taylor v. Phelan,
912 F.2d 429, 433 n.4 (10th Cir. 1990) ("So long as it creates a substantial
connection, even a single telephone call into the forum state can support
jurisdiction."); FMC Corp. v.Varonos, 892 F.2d 1308, 1313-14 (7th Cir. 1990)
(sending allegedly false faxes to forum state created specific jurisdiction in
lawsuit based on those faxes); Brown v. Flowers Indus., 688 F.2d 328, 332333 (5th Cir. 1982) (single telephone call initiated by the defendant was
sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction).

(7)

A website is not passive where it provides a means to purchase goods or
products or services. See Holland America Line Inc. v. Wartsila North
America, Inc., 485 F.3d 450 (9th Cir. 2007) ( Defining passive website as
one that does not provide any means for purchasing items or requesting
services.) CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996)
(posting information over the internet for purpose of selling products is not
a passive website and meets the express aiming requirement to impose
jurisdiction where the sales have an impact.); Telco, 977 F. Supp.at 406
("because [defendants] conducted their advertising and soliciting over the
Internet, they subjected themselves to the jurisdiction of the buyers courts).
Blacks law definition: passive is "receiving or subjected to an action without
A judicial consensus has
responding or initiating an action in return.
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generally emerged that personal jurisdiction exists when Internet activities
involve the conduct of business over the Internet, including substantial
commercial interactivity that result in obligations incurred by the buyer in
buyer's jurisdiction. See id. At *5 (citing Zippo Mfg. Co., 952 F. Supp. At
1125-26; Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1333 (E.D. Mo.
1996); Gary Scott lnt'I, Inc. v. Baroudi, 981 F. Supp. 714, 716 -17 (D.
Mass. 1997); Superguide Corp. v. Kegan, 987 F. Supp. 481, 486-87 (W.D.
N.C. 1997); Thompson v. Handa-Lopez, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 738, 743-44
(W.D. Tex. 1998); Compuserve, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1264
(6th Cir. 1996)).
With these contract laws in m'1nd,

plaintiff now points to the numerous

erroneous factual conclsuions in the court's October 3, 2011 Decision which seeks to
deny plaintiff of an Idaho forum in which to hear her claims. Plaintiff also includes new
evidence to buttress her attack on these erroneous factual conclusions.

Summary Judgment@ pg. 4 states all of the following conclusionary facts :
"Plaintiff saw an internet advertisement for the sale of real
Property by the Smith County Tax Assessor's Office."
Court's stated fact:

Plaintiffs response: This fact is true but OMITS other material facts pertinent
to this stated fact. Specifically, Plaintiff saw the internet advertisment on Smith County's
Website on or about March 1, 2011 when the advertisement was posted for the first time
by Smith County, and further, required all bids to be placed by noon of the last work day
of each month (thereby implying monthly postings.). See exhibit "1" attached to Telford's
affidavit in support of this reconsideration motion, for Bid instruction sheet posted on
Smith County's Website at 9:00 a.m. on March 1, 2011 @ paragraph 12 which instructs
as to the monthly deadline for submission of bids on struck off property. This document
also instructs "buyers at large" to draw down "the request for written statement under
Texas Tax Code section 34.015 regarding delinquent taxes and to mail the executed
document in with the sealed bid and supporting consideration (including a letter of credit),
before expiration of the deadline. Attached as exhibit "2" to Telford's affidavit in support
of this motion is a copy of Smith County Tax Assessor's Website as it existed on March
1, 2011. As can be seen thereby, Smith County instructs "national buyers" to draw
down "the request for written statement under Texas Tax Code section 34.015 regarding
delinquent taxes directly from Smith County's website, to draw down the Bid Sheet form
that Smith County requires Bids to be submitted on, and to mail or personally deliver
the executed Tax Delinquency Statement, the sealed bid and supporting consideration
(including a letter of credit) to the Smith County County Tax Office.
The date this advertisement was posted is relevant to when and where the
subject bid and supporting consideration were formed, executed and consumated.
Court's Stated Facts: 'The Smith County Tax Asessor's Office is a government

entity located in Smith County Texas. The properties that were sold were also located in
Smith County, Texas."
Plaintiffs response:
Plaintiff alleged in her Amended Opposition that Smith
County's status as a governmental entity located in Smith County Texas and the location
of the properties plaintiff purchased at the time of the sale, were irrelevant to whether
these defendants were subject to the jurisdiction of the Idaho courts where plaintiff
suffered the effects of the injuries inflicted upon her by these defendants. Specifically
plaintiff presented Texas law which showed the Smith County was performing a "private
function" having no governmental immunity when they transacted business and inflicted
injuries upon plaintiff in the state of Idaho. Reciting these laws: The Texas legislature in
2005 specfically enacted a statute, H.B. 2039 codified as Local Government Code
§§271.151.160, that proscribed the granting of any immunity to a government unit
entering into a private function such as a contract - following in part the common law rule
in Catalina Development, Inc. v. County of El Paso , 121 S.W.3d 704, 705 (Tex. 2003)
( "By entering into a contract, a governmental entity necessarily waives immunity from
liability, voluntarily binding itself like any other private party to the terms of an agreement.
The government performs a private function when entering into a contract with another
person."). Plaintiff also cited to Athay v.Stacey, 196 P.3d 325, 146 Idaho 407 (Idaho
2008) (Following the rule in Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979): where a foreign
government unit commits a tortious act against a sister state resident, that government
unit is not entitled to immunity from suit when charged with a tort as a private tortfeasor).
Holli also argued to the court that Smith County has sent Holli the deed to the
manufactured home to her Idaho address but had refused to deliver the deed to the real
property Holli had purchased to Holli's Idaho address. Holli stressed that the properites
she expected to be delivered WERE THE DEEDS as it was the deeds that served as
securities for the now defaulted loans Holli obtained in the state of ldhao.
Court's Stated Fact: " Plaintiff traveled to Smith County Texas on February 8,
2011 to complete the necessary formalities allowing her to bid for and, if the winning
bidder, purchase one of the properties."
Plaintiffs response : Plaintiff did not travel to Smith County Texas on
February 8, 2011 for the purpose of completing the necessary formalities to allow her to
bid on the properrty at hand.
First, plaintiff was in texas on another matter and while
there learned of Texas' property tax sales unique from other states. Plaintiff obtained
the necessary Statement while she was in Texas on another matter.
The Tax
Delinquency Statement was good for 90 days from the date of purchase. See statement
as exhibit "1 "attached to Holli's affidavit filed on July 18, 2011 for expiration date of this
document. At the time Holli purchased the Tax Delinquency Statement, the subject real
property which Holli had bid on had not yet been posted on Smith County's website as a
struck off property.
Accordingly Holli had not yet executed any contract concerning
purchase of the "specific property" at issue.
Court's Stated Fact : " Plaintiff verified the parcel number and address with
the tax assessor's office prior to bidding."
Plaintiffs response :

This verification process took place in the coarse of
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negotiations conducted over numerous phone calls between plaintiff and Lois Mosley
while Holli was in Idaho at her Idaho residence. Holli was clearly back in the state of
Idaho by February 14, 2011 as she personally filed an Ex-par1e Motion To Apply
Telford's Motion For Summary Judgment On Ralston's First Amended Complaint To
Ralston's Substituted Counterclaim Filed By Ralston On February 2, 2011, on February
14, 2011 in Oneida County Idaho case no. 2010-185. In addition, in her affidavit filed
with this court on July 18, 2011, Paragraph 5, p. 2, Holli attested that she was told by
Lois Mosley of the Smith County Tax office on or about March 8, 2011 that the property
Holli was interested in was the acreage land hosting a barn and owned by Jospeh and
Tammi Conflitti. Exhibit "3" attached to Holli's affidavit supporting this motion for
reconsideration and filed separately with the clerk Diane Skidmore under separate cover
on 10/17/2011- is an electronic exhibit of the magic jack phone call from Lois Mosley to
Holli at her Idaho residence on March 8, 2011 while Holli and Lois were playing phone tag
to discuss further matters concerning the subject real property.
Court's Stated Fact : "Plaintiff submitted a bid for a parcel being sold by the
Smith County Tax Assessor's office and located in Smith County Texas."
"Plaintiffs "written acceptance bid" was formed,
Plaintiffs response :
executed, signed by an Idaho notary (as required in exhibit "1" to Holli's supporting
affidavit) , and consummated in the state of Idaho.
Holli also included with her written
bid acceptance contract, a letter of credit bearing her Idaho address as the obligatory
address for the loan supporting the letter of credit. A letter of credit supporting at least
the full amount of the bid was a requirement of Smith County when submitting the "Bid
Acceptance contract".
(Again refer back to exhibit "1" attached to Holli's affidavit
supporting this motion - for the instruction letter by Smith County @ paragraph 8 citing
the requirement that the letter of credit be in the minimum amount of the full bid.). After
Holli formed, signed, executed and consummated her written bid acceptance contract in
Idaho,
she mailed these documents to Smith County Texas as instructed on Smith
County's Instruction letter posted on Smith County's website.
Court's Stated Facts : "Smith County telephoned Plaintiffi at her Idaho home
to inform Plaintiff she won the auction. Smith County employees also sent a confirmation
email to the Plaintiff."
In addition, to calling plaintiff several times to confirm
Plaintiffs response :
plaintiff had won the bid, Smith County employee Lois Mosley also faxed Plaintiff a letter
to initate the process of collecting the purchase fees under Plaintiffs letter of credit
bearing Plaintiffs Idaho address as the obligatory address. This letter was attached as
exhibit "5" to Telford's Affidavit filed on July 18, 2011 and referred to by Holli
@
Paragraph 11, p. 4 of Holli's Affidavit. The faxed letter constituted judicial admissions
that : (1) Holli's bid was conclusive and binding; (2) Smith County was preparing the
deed to convey the property to Holli; (3) no redemption right existed on the property
resold to Holli; and (4) Holli was permitted to occupy the property and improve it.
on April 5, 2011, Smith
Furthermore, in compliance with Lois Mosley's faxed letter,
County's lawfirm Linebarger, Goggan, Blair and Sampson sent Holli an email notifying
Holli that they were preparing the deed and had sent Holli a letter confirming Holli was the
new owner of the subject real property so that Holli could obtain property insurance. This
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email was attached as exhibit "4" to Holli's July 18, 2011 affidavit and referred to in
Paragraph 2, p.1 and Paragraph 11, p. 4 of that Affidavit.

Summary Judgment@ pg. 5 states all of the following conclusionary facts :

Court's Stated Facts: "On April 30, 2011, Holli traveled to Texas to inspect
the purchased property. Upon entering the property ... she was informed that she was
on the wrong property. Plaintiff discovered there was an error in the address on the
property list posted on the website. After Plaintiff advised Smith County of the error she
was directed to the property that Smith County actually owned and that she had
purchased via the internet. The parcel Plaintiff had purchased was significantly different
than anticipated. Because of this error, the Smith County Tax Assessor's Office allowed
Holli to adjust her bid to reflect the value of the correct property. Plaintiff changed her bid
to reflect the value of the property and began to improve the property to suit her intended
purposes."

Plaintiff's response : All of the foregoing facts are correct, except the
"adjustment of the bid" should be considered a modification of the original "bid
acceptance contract" plaintiff tendered in perfomance of Smith County's unilateral
offer to sell the subject struck off property advertised on their website.
Court's Stated Facts : "After Plaintiff incurred substantial costs improving the
land, Plaintiff was notified that the former owner had redeemed the property and that
Smith County Tax Assessor's office was revoking the sale."
Plaintiff's response : Plaintiff had not only spent $5450 excavating the subject
real property of trees and shubbery as asserted @ Paragraph 21, p. 8, of Telford's July
18, 2011 Affidavit and as shown in exhibit "11" attached to that affidavit, but Holli had
also moved a manufacutured home on the property and incurred another loan obligation
of $35,000 against title of the home to pay for the infrastructure that supported utilities,
water and waste faciilities to the manufactured home. The lender on the home was an
Idaho lender and again the obligatory address for the second loan in the amount of
$35,000 was plaintiff's Idaho address. (See affidavit of S. Durfee on file with the court.).
In addition, Holli's became obligated on the $18,000 letter of credit which attached to a
personal loan Holli obtained to purchase the struck off property. These obligations also
Accordingly the actual "invested damages" total
attached to Holli's Idaho address. 3
some $65,000 to date and Plaintiff felt the injuries from these defrauded investments in
the state of Idaho where she became obligated thereto.
Smith County had no

3. These monetary obligations are now being funded by Ferron Stokes, given
Oneida County officials obstructed Holli's ability to earn any income by an illegal search
and seizure they performed on Holli's property on August 10, 2011 For example, Ferron
Stokes paid off the delinquent property taxes due in Oneida County case no. 2011-CV-44
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authority at law to redeem the property to the former owner given statutes
presribing such acts as void.
(See Texas Property Tax Code Sec.3423(b): the
owner of .property sold for taxes to a taxing unit may not redeem the property from the
taxing unit after the property has been resold.). Plaintiff alleges that Smith County in fact
retained the property in their coffers so that they could resell the property to another at a
significantly higher value (since the prior owners could not redeem the property as a
matter of law because Smith County had resold the property to Plaintiff.). Plaintiff has
alleged that Smith County exerted unconsented control over plaintiffs properties by
fraud and deception and thereby committed the following civil and criminal violations:
Fraud under Idaho's Consumer Protection Act, Theft by unauthorized transfer under
l.C. 18-2403; Theft by false promise under l.C. 18-2403(d); Theft by extortion under
l.C. 18-2403(e); and common law and constructive fraud under Idaho law.
Court's Stated Facts : " Plaintiff threatened to sue Smith County if the trustee's
deed was not delivered to her immediately.
Tab Beall, an attorney with Perdue,
Brandon, Felder, Collins & Mott, called Plaintiffs Idaho residence to discuss the basis of
her threatened lawsuit or any potential claims she might bring against Smith County.
Plaintiff threatened to include Mr Beall and his lawfirm in her lawsuit unless "they withdrew
from the county's conspiracy to commit various racketeering violations."
Plaintiffs response : These facts are correct and plaintiff has charged the
attorney and his lawfirm with conspiracy to violate the following criminal codes constituting
predicate acts under Idaho's racketeering act : Theft by unauthorized transfer under l.C.
18-2403; Theft by false promise under l.C. 18-2403(d); and Theft by extortion under
LC. 18-2403(e).
Court's Stated Facts : • Defendants seek to have all of plaintiffs claims
dismissed, asserting that this Court lacks jurisdiction. Defendants assert that they have
done nothing to subject themselves to the jurisdiction of Idaho courts because their
appearances have been special appearances to contest jurisdiction or made motions
incidental to contest jurisdiction."
Plaintiffs

response :

Plaintiff contends that the defendants did not make

to the County Treasurer Diane Pett to save the Malad property from foreclosure; Ferron
Stokes purchased the $35,000 note held by S. Durfee on the Manufactured home placed
on the Texas property which was due to foreclose on October 15, 2011 (see affidavit of
S. Durfee filed into this court's record) and is holding Holli's payments due on this note
under a reverse mortgage theory taking in payments as Holli can afford ; and Ferron
Stokes is paying Holli's $18,000 loan obligations to American First Bank which supported
Holli's letter of credit for the purchase of the subject struck off property now affixing
permanently thereto, the manufactured home bearing the $35,000 Idaho lien. Ferron
Stokes will be owed substantial premiums for his reverse mortgage and note liens as soon
as Idaho properly invokes jurisdiction over the torts at hand and allows a jury to award
plaintiff damages. Ferron Stokes is an Idaho business man. (See Idaho Well Drillers
license for Ferron Stokes as exhibit "4" attached to Holli's affidavit supporting this motion
for reconsideration.).

ll

special appearances. In their motion to dismiss, the defendants moved for dismissal
under Rule 12(b)(2), but they also joined summary judgment petitions asking the court
to summary adjudicate all of plaintiffs claims "on their merits" in the defendant's favor on
the alleged assertion that plaintiff failed to state any prima facie claim on it's face that
would allow relief.
The defendants argued that they were permitted to argue both
jurisdictional and merits dismissals in the same motion under rule 4(i) which allowed the
joinder of defenses in one motion without making a general appearance.
Plaintiff
contended that rule 4(i) also included provisions that if a defendant argued defenses
outside of Rule 12(b)(2), (4) and (5), before a court had ruled on the 12(b)(2), (4) and (5)
defenses and denied them,
that the defendants would be making a voluntary
appearance. This conflict in rule 4(i) has never been addressed by an Idaho Appellate
Court and certainly has not been clearly addressed by this court's October 3, 2011
decision which continues to lend confusion to this issue. Therefore, plaintiffs reasserts
that by taking the defendants position, the Court has rendered the other provisions in rule
(4 )(i) superiluous.

Court's Stated Fact : " Plaintiff sued the Defendants in Oneida County Idaho
claiming breach of contract, and violations of both the Idaho Consumer Protection Act
and the Idaho Racketeering Act."
Plaintiffs response :
Plaintiff also sued for equitable claims of Specific
Performance, Constructive Trust, and Breach of Implied Covenant Of Good Faith and
Fair dealing.

(2)

The Court's Misapplied The Law Based On The Court's
Erroneous Factual Conclusions
To begin it's legal anaylis,

the Court incorrectly asserts that

negotiations and contract formations took place in Texas.

the

In fact nothing in the

record supports either factual conclusions. The negotations and contract formations,
executions and consummations took place in Idaho as the evidence clearly shows.

The

Court then identifies that plaintiff must meet two prongs to assert jurisdiction over her
case in Idaho, to wit: the defendant's actions must fall within Idaho's Long Arm Statute
and jurisdiction over the defendants must be reasonable under the Due Process Clause.
Notably missing from the Court's jurisdictional analysis is any assessment under Idaho
Long Arm Statute's - Tortious Injury Prong . Here, it is undisputed that the defendants
caused more than $65,000 in actual obligatory damages in the state of Idaho as a direct
result of the defendant's civil and criminal fraud purposefully interjected into Idaho and
against an Idaho resident.

-3Z,~

-

(a)

The Court Has Improperly Limited Analysis of Plaintiff's
Claims Under the Idaho Long Arm Statute To The "Doing
Business" Prong And Has Completely Avoided Any
Analysis Under The Tortious Act Prong 4
( i)

Under Western States Equipment Co. v. Am Amex Inc.,
Jurisdiction Is Properly Placed In Idaho

In assessing the "Doing Business" prong,

the court has correctly stated that

Idaho may obtain jurisdiction over a business transaction if "at least some negotiations or
business were performed in Idaho."

The Court then cites to Western States Equipment

Co. v. Am Amex Inc., 125 Idaho 155, 158, 868 P.2d 483, 486 (1994) for the proposition
that a contract alone cannot support jurisdiction.

However in analyzing Western States

supra as applied to the facts of this case, there are clear similarities such that the Idaho
Supreme Court would hold that jurisdiction over this case under both the Business Prong
of the Idaho Long Arm Statute and the Due Process Clause of the US Constitution.
Specifically in Western States Equipment Co. v. Am Amex Inc., 125 Idaho 155,
158, 868 P.2d 483, 486 (1994),

several telephone negotiations took place between

American's secretary in Georgia and Western's credit manager in the State of Idaho
concerning the leasing of equipment.

At

least one (1) of these conversations was

initiated by American's secretary by calling the office in Idaho.

(See Aff. Of Telford

supporting this motion for reconsideration, exhibit "3" filed under separate cover as an
electronic record with the clerk of the court,

plaintiff presented a recorded incoming

phone call from Smith County Tax official Lois Mosley on March 8, 2011 to plaintiff in
Idaho for purposes of further discussing and negotating the sales offer by Smith County
concerning the subject struck off property.)

in Western, the Supreme Court found that

the single phone contact, combined with the credit application which was faxed to
Western's general office in Idaho, indicated the transaction of business in Idaho for

4. Idaho's Long Arm Statute, l.C. § 5-514 has two prongs applicable to the
case at bar : (a)
The transaction of any business within this state which is hereby
defined as the doing of any act for the purpose of realizing pecuniary benefit or
accomplishing or attempting to accomplish, transact or enhance the business purpose or
objective or any part thereof of such person, firm, company, association or corporation;
(b)
The commission of a tortious act within this state;
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purposes of pecuniary benefits as defined in l.C. § 5-514(a).

The Court further

concluded that Western had established that American had purposely availed itself of the
privilege of conducting business in Idaho under the Due Process Clause because
American negotiated with Western to obtain credit from Western and Western did extend
credit to American in Idaho based on the faxed credit application.
In comparing the similarities in Western supra with plaintiffs case, on July 18,
2011, Plaintiff filed an Affidavit wherein she attached exhibits 3, 4, 5, 6 and 10, all which
showed more than 9 phone calls were made by defendants or their agents to plaintiffs
Idaho phone number, 2 faxes were sent to plaintiff by the defendants, and that at least 6
emails were transmitted to plaintiff by the defendants and their agents; all in an effort to
secure pecuniary benefit from

the transactions.

However,

exhibit "5"

attached to

Telford's July 18, 2011 affidavit would be the most compelling in applying the standards
in Western supra to plaintiff's case.

Exhibit "5" shows that Smith County employee Lois

Mosley faxed Plaintiff a letter to plaintiff's Idaho home confirming the finality of the
purchase and seeking to commence the process of drawing funds on Plaintiffs Letter of
Credit which loan obligations attached to plaintiffs Idaho residence. Plaintiff asserts that
Mosley's faxed letter seeking a substantial draw on plaintiffs Letter of Credit is likened to
the faxed credit application to Western from American , and further, that both faxes were
sent into the state of Idaho in order to realize pecuniary benefits.
Supreme Court ruled in Western States Equipment, supra,

Therefore, like the

Smith County purposely

availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in Idaho under the Due Process
Clause because Smith County negotiated with Plaintiff to obtain funds off of plaintiffs
letter of credit , and did in fact receive a substantial amount of money for the purchase of
the manufactured home permanently affixed to the subject struck off property. Therefore
under Western States supra, jurisdiction in Idaho is established.

( ii )

Under Southern Idaho Pipe v. Cal-Cut, Jurisdiction
Is Properly Laid In Idaho

This Court then cited to Southern Idaho Pipe & Steel v. Cal-Cut, 567 P.2d 1246;
98 Idaho 495 (ID 1977) and distinguished plaintiffs case by holding that Smith County

did not directly solicit business from the Plaintiff in Idaho as was done in Southern Idaho.
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Plaintiff disagrees.

In Southern Idaho,

Cal-Cut argued that it did not maintain sales

offices or agents in the state, however it did advertise for the sale of goods by mail or
telephone and that such advertisements reached Idaho citizens.

It was admitted that

Deliveries were made in California as were the contracts of sale and that upon executing
an acceptance contract to Cal-cuts solicited unilateral offers, the buyer was responsible
for transporting the purchased steel pipe.

On June 23, 1973, Southern Idaho received in

the mail a publication advising that Cal-Cut wished to negotiate the sale of used steel
pipe. Several phone conversations ensued between the parties to negotiate terms.
offer was accepted by mail by Southern Idaho.

The

Southern Idaho enclosed a $20, 000

check along with its acceptance bid for 30,000 feet of steel.

(This transaction, like

plaintiffs herein, was a unilateral contract.). Southern Idaho took delivery of 12,937
feet of pipe in California between September 8, 1973 and October 5, 1973 with just over
17,000 feet still owing. Sometime in October, Cal-Cut refused to make any more pipe
available.
The Idaho Supreme Court opined that Cal-Cut's activities in the State of Idaho
constituted the "transaction of business" within the meaning of l.C. § 5-514(a).

Although

it was true that Cal-Cut did not operate a sales office and did not maintain sales agents in
Idaho, this fact did not prevent jurisdiction in Idaho under l.C. § 5-514(a) citing

Inter-

mountain Business Forms, Inc. v. Shepard Business Forms Co., 96 Idaho 538, 531 P.2d
1183 (1975). This Court has said in the past that by enacting the statute in question the
legislature intended to exercise all the jurisdiction available to the State of Idaho under the
due process clause of the United States Constitution.
America, supra, 93 Idaho at 30, 454 P.2d 63.

Doggett v. Electronics Corp. of

In modern times that jurisdiction has been

expanded to cover contacts with a state that fall far short of a physical presence citing
Fullmer v. Sloan's Sporting Goods, Co., 277 F.Supp. 995 (1967),

where a Defendant

advertised its products in a magazine of national circulation and sold its products to out-ofstate customers by mail order,

the Idaho federal court held that the defendant was

subject to the jurisdiction of Idaho because " the defendant was doing an act for the

purpose of realizing pecuniary benefit in the State of
Here,

Idaho'~

Cal-Cut sent advertising circulars to potential buyers notifying them of

the availability of steel pipe and announcing the terms of which they would sell.

Follow-

up communications were then made by telephone and mail to secure the transactions.

The fact that Southern Idaho received the steel pipe in California and opened their offers
in California were not dispositive.
Plaintiffs case is similar to Southern Idaho in that both cases involve unilateral

contracts.

(See pg 5 supra, provision 4 for rules on unilateral contracts. Also see

Evanston Insurance Company v. Westchester Surplus Lines Insurance Company;
Case No. 10-36133 (9th Cir. 10/03/2011).
Idaho Pipe,

5

the sellers imputed unilateral offers

In Plaintiffs case as in Southern
into Idaho by advertising means

that would have a tendency to reach forum residents.
acceptance

The buyers executed written

bids supported by monetary consideration in performance of the Seller's

unilateral offers.

The Sellers then realized substantial pecuniary benefits

from the

buyer's performances.
To avoid Southern Idaho's similarity to plaintiffs case, the Court inaccurately
asserted

that Smith County did not actively solicit business in Idaho because Smith

County's online advertisement did not allow viewers to consummate a transaction online.
The Court therefore summated that Smith County operated a passive website and their
online advertisements cannot hold Smith County liable to the jurisdictions of sister state
courts.

Finally,

this Court asserted without any any evidentiary support that Smith

5.
The 9th Circuit and Idaho both hold unilateral contracts subject to
enforcement. In Evanston Insurance Company, supra.the 9th circuit held that "A
unilateral contract exists when one party offers to do a certain thing in exchange for the
other's performance, and performance by the other party constitutes acceptance and
execution of the contract."
Here, the fax from Bellevue Master to Northwest on
February 22, 2001 was an offer: Northwest would be able to continue working as a
subcontractor at the construction project provided it complied with Bellevue Master's
insurance requirements. When Northwest contacted its insurance broker and
requested that the broker issue the insurance certificate to Bellevue Master, Northwest
accepted the unilateral contract, and a contract was thereby formed, executed and
subject to enforcement." Idaho also concurs that a unilateral contract will be formed and
executed when the offeree performs upon the terms of an offer in Shore v. Peterson,
204 P.3d 1114, 146 Idaho 903 (Idaho 2009) ("where the offeror makes a promise that
is conditional on the offeree"s acceptance, an offeree accepts by rendition of the
requested performance.")
citing CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 21 at 52 (1963)
( An offer for a unilateral contract calls for acceptance by rendition of the
requested performance.) J. CALAMARI and J.PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §
1-10 (1977). Deer Creek, Inc. v. Clarendon Hot Springs Ranch, Inc., 107 Idaho 286,
291, 688 P2d 1191, 1196 (Ct. App. 1984).
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County required interested parties to travel to Texas to purchase property.

(This later

factual conclusion is directly controverted by the bid instructions electronically available on
Smith County's website.).

To address this Courts legal conclusion,

it is necessary to

determine the legal parameters of a passive website. (See pgs 6-7 supra, provision no.
7 and footnote 6 infra for authorities addressing the definition of a passive vs interactive
website.)

6

CONDUCT A

In nearly every authority plaintiff examined,

PASSIVE

WEBSITE

WHERE

a person DOES NOT

THEY PROVIDE A

MEANS

TO

PURCHASE ITEMS OR SERVICES OVER THEIR WEBSITE.
Resorting back to exhibits "1" and "2" attached to Telford's affidavit in support
of this motion for reconsideration,

these evidentiary documents

establish that Smith

County did not operate a passive website sufficient to avoid jurisdiction in a sister state
court for any contractual or tort liability arising thereunder.
supra, paragraph 2 under plaintifs response:

First as stated on page 8

Smith County was engaging in private

functions when selling properties in Smith County.

Second in reviewing

exhibit "2"

attached to Telford's Affidavit, ' the struck off property website for Smith County Tax
Office' ,

this page directly represents that Smith County desires to sell struck off

properties to the public at large by stating verbatim: "The law further prohibits the sheriff
or constable from delivering a tax deed to any purchaser who fails to present to the

6. A website is not passive where it provides a means to purchase goods
or products or services. See Holland America Line Inc. v. Wartsila North America,
Inc., 485 F.3d 450 (9th Cir. 2007) ( Defining passive website as one that does not
provide any means for purchasing items or requesting services.) CompuServe, Inc. v.
Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996) (posting information over the internet for
purpose of selling products is not a passive website and meets the express aiming
requirement to impose jurisdiction where the sales have an impact.); Telco, 977 F.
Supp.at 406 ("because [defendants] conducted their advertising and soliciting over the
Internet, they subjected themselves to the jurisdiction of the buyers courts). Blacks law
definition: passive is "receiving or subjected to an action without responding or
initiating an action in return.
A judicial consensus has generally emerged that
personal jurisdiction exists when Internet activities involve the conduct of business
over the Internet, including substantial commercial interactivity that result in
obligations incurred by the buyer in buyer's jurisdiction. See id. At *5 (citing Zippo
Mfg. Co., 952 F. Supp. at 1125-26; Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp.
1328, 1333 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Gary Scott lnt'I, Inc. v. Baroudi, 981 F. Supp. 714,
716-17 (D. Mass. 1997); Superguide Corp. v. Kegan, 987 F. Supp. 481, 486-87 (W.D.
N.C. 1997); Thompson v. Handa-Lopez, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 738, 743-44 (W.D. Tex.
1998); Compuserve, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1264 (6th Cir. 1996)).
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officer... "

Any purchaser is not limited to the state of Texas.

A further reading of this

page shows that Smith County provided links for the potential purchaser which permitted
that purchaser to draw down the required Delinquent Tax Statement, the Bid instructions
(attached as exhibit "1" to Telford's affidavit), the Bid Sheet which is actually the Bid
contract, and the county clerks records to verify liens against the property.

A review of

the bid instructions found at exhibit "1" attached to Holli's affidavit, directs the potential
purchaser to (1) complete a Request for written statement regarding delinquent taxes, (2)
Notarize the statement,

(3) submit a copy of the statement with each sealed bid, (4)

attach your money order or letter of credit for the full amount of the bid, (5) sign the bid,
and (6) submit the bids either by mail or in person to Smith County Tax Office.
NOWHERE
PURCHASER

TO

IN

THESE DOCUMENTS

DOES

TRAVEL TO TEXAS TO PURCHASE

IT

REQUIRE

PROPERTY

THE

as this

court erroneously factually concluded on page 8 paragraph 2 of it's decision.
Based on the foregoing it is clear that Smith County was actively selling
properties on their website to any purchaser and likewise that Smith County provided
the means on their website to receive written acceptances to their bid offers, via mail to
their offices.

Furthermore as plaintiff has re-established in her supporting affidavit,

plaintiff DID NOT TRAVEL TO SMITH COUNTY TEXAS TO INITIATE, TRANSACT OR
CONSUMMATE HER PURCHASE. Lawsuit records in Oneida County, show that plaintiff
was in the state of Idaho during the time the property initially went up for sale on Smith
County's website, during the whole of the bid period and nearly 1Yi months after Plaintiff
was advised that she was the new owner of the struck off property.

(iii)

Akichika Is No Longer Good Law Under Blimka v. My
Web Wholesaler LLC, (Idaho 2008) In Light Of The "Effects
Tesr Promulgated By The US Supreme Court In Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc. And Calder v. Jones

This Court spends a considerable amount in it's decision asserting that Akichika
v. Kellerher, 96 Idaho 930, 539 P .2d 283 (1975)

controls plaintiff's case.

Plaintiff

disagrees that there are any similarities between Akichika and her case as the contract
at issue in Akichika was signed, consummated, paid for and negotiated in the state of
Oregon, the seller's domicile, where here, the contracts at issue were signed, executed,
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paid for,

negotiated,

consummated and performed upon from the state of Idaho,
Nevertheless, the Idaho Supreme Court in

plaintiffs domicile.

Wholesaler LLC, 152 P.3d 594, 143 Idaho 723 (Idaho 2008),

Blimka v. My Web

held that Akichika v.

Kellerher, 96 Idaho 930, 539 P .2d 283 (1975) was no longer good law because the U.S.
Supreme Court issued two decisions wherein it placed substantial emphasis on providing
a forum in a state where the victim suffers injury from tortious action directed toward a
resident of that state.

See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984) and

Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984 ).

In Akickika,

this Court held that the non-

resident defendant was not transacting business in Idaho when he sold a used truck to an
Idaho resident.

More specifically, the Idaho resident drove to Oregon, executed a

contract of purchase in Oregon, paid a deposit for the truck in Oregon and then drove the
truck from Oregon back to his home in Idaho whereupon the truck broke down.

The

Seller then appeared in Idaho to collect more money from the buyer or repossesss the
truck.

As applied to Akichika, the Idaho Supreme Court then held that because the

contract was executed, performed and consummated in Oregon, there was no actual
"contract contacts" which were directed into Idaho.
Blimka supra, presented two contacts analysis with Idaho, a doing business
analysis and a tort analysis.

The Idaho Supreme Court held that since the damages

under Blimka's tort claim of fraud - would be identical to the damages under Blimka's
contract claim,
Blimka's

the only contacts analysis needed to invoke jurisdiction in Idaho was

tortious injury claim.

The court therefore disregarded Blimka's "contract

contacts" argument of doing business in Idaho and sustained jurisdiction over Blimka's
case because the internet Seller committed fraud against Blimka, an Idaho resident.
Blimka supra has efectively mooted the application of Akichika v. Kellerher;
therefore this court errored in applying this case to prejudice plaintiffs access to an Idaho
Court.

Moreover,

this Court failed altogether to address the tortious injury prong in

creating jurisdiction over plaintiffs civil and criminal fraud claims in the state of Idaho
where plaintiff suffered insurmountable damages.

Ill.

This Court Has Wholly Avoided Any Purposeful Availment
Or Contacts Analysis Under Plaintiff's Tort Claims Sounding
In Civil And Criminal Fraud
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Plaintiffs Complaint and supplemental charges alleged various torts against the
defendants which injuries and damages were felt in the state of Idaho.

As an offer of

proof that plaintiff suffered injuries in the forum state of Idaho, plaintiff supplied this court
with numerous affidavits which pointed to various loan obligations plaintiff incurred as an
Idaho citizen in performance on two related unilateral contracts offered by Smith County
to sell a distressed land lot and a manufactured home to plaintiff - if plaintiff would
agree to pay the assessed market value of the land lot and a certain sum of money
for the manufactured home.

Plaintiff accepted these unilateral contract offers by Smith

County when she performed upon these offers by substantially obligating herself on
loans to

the tune of $65,000 as an Idaho resident.

(The lenders were also Idaho

residents or doing lending business in Idaho.).
The record shows that the defendants informed plaintiff by phone on April 4,
2011 that plaintiff was the new owner of the struck off property.

On April 8, 2011, the

defendants faxed plaintiff a letter informing plaintiff that she could now occupy and
improve the struck off property (in part by placing the manufactured home plaintiff had
simultaneously purchased from Smith County - onto the struck off property. ).

(See

exhibit "5" attached to Telford's July 18, 2011 affidavit for the April 8, 2011 faxed letter.).
Under this same faxed letter, the defendants admitted that they were expediting a draw
on plaintiffs letter of credit to pay for the struck off property.

(Smith County had already

taken a draw under the letter of credit in March of 2011 to pay the deposit purchase on
the manufactured home.

See exhibit "1" attached to plaintiffs Amended Opposition to

the defendant's motion to dismiss filed with the Court on September 1, 2011 for this "wired
fund transfer" in the amount of $4,214.77 to Smith County Attorney's offices - as partial
funding for the transactions at hand.)

By

May 5, 2011 when plaintiff placed the

manufactured home on the struck off property, the defendants had deceptively procured
plaintiff to obligate herself to the tune of $65,000 to improve the subject property - all the
while deliberately withholding their fraudulent intent to never turn over title to the struck
off property to plaintiff.

(The defendants did turn over title to the manufactured home as

"a carrot" to plaintiff that plaintiff could rely on Smith County's representations regarding
title to the struck off property.).

The defendants had actual personal knowledge that

plaintiff was substantially improving the property because the record shows that on May
6, 2011,

plaintiff emailed to Smith County tax official Lois Mosley,

at least 6 email

communications attaching digital pictures of her ongoing improvements to the struck off
property. (See exhibit "6" attached to Telford's July 18, 2011 Affidavit for these email
commnications.).
property,

Almost three weeks after Plaintiff had substantially improved the

Lois Mosley corruptly informed plaintiff that Smith County was revoking the

sale (on the fraudulent grounds that the prior owner had redeemed the property.).
Under Texas law,

a taxing unit cannot accept redemption funds once the

property has been resold to a bonafide purchaser (see Texas Property Tax code Sec.
34.23(b): the owner of... property sold for taxes to a taxing unit may not redeem the
property from the taxing unit after the property has been resold),

and any prior owner

attempting to redeem defaulted property must contact the purchaser and obtain an
accounting of the monies it would cost to redeem property within the redemption period.
(see Texas Propty Tax Code Sec. 34.21 (I): The owner of property who is entitled to
redeem the property under this section must request that the purchaser of the property,
provide that owner a written itemization of all amounts spent by the purchaser . . in costs
on the property ... within 180 days of losing the property to default. Sec. 34.23(b)). Here,
the struck off property had already been resold to plaintiff as acknowledged in Mosley's
April 8, 2011 faxed letter.

Accordingly,

the taxing unit had no right to redeem the

property to the original owners. Secondly, in the affidavits of Telford, Greer and Vogt,
filed into the court record on or about July 18, 2011, all of these persons attested that
while plaintiff was improving the property, the original owners repeatedly came onto the
property to inquire into plaintifs activites and were informed by plaintiff

that plaintiff

owned the property through a resale of the property to plaintiff by Smith County. At this
point in time, the original owners had direct contact with plaintiff and never once asserted
a redemption right nor submitted a written request to plaintiff to obtain an accounting of
the monies it would cost to redeem the property.

Finally, the original owners redemption

rights, if any were said to exist, expired on May 4, 2011 according to Mosley's letter. As
attested,

plaintiff never received any redemption petition from the original owners up

through the end of the day of May 4, 2011; irrespective that the owners had direct access
to plaintiff while plaintiff was on the property excavating same.
Based on the foregoing,

Smith County's basis for fraudulently depriving

plaintiff of the fruits of her bargains on the fraudulent and corrupt assertion that the
original owners had redeemed the struck off property, is an illegal and invalid defense
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under Idaho, Texas and Federal laws.

As such, the Smith County defendants and

their lawfirm have intentionally and purposely inflicted tortious injury upon plaintiff,

an

Idaho resident, within the state of Idaho and must be held to answer in an Idaho court of
law.
Moreover, when the contracting defendants defrauded plaintiff of the fruits
of her bargains and thus caused plaintiff to suffer substantial losses in the state of idaho
by and through depleting an Idaho resident's assets and causing an Idaho resident to
obligated to loans of upwards of $65,000, these defendants subjected themselves to the
jurisdiction of the state of Idaho where plaintiffs injuries were felt from the defendant's
fraud;

irrespective that the misrepresentations were made from the state of Texas.

7

During the whole of their contracting with plaintiff, the defendants knew that the brunt of
plaintiffs injuries would be felt in Idaho.

8

Because the record herein shows that plaintiff suffered substantial injuries in this
state as a result of the defendants civil and criminal fraud,

this court errored by mot

addressing the tortious injury prong in it's October 3, 2011 Decision for invoking
jurisdiction in the state of Idaho over plaintiffs primarily fraud based causes of actions.

7.
See Gates v. Collier, 378 F.2d 888 (9th Cir. 1967) (With respect to that
portion of Collier's claim which is based on fraud, § 377 of the Restatement recites that
the place of wrong is where the loss is
" When a person sustains loss by fraud,
sustained, not where fraudulent representations are made."); United States v. Pascucci,
943 F.2d 1032, 1035 (9th Cir. 1991) (Jurisdiction lies where the plaintiffs assets are
depleted through the wrongs commited by the defendant); Sinatra v. Nat'I Enquirer,
Inc., 854 F.2d 1191, 1195 (9th Cir. 1988 ) (exercising personal jurisdiction over a Swiss
Clinic that misappropriated Frank Sinatra's name through a series of advertisements
claiming recommendation by high profile California resident.); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
v. Neaves, 912 F.2d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 1990) (fraudulent letter sent to plaintiff in forum
state was express aiming).
8.
See Yahoo Inc v. La Ligue Contra Lw Raciseme Et L'Antisenitiseme, 433
F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006) (We hold jurisdiction proper in California from a letter sent to
Yahoo threatening financial penalties against Yahoo if Yahoo did not comply with a french
order to cease and desist certain internet activities engaged in France. Because the
impact of any financial penalties would be felt by Yahoo at her resident heaquarters in
Santa Clara, California,
we hold we have jurisdiction in Caifornia by applying the
"effects test" under Calder which focuses on the forum in which the defendant's actions
are felt, whether or not the actions themselves occurred within the forum. See
Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 803 (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984)).
We take this opportunity to clarify our law and to state that the "brunt" of the harm need

Ill.

The Court's Analysis Of Rule 4(i) Renders Superfluous Various
Parts Of That Rule
See State v. Yzaguirre, 163 P.3d 1183, 144 Idaho 471 (Idaho 05/25/2007) (In

determining its ordinary meaning "effect must be given to all the words of the statute if
possible, so that no word will be rendered void, superfluous, or redundant." State v.
Mercer, 143 Idaho 108, 109, 138 P.3d 308, 309 (2006) (quoting In re Winton Lumber
Company, 57 Idaho 131, 136, 63 P.2d 664, 666 (1936)).
At pages 4-6 of plaintiffs amended opposition, plaintiff made the following
argument

citing

Rhino Metals, Inc. v. Craft, 193 P.3d 866, 146 Idaho 319 (Idaho

09/24/2008 ) : "If a party wishes to insist upon the objection that he is not in court, he

not be suffered in the forum state. If a jurisdictionally sufficient amount of harm is
suffered in the forum state, it does not matter that even more harm might have been
suffered in another state. Calder stands for the proposition that purposeful availment is
satisfied even by a defendant "whose only 'contact' with the forum state is the 'purposeful
direction' of a foreign act having effect in the forum state." Also see Blimka v. My Web
Wholesaler LLC, 152 P.3d 594, 143 Idaho 723 (Idaho 2008) (Blimka argues that the
district court properly exercised personal jurisdiction over the defendants with respect to
the fraud claim pursuant to Idaho Code§ 5-514(b), and with respect to the contract claims
pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-514(a). Since we conclude that jurisdiction existed on the
fraud claim, both with respect to My Web and DePa/ma, and because the fraud claim
supports all relief granted in the judgment, we need not address the issue of jurisdiction
over the contract claims. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984)
and Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984). In this case, the allegedly fraudulent
representations were directed at an Idaho resident and the injury occurred in this state
when Blimka departed with funds as a result of the fraud. Plaintiff paid large sums of
money for defective goods that were mispresented to Blimka. Thus, we hold that
Blimka's allegation of fraud was sufficient to invoke the tortious acts language of Idaho
Code § 5-514(b) with respect to both defendants. Morover, because the defendants
purposefully directed their allegedly false representations into Idaho and the plaintif
suffered a pecuniary loss as a result of these false representations, the exercise of
personal jurisdiction is presumed not to offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice under the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Brainerd v. Governors of the
Univ. of Alberta, 873 F.2d 1257, 1260 (9th Cir. 1989). Idaho has an ever-increasing
interest in protecting its residents from fraud committed on them from afar by electronic
means.). Citing Calder et al v. Jones, 104 S. Ct. 1482, 465 U.S. 783 (1984) ("the fact
that the actions causing the effects in California were performed outside the State did not
prevent the State from asserting jurisdiction over a cause of action arising out of those
effects ... the brunt of the harm was suffered or is being suffered in the forum state,. ..
thereby invoking jurisdiction in the forum where the "effects" of the out of state conduct
is felt." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-298 (1980);
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws§ 37 (1971 ).

must keep out for all purposes except to make that objection." Pingree Cattle Loan Co. v.
Charles J. Webb & Co 36 Idaho 442, 446, 211 P. 556, 557 (1922) (quoting from Lowe v.
Stringham, 14 Wis. 222, 225 (1861)).

Rule 4 (i) provides in part that "If, after a motion

under Rule 12(b)(2), (4), or (5) is denied, the party pleads further and defends the action,
such further appearance and defense of the action will not constitute a voluntary
appearance under this rule. Here, the defendants would not be pleading further in the
action because they merged their rule 12(b)(6) petitions with their rule 12(b)(2),(4) and (5)
petitions and argued all petitions on their merits in thr first instance.
The defendants assert that another provision of rule 4(i) permits them to merge
all defenses in one motion and thereby not make a general appearance.

This issue

presented is whether this merger of motions is a grant to argue all of the defenses on
their merits at once in the jurisdictional motion, or merely a grant to preserve the other
defenses.

Plaintiff contends that it is meremy a grant to preserve other defenses

otherwise the defendants would render superfluous the other provision under rule 4(i) "If, after a motion under Rule 12(b)(2), (4), or (5) is denied, the party pleads further and
defends the action, such further appearance and defense of the action will not constitute a
voluntary appearance under this rule.
The Court has not addressed this conflict in the rule in his October 3, 2011
Decision presumably so that this question can be raised on appeal as a first impression
question and set stare decisis law for trial courts in the future.

CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, plaintiff asserts that her contracts and tort
claims are jurisdictional in the state of Idaho under the Doing Business prong and the
tortious injury prong of the Idaho Long Arm Statute. Furthermore, the record before this
court shows that the defendants purposefully availed themselves of
committing the tortious conduct of fraud
resident thereby

intentionally

in the state of Idaho and against an Idaho

subjecting them to jurisdiction in Idaho under the Due Process Clause

where plaintiff suffered the whole of her injuries and da

Dated: October 17, 2011

Certificate of Service
The undersigns that she served the foregoing document on the following parties
by fax and by email on October 18, 2011

Brian K. Julian
Stephen L Adams
250 S. Fifth St. Ste 700
Boise Idaho 83707
fax no. 208-344-5510

HOLLI TELFORD
AKA HOLLI LUNDAHL
10621 S. Old Hwy 191
Malad, Idaho 83252

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF ONEIDA

HOLLI TELFORD
Case No. CV 2011 - 00066
Plaintiff

vs.
SANDRA COPELAND, et al.

Defendants

Am~tJDe

r>

PLAINTIFPS OPPOSITION TO THE
DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS TO DISMISS
SUPPORTED BY:
(1) The Affidavit of Hom Telford
(2) The Affidavit of LA Greer
(3) The Affidavit of Sham Neilsen
(4) The Affidavit of Kim Vogt
(5) The Affidavit of S. Durfee
(6) Verified Response To Court Order
Dated August 18, 2011
CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

COMES NOW Holli Telford and timely files her OPPOSITION to the defendanfs
motions to dismiss within 7 days before the scheduled hearing date of September 7,
2011. ,

1. The Defendants contend that Rule 56 applies to lhe motions to dismiss.
Plaintiff disagrees. Rule 56 does not apply until after the Court has exercised his
discretion and decided that he is going to consider matters outside of the pleadings. See
In the adoption of John Doe v. Idaho Dept. of Health And Welfare, Docket no. 37936
(Idaho Supreme Court, 2011) (The Civil Rules provide that it matters outside the
pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court. a motion under 1.R.C.P.
12(b)(6) shall be treated as one for summary judgment l.R.C.P. 12(b). Glaze v.
Deffenbaugh, 144 Idaho 829, 831, 172 P.3d 1104, 1106 (2007}. Here, the Supreme
Court affirmed that it was within the courts disa"etion to consider or exdude affidavits,
and that if the affdavits were considered, then the judgment would be converted to a Rule
56 judgment Here, since the Defendanfs motions to dismiss were couched under Rule
12 of the Idaho Rules of CfvH Procedure and the court doesnt exercise his discretion to
convert the motions until the time of the hearing, then the time schedule set out in Rule
7(b)(3).(B) or (E) controls. These provisions read as follows:

HOLLI TELFORD
AKA HOLLI LUNDAHL
10621 S. Old Hwy 191
Malad, Idaho 83252

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF ONEIDA

HOLLI TELFORD
Case No. CV 2011 -- 00066
Plaintiff
vs.
SANDRA COPELAND, et al.
Defendants

AFFIDAVIT OF HOLLI TELFORD
supporting :
l.R.C.P RULE 11 (a)(2)(B) MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE
COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN FAVOR OF GARY
BARBER, TAB BEAL, LAW OFFICES
OF PURDUE, BRANDON, FELDER,
COLLINS & MOTT, AND SMITH COUNTY
REQUEST FOR RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATION
AFTER RECONSIDERATION OF THE
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ABOVE STATED
REQUEST FOR RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATION
OF THE RULE 68 SETTLEMENT JUDGMENT
BETWEEN LISA NIELSEN AND HOLLI TELFORD
REQUEST TO CERTIFY AS A FINAL
JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 54(b) THE
COURT'S ORDER DENYING DEFAULTS
AND DEFAULT JUDGMENTS AGAINST
THE REMAINDER DEFENDANT'S
BECAUSE PLAINTIFF SERVED THESE
THESE DEFENDANTS BY CERTIFIED
MAIL VERSUS PERSONAL SERVICE
UNDER IDAHO'S CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT'S SERVICE STATUTE
AS PERMITTED FOR TORTFEASORS
RESIDING OUT OF STATE
MOTION TO STAY THE TRIAL
PROCEEDINGS AS TO THE REMAINDER
DEFENDANTS UNTIL THE SUPREME
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HAS INTERPRETED IDAHO'S CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT'S SERVICE STATUTE
COMES

State of Utah
:ss
County of Box Elder

I, Holli Telford, being duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:

1.

I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth herein and do competently

attest thereto.
2.

The Court failed to liberally construe all facts and reasonable inferences

in my favor as required when considering a motion to dismiss, this court inserted facts
into it's Summary Judgment Decision which were neither in the record nor supported by
any of the evidence founded upon the record, and this court failed to conduct a contacts
analysis under my tort causes of action sounding in civil and criminal fraud.
3.

The Court's factual conclusions I executed , consummated and signed

the contracts to purchase the subject struck off property and the manufactured home
placed thereon - in Texas, are wholly incorrect, and I contend that these inaccurate
factual assertions tainted this Court's "purposeful availment analysis" as applied to my
contract claims under the "Doing business" prong under Idaho's Long Arm Statute and the
Due Process Clause.
4.

I saw the internet advertisment for the sale of the struck of property at

issue in these proceedings on Smith County's Website on March 1, 2011 when the
advertisement was posted for the first time by Smith County over their website. Attached
hereto as exhibit "1" is the Bid instruction sheet posted on Smith County's Website at
9:00 a.m. on March 1, 2011. In paragraph 12 it states the monthly deadline for
submission of bids on struck off properties is by noon of the last work day of each month.
I contend that this statement implies that Smith County posts a new struck off property list
at the beginning of each month on their website. Moreover I attest that I was monitoring
Smith County's struck off property list during the months of February, March and April of
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2011, and a new list was posted at the beginning of each month. I further attest that the
property I bid on was not posted on their website until March 1, 2011.
5.

Attached as exhibit "2" hereto, is a true copy of Smith County Tax

Assessor's Website as it existed on March 1, 2011.

As can be seen in this exhibit,

Smith County instructs "national buyers" accessing their website to draw down "the
request for written statement under Texas Tax Code section 34.015 regarding
delinquent taxes, to draw down the Bid Sheet form that Smith County requires Bids to be
submitted on, and to mail or personally deliver the executed Tax Delinquency Statement,
the sealed bid and supporting consideration (including a letter of credit) to the Smith
County County Tax Office.
6.

A further review of exhibit "1" attached which was the bid instructions

sheet Smith County directed me to draw down fom their website before executing my bid
in March of 2011, this document required that I pull down the Request for Written
Statement regarding Tax Delinquencies, that I have this document notarized and submit
this document to Smith County, along with my sealed bid, and my letter of credit. The
document further shows that bidding papers may be submitted by mail.
7.

In accordance with these instructions: (1) I did sign, execute and form

my written bid acceptance contracts for the at issue struck off property from my residence
in Malad, Idaho;

(2) I did obtain a letter of credit from my bank and incur an $18,000

personal loan to support that letter of credit which constituted my consideration for my
written bid acceptance contract,

(3) I did obligate myself to a personal loan specifically

for the transactions at hand and these loan obligations attach to collateral which attaches
to my residence in Malad Idaho, and (4) I did mail my bidding documents to the Smith
County Tax Office before the deadline date of the last business day of the month as
instructed in exhibit "1" attached.
8.

During the whole of the time that I was engaging in commercial activity

with Smith County I was aware that they were acting as private parties and that no
immunities were accorded these defendants for their commercial activities. See H.B.
2039 codified as Local Government Code §§271.151.160 no immunities for government
units engaging in contracts and other commercial functions.
9.

I did not travel to Smith County Texas on February 8, 2011 for the

purpose of bidding on the struck off property subject of this action. I was in Texas on
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another matter and while there I learned of Texas' property tax sales unique from other
states. I obtained this Statement which on its face shows that it is good for 90 days from
the date of purchase. See this Statement as exhibit "1 "attached to my affidavit filed on
July 18, 2011 to verify this expiration date .
as I personally

I was back in Idaho by February 14, 2011

filed an Ex-parte Motion To Apply Telford's Motion For Summary

Judgment On Ralston's First Amended Complaint To Ralston's Substituted Counterclaim Filed By Ralston On February 2, 2011, on February 14, 2011 in Oneida County
Idaho case no. 2010-185.
10.

My negotiations concerning the subject struck off property did not

commence until after March 1, 2011, when the property was first posted on Smith
County's website. On March 8, 2011, I verified during a phone call with Lois Mosley from
my home in Idaho the particulars concerning the property.

Filed under separate cover

as electronic exhibit "3" - is a phone recording from Lois Mosley to my Idaho address for
the purpose of negotiating matters concerning the subject struck off property. The call
was recorded because I was unavailable to answer my phone.
11.

In addition to calling me several times on April 4, 2011 to confirm

that I had won the bid, Smith County employee Lois Mosley also faxed me a letter
to initate the process of collecting the purchase fees under my letter of credit bearing my
Idaho address as the obligatory address securing collateral for my personal loan. This
letter was attached as exhibit "5" to my Affidavit filed on July 18, 2011 and I made
references to the letter in my July 18, 2011 Affdaivit @ Paragraph 11, p. 4 . In addition,
Lois Mosley confirmed in this faxed letter that : (1) my bid was conclusive and binding;
(2) Smith County was preparing the deed to convey the property to me; (3) no
redemption right existed on the property resold to me; and (4) I was permitted to occupy
the property and improve it.
12.

To substantiate Mosley's faxed letter, Smith County's lawfirm Linebarger,

Goggan, Blair and Sampson, on April 5, 2011 sent me an email notifying me that they
were preparing the deed and had sent me a letter confirming I was the new owner of the
subject real property so that I could obtain property insurance. This email was attached
as exhibit "4" to my July 18, 2011 affidavit and referred to in Paragraph 2, p.1 and
Paragraph 11, p. 4 of that Affidavit .
13.

On April 30, 2011, I traveled back to Texas to inspect the purchased

property.

Upon entering the property ... I was informed that the property address listed

on Smith County's website for the property I purchased was wrong. I advised Smith
County of the error and was subsequently directed to the property that Smith County had
sold to me. The Smith County Tax Assessor's Office modified the purchase price of the
property to the market value of the property, due to their self imposed error. I was told
that I could now improve the "correct property."
14.

I spent $5450 in excavating the struck off property of shubbery and trees

that infested the property. See exhibit "11" attached to my July 18, 2011 affidavit for proof
of these expenditures. I also moved a manufacutured home on the property and incurred
another loan obligation of $35,000 against title of the home to pay for the infrastructure
that supported utilities, water and waste faciilities to the manufactured home. The lender
on the home was an Idaho lender and again the obligatory address for the second loan in
the amount of $35,000 was my Idaho address. Moreover any suit against me for default
on the $35,000 lien would be required to be heard in Idaho under a forum clause that
attaches to that $35,000 mortgage.

Finally, I became obligated on the $18,000 letter of

credit which attached to the above stated personal loan.

All of these loans were

committed to fund the transactions at hand and to improve the subject struck off property.
These loans and expenditures total some $65,000 to date and represent actual injuries
inflicted upon me in the state of Idaho as a result of the fraud of the defendants.
15.

I was unable to fund these loan obligations because of an illegal search

and seizure conducted on my home on August 10, 2011 and which tainted what income I
earned as a tax representative for a small group of low income people. Consequently
my monetary obligations are now being funded by Ferron Stokes. For example, Ferron
Stokes paid off the delinquent property taxes due in Oneida County case no. 2011-CV-44
to the County Treasurer Diane Pett to save the Malad property from foreclosure; Ferron
Stokes purchased the $35,000 note held by S. Durfee on the Manufactured home placed
on the Texas property which was due to foreclose on October 15, 2011 (see affidavit of
S. Durfee filed into this court's record) and is holding Holli's payments due on this note
under a reverse mortgage theory - taking in payments as Holli can afford ; and Ferron
Stokes is paying Holli's $18,000 loan obligations to American First Bank which supported
Holli's letter of credit for the purchase of the subject struck off property now affixing
permanently thereto, the manufactured home bearing the $35,000 Idaho lien. Ferron

5

Stokes will be owed substantial premiums for his reverse mortgage and reverse note
liens, as soon as Idaho properly invokes jurisdiction over the torts at hand and allows a
jury to award me damages. Ferron Stokes is an Idaho business man. (See Idaho Well
Drillers license for Ferron Stokes as exhibit "4" attached hereto.
16. On June 1, 2011, Smith County informed me that they were revoking the
sale and that they had redeemed the property to the original owners. Smith County
lacked any authority at law to redeem the property to the former owner given statutes
presribing such acts as void. (See Texas Property Tax Code Sec.34.23(b): the
owner of... property sold for taxes to a taxing unit may not redeem the property from the
taxing unit after the property has been resold.). I contend that Smith County in fact
retained the property in their coffers so that they could resell the property to another
potential buyer at a significantly higher value given my substantial improvements to the
property. I am accusing Smith County of exerting unconsented control over my
properties by civil and criminal fraud and deception as proscribed under Idaho's
Consumer Protection Act, Idaho's Racketering act vis-a-vis Theft by unauthorized
transfer under l.C. 18-2403; Theft by false promise under l.C. 18-2403(d); Theft by
extortion under l.C. 18-2403(e); and common law and constructive fraud under Idaho law.
17.

In applying the law to the facts, this Court has mistated the facts

contained in the record in order to misapply various laws against me. In addition, this
court has based its decision to deny me jurisdiction in Idaho based on a case that was
effectively overruled by the Idaho Supreme Court in Blimka v. MyWeb Wholesale.
Because of the court's distortion of the facts, the court has wrongfully denied jurisdiction
over my case under the "Doing Business Prong" of Idaho's Long Arm Statute.

-
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18.

In addition, there is absolutely no analysis conducted by the court under

the "tortious injury" prong of Idaho's Long Arm Statute.

I attest that I suffered and

continue to suffer substantial damages in the state of Idaho from the defendants civil and
criminal fraud directed at me as an Idaho citizen and having serious effects in the state of
Idaho.
Further this affiant saith na

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this '18th day of October, 201 '1

?,

- .341-

Certificate of Service

The undersigns that she served the foregoing Affidavit of Telford supporting
Rule 11 motiion for reconsideration on the following parties by fax and by email on
October 18, 2011

Brian K. Julian
Stephen LAdams
250 S. Fifth St. Ste 700
Boise Idaho 83707
fax no. 208-344-5510

1
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SMITH COUNTY TAX OFFICE
SEALED BID INSTRUCTIONS
-YOU MUST SUBMIT A COMPLETED BID OR IT MAY BE DISQUALIFIED"**
1.

DO NOT disturb any occupants.

2.

DO NOT enter vacant structures.

3.

Read carefully the General Conditions for Bids.

4.

Complete the form titled Request For Written Statement Under Texas Tax Code §34.015 Regarding
Delinquent Taxes. On this form you are to list all properties owned by you in SMITH COUNTY or ANY CITY
or ANY SCHOOL DISTRICT that is located at least in part in Smith County.

5.

Have completed form notarized. Wait to sign this form before the notary so she/he may witness your
signature.

6. Submit notarized form with $10.00 to the Smith County Tax Office to request a written statement stating
whether there are any delinquent taxes owed by you to SMITH COUNTY or to ANY SCHOOL DISTRICT or
MUNICIPALITY having territory in Smith County.

7. Submit a copy of this statement from the Smith County Tax Office with each sealed bid.
8.

Attach your cashier's check, money order or letter of credit for the full amount of your bid.

9.

Sign the bid. AU bids must be signed by hand.

1G. Submit your bid for each property in separate sealed envelopes with the following typed on the exterior of
EACH envelope:
"SEALED BID ENCLOSED"
NAME
ADDRESS
TELEPHONE NUMBER
PROPERTY ACCOUNT NUMBER
CAUSE NUMBER

11. Submit your bid for each property to:
By Mail
Smith County Tax Offii:;e
P.O. Box 2011
Tyler, Texas 75710

In Person
Smith County Tax Office
Cotton Belt Building
1517 West Front
Tyler, Texas 75702

12. All bids must be received no later than 12:00 p.m. (noon) on the last work day of each month.
13. You need not be present at the bid opening.

ll 111
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Property Struck Off List

3 /1 I 2611

J
m
Tax Assessor

Struck Off Tax Sales

Property Taxes
Beginning with Texas tax sales conducted on or after October 7, 2003, purchasers at
foreclosure sale must present to the sheriff or constable conducting the sale a
written statement issued to the purchaser by the Smith County Tax AssessorCollector stating that the purchaser owes no delinquent property taxes to the county
and that there are no known or reported delinquent taxes owed by the purchaser to
any school district or city with territory in Smith County. The law furtl\er prohibits the
sheriff or constable from delivering a tax deed to any purchaser who fails to present
to the officer this required written statement Issued by the county tax assessorcollector. To obtain this needed statement, complete the following form and return to
the Smith County Tax Office. Remember to enclose the appropriate $10.00 fee or
your request will not be processed.

Property Tax
FAQs

a tax

Property Tax
Rates
Delinquent Tax
Sales
Struck Off Tax
Sales
Ve hide
Registration

\lirk h"te for the R"quest for Written Stat"ment Und"r Texas Tax Code § 34 01 5
Regarding Deljnquent wxes

Vehicle
Registration
FAQs

Click here for the Sealed Bid !nstr11rtlgo< and Bid Sheet.
(Note: Properties are subject to any and all Oty of Tyler and Smith County liens
recorded in the County Ci"r!s Records Troup properties are subject to Troup ISD
taxes.)

Related Links
Taxes Online

Inventory of Smith County Property Struck off Tax Sale

About Us

I

Directory

I

County News

I

Employee Connection (Employees Only)

I

Careers at Smith County

Smith County Texas Smith County Texas
i§ Copyright 2011 Smitll County • AH rights reserved
phone 1.903.590.2600 I email comments@smith-county.com

I

Other Links
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State of Idaho
Department of Water Resources

DRILLING COMPANY CERTIFICATE
This is to recognize that STOKES DRILLING, Dri16ng Company License
Number 660, has the following Licensed Driller in the ~s employ
authorized to supervise the driling and completion of eaeh well constructed by
the company named on this certificate:

FERRON STOKES, PRINCIPAL DRILLER
This certificate and the ~ng authorization card are for the licensing
period commencing Apri 1, 2010, and expiring on March 31, 2012.
This certifk:ate has been issued on
October 4, 2010

~~~~
Charles D. Galloway, P.E.
Chief, Resource Protection Bureau
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN Ai"l\1D FOR THE COUNTY OF Ol'ot1EIDA

**** ***
Register #CV-2011-66
HOLLI TELFORD,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
-vsSANDRA COPELAND, ET AL
Defendants,

ORDER

Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 6(e)(2), the Court advises the parties that the hearing scheduled on
November 21, 2012 will be argued without the submission of any evidence not previously
submitted in \\lriting. No live testimony will be permitted. This hearing is for argument only on
the matters raised by the VvTitten submissions of the parties, in compliance with the Idaho Rules
of Civil Procedure.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 8th day ofNovember, 2011.

STEPHENS. DlJNN
District Judge

ORDER
Holli Telford vs. Sandra Copeland, et al, CV-2011-66
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 8th day of November, 2011, I served a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing MINUTE ENTRY ANTI ORDER to the following person(s) in the
manner indicated below:
Holli Telford
10621 S. Old Hwy. 191
Malad, ID 83252

[x]
[]
[]
[]

U.S. Mail/Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

Stephen L. Adams
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP
P.O. Box 7426
Boise, ID 83707-7426

[x] U.S. Mail/Postage Prepaid

[ ] Hand Delivery
[] Overnight Mail
[ ] Facsimile

Deputy'crerk

ORDER
Holli Telford vs. Sandra Copeland, et al, CV-2011-66
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O'clock _,Q.M

Brian K. Julian, ISB No. 2360
Stephen L. Adams, ISB No. 7534
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP
C. W. Moore Plaza
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700
Post Office Box 7426
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
Telephone:
(208) 344-5800
Facsimile:
(208) 344-5510
E-Mail: bjulian@ajhlaw.com
sadams @ajhlaw.com
Attorneys for Defendants Tab Beall,
Law Offices of Perdue, Brandon, Fielder,
Collins and Mott, LLP, Smith County and
Tax Assessor, Gary Barber
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ONIEDA
HOLLI TELFORD assignee to M.D. Diet Trust,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV 2011-000066

vs.
SANDRA COPELAND; ADMITRA. MILLS;
JEANETTE HARMON; CODY KELLEY;
PAUL KELLEY JR; THE ESTATE OF PAUL
KELLEY SR; SMITH COUNTY TRUSTEE;
TAX ASSESSOR GARY BARBER; SMITH
COUNTY; ARTIE ROSS; ATTORN'EY TAB
BEAELL; LAW OFFICES OF PURDUE
BRADON, FELDER, COLLINS & MOTT;
LISA NEILSON, AND DOES 1 - 10,

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
AND REQUEST FOR 54(b)
CERTIFICATE, FILED OCTOBER 18,
2011

Defendants.

COME NO\V Defendants Tab Beall, Law Offices of Perdue, Brandon, Fielder, Collins &
Mott, Smith County, and Gary Barber (herein referred to as "Defendants"), and hereby submit
this objection to Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration and 54(b) Certificate, filed October 18,

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND REQUEST FOR
54(b) CERTIFICATE, FILED OCTOBER 18, 2011 - 1
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2011.

I.
INTRODUCTION
On October 3, 2011, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision granting various aspects
of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Motion to Quash, and Motion for Summary Judgment.

Memorandum Decision (Oct. 3, 2011), p. 1. In its ruling, the Court determined that the
Defendants did not act in any manner which subjected them to jurisdiction under the Idaho long

arm statute, and further found that even if the long arm statute was applicable, constitutional
considerations prevented the Idaho Courts from exercising jurisdiction over the Defendants. Id.,
pp. 10- 12. 1
On October 18, 2011, Plaintiff filed a motion on several issues (hereinafter referred to as
Plaintiff's "Motion for Reconsideration"), including requesting reconsideration of the Court's
October 3, 2011 Memorandum Decision, and requesting a 54(b) certificate related to
Defendants' dismissal. With regard to these issues, Defendants contend that because Plaintiff has
not presented any new evidence or recently decided caselaw to the Court, the Court has had a
chance to fully review the facts and applicable law and there is no basis for the Court to
reconsider its previous decision. With regard to the request for the 54(b) certificate, Defendants
contend that such certificate is not allowable under the circumstances. These issues will be
discussed in more detail below.
With regard to the remainder of the issues addressed in Plaintiff's Motion for
Reconsideration, such issues are either not addressed in her briefing, or are not related to

The Court did not rule on Defendants' other requested grounds for dismissal. However, the Court did rule
that Defendants' joinder of other defenses, such as lack of venue, did not constitute a general appearance as the
defenses were consolidated into one motion, as allowed by l.R.C.P. 4(i) and 12(g). Memorandum Decision (Oct. 3,
2011), pp. 12 - 13.

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND REQUEST FOR
54(b) CERTIFICATE, FILED OCTOBER 18, 2011 - 2
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Defendants. Specifically, the caption of Plaintiff's brief indicates that she is seeking 54(b)
certification related to the "rule 68 settlement judgment between Lisa Nielsen and Holli Telford."

Motion for Reconsideration, p. 1. Defendants are aware that Lisa Nielsen was named as a party
in this lawsuit, but are have never been informed that Ms. Nielsen appeared, nor are they aware
that Ms. Nielsen ever made a Rule 68 offer of judgment related to this lawsuit. Further,
Defendants could not find any portion of Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration addressing this
issue. In any case, as Defendants' counsel does not represent Ms. Nielsen, this issue will not be
addressed below.
Similarly, in the caption Plaintiff requested a 54(b) certificate relating to the July 18,
2011 Memorandum Decision denying default judgments against the non-appearing parties. As
stated above, Defendants' counsel does not represent these individuals, and there is no discussion
in Plaintiff's brief showing a compelling reason why such certification is needed. Plaintiff has
six months to properly serve the Complaints and Summonses from the date it was filed. l.R. C.P.
4(a). Such deadline runs on or around December 3, 2011 (six months from the date of the
Complaint filing on June 3, 2011), and so if Plaintiff fails to properly serve prior to that time, she
will have the opportunity to appeal the dismissal of her case after that. Therefore Defendants will
not address this issue below.
Finally, Plaintiff asks the Court to stay trial proceedings until the Supreme Court has
ruled on this issue. Once again, there is no discussion of reasons or citation of authority
supporting the request to stay the proceedings. In any case, there is no trial setting, service has
not yet been properly affected, and the Supreme Court has not taken up this issue on appeal.
Therefore, there is no reason for the Court to stay anything in t11is matter. This issue will not be
discussed in more detail below.

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND REQUEST FOR
54(b) CERTIFICATE, FILED OCTOBER 18, 2011 3
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II.
LEGAL ARGUMENT
A.

NO 54(b) CERTIFICATE SHOTJLD BE ISSUED IN THIS CASE BECAUSE NO
CLAIMS HAVE BEEN DISMISSED IN FlJLL, Ai~1) BECAUSE PLAINTIFF HAS
FAILED TO SHOW ANY COMPELLING NEED FOR A PARTIAL APPEAL.

With regard to Plaintiff's request for a 54(b) certificate regarding the Court's October 3,
2011 Memorandum Decision, Defendants contend that issuance of such certificate under the
circumstances would be inappropriate. Such certificates are not routinely issued, "and
certification should be granted only upon a showing of hardship, injustice or other compelling
reasons." Bowen v. Heth, 120 Idaho 452, 454 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991).
We have cautioned that I.R.C.P. 54(b) certification should not be granted
routinely, or as a matter of course; it should be reserved only for "the infrequent
harsh case." The party requesting certification must show that it will suffer some
hardship or injustice, or provide some other compelling reason why the
certification should be granted. Further, mere delay is not a hardship in and of
itself, because I.R.C.P. 54(b) contemplates that t..liere will normally be a delay in
cases involving multiple parties and motions.
Kolin v. St. Luke's Reg'l Med. Ctr., 130 Idaho 323, 328 (1997) (internal citations omitted). The

logic behind a rule 54(b) certificate is to "avoid an injustice which might result if an appeal were
delayed until final disposition of the entire case. Except where an injustice would result from
denial of an immediate appeal, Rule 54(b) was not intended to abrogate the general rule against
piecemeal appeals." Pichon v. L.J. Broekemeier, Inc., 99 Idaho 598, 602 (1978).
In this case, Plaintiff has failed to identify any compelling reason why a 54(b) certificate

should be issued by the Court. Plaintiff's affidavit (dated October 18, 2011), does not address
why a 54(b) certificate should be issued. The affidavit only addresses Plaintiff's concerns about
the Court's October 3, 2011 Memorandum Decision, and does not identify whether any injustice
would occur if the appeal were delayed until a fi.1.'1al judgment was issued in this matter.

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AA'D REQUEST FOR
54(b) CERTIFICATE, FILED OCTOBER 18, 2011 - 4
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Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden showing that a 54(b) certificate should be
issued.
In addition to this, Defendants contend that a 54(b) certificate is not allowed under the

plain language of the rule. The rule states:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action . . . or when
multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment
upon one or more but less than all of the claims or parties only upon an express
determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction
for the entry of the judgment.
l.R.C.P. 54(b). The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that "Idaho's version of Rule 54(b) was

different from the corresponding federal Rule 54(b). Idaho's rule permitted certification only
when there was more than one claim for relief and one or more but less than all of those claims
were disposed of against all parties against whom those claims were made." Pichon v. L.J.
Broekemeier, Inc., 99 Idaho 598, 601 (1978). \\There the ruling of the trial court left some aspects

of the claims outstanding against other parties, certification was not proper on those claims
against the dismissed parties. Id. In other words, the certification is only allowed when one claim
is dismissed against all parties, not when one party (or in this case, four of the defendants), have
all claims dismissed against them.
Plaintiff's Complaint has four causes of action, which are alleged generally, and therefore
it must be assumed that they are alleged against all of the named defendants. Because none of

those claims have been dismissed in their entirety, and because there is no compelling reason,
I.R. C.P. does not allow for a 54(b) certificate. Therefore, Defendants contend that Plaintiff's

request for a 54(b) certificate should be denied.
B.

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION SHOTJLD BE DENIED
BECAUSE THERE IS NO BASIS IN LAW OR FACT FOR THE COURT TO
RECONSIDER ITS PRE"VIOUS OPINION.

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND REQlTEST FOR
54(b) CERTIFICATE, FILED OCTOBER 18, 2011 - 5
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\\Then a party files a motion for reconsideration, there is no requirement that the party
provide the Court with either newly decided case law or new evidence. Johnson v. Lambros, 143
Idaho 468, 472

73 (Idaho Ct. App. 2006). However, a motion for reconsideration usually

includes new or additional facts. Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 118 Idaho 812,
823 (1990). The purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to allow the Court to "obtain a full
and complete presentation of all available facts, so that the truth may be ascertained, and justice
done, as nearly as may be." Id. Even though no new facts are required when filing a motion for
reconsideration, the burden is on the Plaintiff to bring to the Court's attention any new facts or
reasons why the Court's previous decision should be reconsidered. See Coeur d'A.lene Mining

Co. , 118 Idaho at 823 ("The burden is on the moving party to bring the trial court's attention to
the new facts. We will not require the trial court to search the record to determine if there is any
new information that might change the specification of facts deemed to be established.");

Johnson, 143 Idaho at 472 - 73 (absent new facts, the Court had no basis on which to grant a
motion for reconsideration) (citing Devil Creek Ranch. Inc. v. Cedar Mesa Reservoir & Canal

Co., 126 Idaho 202 (1994) and Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586 (2001)).
In this case, Plaintiff has failed to provide any new facts to the Court which it could

utilize to reconsider its prior ruling. As discussed above, Plaintiff's October 18, 2011 affidavit
contains no new facts which were not previously available to the Court in Plaintiff's prior
affidavits. 2 In fact, a majority of Plaintiff's affidavit is an extension of her Brief, in that it sets
forth her analysis of why the Court incorrectly determined there was no jurisdiction over the

Plaintiff does append new documents to her affidavit, but none of these documents are relevant to the
issues for reconsideration. Exhibit 1 is instructions for how to complete the sealed bid documents. Exhibit 2 is
allegedly a printout of Smith County's website. Exhibit 3 is allegedly a recorded telephone conversation with Lois
Moseley, who is not a party to this suit, and Exhibit 4 is a certificate for Ferron Stokes, who is also not a party to this
suit. None of these documents provide new or relevant evidence to whether there is jurisdiction over Defendants in
Idaho.

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND REQUEST FOR
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Defendants. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden to show that any new facts would
support a reconsideration of the Court's prior ruling.
The only reason, then, for the Court to reconsider this matter would be if the Court
misapplied the law to the facts as presented. Johnson, 143 Idaho at 473 (errors of law may be
basis for reconsideration). Defendants contend that the Court properly determined that no
jurisdiction exists over Defendants, and that Plaintiff has failed to show that the Court made an
error of law. Even utilizing Plaintiff theory of law regarding formation of contracts and such, see

Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 4 - 12, Plaintiff puts forth no evidence or legal reason to support
her claim that any contract was formed in Idaho. Therefore, the Court did not improperly
determine that the long arm statute did not create jurisdiction over the Defendants in Idaho.
Further, Plaintiff relies on both W States Equip. Co. v. Am. Amex, 125 Idaho 155 (1994)
and Southern Idaho Pipe & Steel Co. v. Cal-Cut Pipe & Suvplv, 98 Idaho 495 (1977) to support
her conclusion that jurisdiction is appropriate. However, Plaintiff ignores the fact that in both of
those cases, the out-of-state entities initiated the relevantcontact with the in-state entities, seeking
to form a business relationship. W States Equip. Co., 125 Idaho at 156; Southern Idaho Pipe &

Steel Co., 98 Idaho at 496. In this case, the opposite occurred. Plaintiff sought out Defendants in
Texas, and then initiated contact with them. Thus, the rulings in those cases do not provide any
support for Plaintiff's request for reconsideration.
Plaintiff also attempts to allege that the Idaho Supreme Court has overturned Akichika v.

Kelleher, 96 Idaho 930 (1975) in Blimka v. My Web Vlholesaler. LLC., 143 Idaho 723, 727
(2007). Motion for Reconsideration, p. 19. This is incorrect. In Blimka, the Idaho Supreme Court
distinguished Akichika, but did not overturn it. Blimka, 143 Idaho at 727. Therefore, the Akichika
analysis and holding is still valid law in Idaho, and there was no error in the Court relying on it

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND REQUEST FOR
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as valid caselaw.
Finally, Plaintiff contends that the Court should reconsider its ruling as to whether
Defendants properly made a special appearance. Plaintiff relies on Rhino Metals, Inc. v. Craft,
146 Idaho 319, 320 (2008) for support of this proposition. However, Rhino Metals. Inc. was cited
by the parties at the hearing on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, and Plaintiff does not
satisfactorily show that the Court misconstrued its language. VVhile Rhino Metals, Inc. does state
that "If a party wishes to insist upon the objection that he is not in court, he must keep out for all
purposes except to make that objection," it also contains the following language:
Rule 4(i) further provides that the voluntary appearance or service of any pleading
by a party constitutes voluntary submission to the personal jurisdiction of the
court "except as provided herein." It then lists three exceptions. First, filing a
motion under Rule 12(b)(2), (4), or (5) does not constitute a voluntary
appearance. Second, filing a motion asserting any other defense does not
constitute a voluntary appearance if it is joined with a motion under Rule
12(b)(2), (4), or (5). Finally, filing a pleading and defending the lawsuit does not
constitute a voluntary appearance if it is done after the trial court has denied the
party's motion under Rule 12(b)(2), (4), or (5).
Rhino Metals, Inc., 146 Idaho at 322 (quoting Engleman v. Milanez, 137 Idaho 83, 85 (2002)).

Defendants' actions in this case fall precisely within the second exception: all of Defendants'
other affirmative defenses were joined with Defendant's Rule 12(b)(2) motion. Therefore,
Plaintiff can only arrive at her conclusion that a general appearance occurred by ignoring the
plain language of I.R.C.P. 4(i) and 12(g) and the remainder of the language of the Rhino Metals.
Inc. case on which she relies.

Based on the foregoing, Defendants contend that Plaintiff has not satisfactorily met her
burden to show that there is a basis for the Court to reconsider its prior decision.
III.
CONCLUSION

RESPONSE TO PLAL~TIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERi\TION AND REQUEST FOR
54(b) CERTIFICATE, FILED OCTOBER 18, 2011 - 8
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Based on the foregoing, Defendants request that the Court deny Plaintiff's petition for
reconsideration, and further deny Plaintiff's petition to issue a 54(b) certificate.
DATED this

day of November, 2011.
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP
~
.
Cr/ _ _ __
_./___;;'Yi,_ _
_
"-_,
B y_ _ _ _ _ /~JV",
Brian K. Julian, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendants Tab Beall, Law
Offices of Perdue, Brandon, Fielder, Collins
and Mott, LLP, Smith County Texas, and
Gary Barber
·~

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _lI_ day of November, 2011, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION Al\TD REQUEST FOR 54(b) CERTIFICATE, FILED OCTOBER 18,
2011 by delivering the same to each of the following attorneys of record, by the method
indicated below, addressed as follows:
Holli Telford
Assignee to M.D. Diet Trust
106212 S. Old Hwy 191
Malad City, Idaho 83252

[ x]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ x]

Pro Se Plaintiff

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
E-mail

.

I

Brian K. Julian

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION A1\1D REQUEST FOR
54(b) CERTIFICATE, FILED OCTOBER 18, 2011 - 9
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HOLLI TELFORD

10621 S. Old HVl'Y 191
Malad, Idaho 83252

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF ONEIDA

HOLLI TELFORD
Case No. CV 2011 -- 00066

Plaintiff

AFFIDAVIT OF LISA NIELSEN

vs.

CONFIRMING RULE 68 SETTLEMENT
JUDGMENT

SANDRA COPELAND, et al
Defendants

STATE OF UTAH
: SS

County of
I, Lisa Nielsen, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:

1.

I have personal knowledge of the facts of herein and do competently attest

2.

I entered into a Rule 68 settlement contract regarding Texas properties

thereto.
that I defaulted on. Holli Telford was the substitute trustee for the lender that

mortgaged one of the properties.

She agreed to forego foredosure proceedings

associated.with the defaulted Texas property if l sent Texas recording official Ann
Carraway Bruce a conveyance instrument which transferred title in the property to Jim
Keddington. My voluntary conveyance avoided costly foreclosure fees which I would

have been otherwise Hable for_
3.

I contacted Jim Keddington to notify him that Texas recording official Ann

Bruce was supposed to be sending him a letter confirming that the property had been
transferred to him after recording my voluntary conveyance deed. Mr. Keddington gave
me attached exhibit "1 ", an email communication from Ms. Bruce verifying that she had
sent a letter to Jim_

Jim later called me to complain that he had received no such letter

from Ms. Bruce.

fc
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4.

I subsequently called Ms. Bruce to inquire into the conveyance matters that

were supposed to be confirmed by her in an offidal letter. Ms. Bruce informed me that
she had sent my quitclaim deed to the County clerk for recording and that the Clerk
refused to record my document unless I made a personal visit to the recording office.

could not as I was in Utah at the time addressing serious financial difficulties with my
office supply business.

5.

Holli expedited the foreclosure process by executing a foreclosure deed on

December 28, 2010 to Jim Keddington. Again, the clerk refused to record Holli's ·

foreclosure deed because I had not personally appeared before the clerk to file a quitclaim
deed. As a result Holli and Jim have suffered subtantial losses as well as myself.
6.

Holli and I agreed that Hom would sue me in the present proceedings and

only seek statutory damages of $1 ,000 for the failed conveyance m?tters - if I would
assign all of my causes of actions arising out of the Texas land transactions to Jim
Keddington. I did so assign my rights over to Jim Keddington.

7.

As promised, Holli and I entered into a Rule 68 settlement judgment where I

agreed to pay Holli $1,000 plus $88 in filing and service fees and I further agreed that I no
longer had any rights, titles or interests in the Texas land transactions.
8.

This settlement agreement has already been performed upon by me and is a

judicially closed matter. Accordingly, I seek a final judgment from this court dismissing
all of plaintiffs claims against me with prejudice as settled.

r your affiant saith naught,

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO B~FORE ME THIS _i1_ DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2011

CQs.Ll~"i
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conveyed in fee simple Thank-you.
fQuoled text hidden]

Bruce, Margaret <margaret.bruce@daHascityhall.com>
To: james keddington <jimkeddington@gmail.com>

We sent a letter to the address specified ,

Ann Carraway Bruce
Sr. Real Estate Specialist
320 E. Jefferson, Room 203
Dallas, TX 75203
214-948-4103
214-948-4083 (fax)

marnaret. bruce@dallascitvhall .com
wtfW. pat. da llascitv ha II. corn

from: james keddington [mailto:iimkeddington@amail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, November 16, 2010 2:49 PM
To: Bruce, Margaret
subject: Re: FW: Scan from a Xerox WorkCentre Pro
[Quoted text hidden]
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